Titus Stahl

Recognition is one of the most debated concepts in contemporary social and political thought. Its proponents, such as Axel Honneth, hold that to be recognized by others is a basic human need that is central to forming an identity, and the denial of recognition deprives individuals and communities of something essential for their flourishing. Yet critics including Judith Butler have questioned whether recognition is implicated in structures of domination, arguing that the desire to be recognized can motivative individuals to accept their assigned place in the social order by conforming to oppressive norms or obeying repressive institutions. Is there a way to break this impasse? Recognition and Ambivalence brings together leading scholars in social and political philosophy to develop new perspectives on recognition and its role in social life. It begins with a debate between Honneth and Butler, the first sustained engagement between these two major thinkers on this subject. Contributions from both proponents and critics of theories of recognition further reflect upon and clarify the problems and challenges involved in theorizing the concept and its normative desirability. Together, they explore different routes toward a critical theory of recognition, departing from wholly positive or negative views to ask whether it is an essentially ambivalent phenomenon. Featuring original, systematic work in the philosophy of recognition, this book also provides a useful orientation to the key debates on this important topic.

ABSTRACT Critical theories often express scepticism towards the idea that social critique should draw on general normative principles, seeing such principles as bound to dominant conceptual frameworks. However, even the models of immanent critique developed in the Frankfurt School tradition seem to privilege principles over particular moral experiences. Discussing the place that particular moral experience has in the models of Honneth, Ferrara and Adorno, the article argues that experience can play an important negative role even for a critical theory that is committed to the necessity of conceptual mediation, as moral experiences can undermine our confidence in the appropriateness of our moral concepts. Building on McDowell’s account of moral perception and Brandom’s interpretation of Hegel’s theory of experience, one can reconstruct Adorno as providing a “radically negativist” approach to immanent critique that takes particular moral experience seriously.

That we can hope is one of the capacities that define us as human beings. To hope means not just to have beliefs about what will happen, but to imagine the future as potentially fulfilling some of our most important wishes. It is therefore not surprising that hope has received attention by philosophers, psychologists and by religious thinkers throughout the ages. The contributions in this volume, written by leading scholars in the philosophy of hope, gives a systematic overview over the philosophical history of hope, about contemporary debates and about the role of hope in our collective life.

The link between the right to privacy and the right to democratic self-determination is often understood to imply that privacy rights have only instrumental value for democratic participation, and that they consist solely in the possibility to retreat from participation in a public. I examine three arguments for an internal link between both sets of rights: The right to privacy protects political public spheres from epistemic inequality, it protects groups in public from a loss of their deliberative autonomy and it blocks the colonisation of deliberative publics by strategic action orientations. These arguments suggest a genuine political purpose of the right to privacy.

Theories of ideology explain the stability of unjust social institutions by reference to the ways in which social power undermines the epistemic agency of those subordinated by them. The historically dominant model of ideology understands it as ‘false consciousness’, that is, as a set of socially distorted beliefs. The false consciousness model of ideology is, however, unsatisfactory in various respects. I argue that this, in part, explains why theorists have more recently turned to a competing model that understands the epistemic constraints caused by relations of social power in terms of hermeneutical injustices. While Fricker’s theory of hermeneutical injustice avoids some implausible assumptions of false consciousness theories, it lacks, however, a plausible account of how social power can distort hermeneutical resources. I argue that there is a competing model of ideology in the Marxist tradition, according to which ideologies arise from distortions of concepts that are internal to social practices; this model takes up the insights from theories of hermeneutical injustices, and supplements them with a convincing ‘materialist’ explanation of how power, practices, and discourse are linked.

The tradition of critical theory, broadly conceived, is skeptical towards the project of ideal theory on the basis of two specific arguments developed in that tradition. One argument questions whether we are epistemically capable of conceptualizing an ideal society, whereas another argument questions whether any “ideal” can be determined by reference to norms the intelligibility and justification of which remains unchanged throughout processes of social transformation. The author argues that the epistemic argument does not rule out the possibility that idealizations could theoretically serve a valuable function, and that it also leaves room for standpoint-theoretic optimism regarding ideals that emerge from the collective practices of subordinated groups. By contrast, the second “immanent critique” argument more fundamentally undermines the idea that there could be a final conception of an ideal society. This argument only leaves room for idealizations as revisable, transient reference points for political practice.

In Morality and Socially Constructed Norms, Laura Valentini argues that moral obligations to respect social norms can be explained without invoking the concept of ‘joint commitment.’ Her resulting account is, in one important sense, individualistic, and therefore struggles to account for widely held intuitions about the normative significance of social norms. I argue that we can rescue the notion of joint commitment from Valentini’s objections, and incorporate it into a version of her account that preserves its insights.

The hope for a better future can, and frequently does, motivate political action. Political hope is therefore often considered a positive force. However, not all forms of political hope are beneficial. Some scholars and activists claim that some kinds of hope also function as an ideology. I argue that we can give a precise meaning to the notion of ‘ideological hope,’ and I argue that to say of a given instance of hope that it is ‘ideological’ means more than that it is irrational or immoral. I distinguish two forms of ideological hope: forms where the ideological nature of hope derives from underlying ideological beliefs and judgments, and structural forms. The case of structurally ideological hope shows that even the rational hopes of political agents can undermine their purposes by binding them to distorted political self-understandings.

Rahel Jaeggi argues that forms of life ought to be the main reference point for a critical theory of society because the internal normative structure of life forms allows for immanent critique. In this article, I extend her model by systematically considering the possibility of oppressive forms of life. Oppressive forms of life are clusters of practices in which subordinated groups are systematically excluded or disabled from participating in the social processes of interpretation through which the values and purposes of those very practices are determined. The possibility of oppressive forms of life poses a challenge to the method of immanent critique because it seems that any such critique must rely on immanent norms that are at least partly constituted by interpretations and that can therefore be distorted by oppression. I argue that Jaeggi’s model of immanent critique can be extended to respond to that challenge, either by recovering a constitutive form of freedom within all forms of life or by consciously adopting a partisan stance in favour of oppressed and marginalised self-understandings.

Lukács is widely recognized as being the first critical theorist to have explicitly developed the idea of a “standpoint theory”. According to such a theory, members of oppressed groups enjoy an epistemic privilege regarding the nature of their oppression. However, there is no agreement regarding what precise argument Lukács offers for his claims regarding the alleged epistemic privilege of the working class. Additionally, it remains unclear whether later feminist standpoint theories share any continuity with Lukács’s argument. In this analysis, I identify four arguments for the epistemic privilege of oppressed groups that could be attributed to Lukács. I argue that, although Lukács does not consistently endorse any specific argument, the most promising interpretation suggests that epistemic privilege arises from a contradiction between the norms that guide the self-understanding of such groups and the effects of the social practices they are socially obligated to engage in.

Theories of recognition often acknowledge that some forms of recognition can be ideological. Only recently have authors also begun to ask whether all ideological phenomena involve a more basic form of misrecognition of epistemic agents. I argue that an expressivist reconstruction of the Marxian theory of ideology can help us to understand what forms of misrecognition are involved in ideology. According to this understanding, ideological discourses reflect the rules of hierarchical social practices and impose limits on the capacity of subjects to challenge dominant conceptual distinctions. While rational epistemic subjects will tend to experience such limits as misrecognition, this does not require any negative interpersonal attitudes on the part of others. Therefore, at least some forms of ideology involve primarily structural, rather than interpersonal, misrecognition. I argue that ideologies that persist without involving widespread false beliefs can best be understood in this way and that neoliberalism is a paradigmatic example of such an ideology.

Substantively revised entry, 2023. Georg (György) Lukács (1885–1971) was a literary theorist and philosopher who is widely viewed as one of the founders of “Western Marxism” and as a forerunner of 20th-century critical theory. Lukács is best known for his Theory of the Novel (1916) and History and Class Consciousness (1923). In History and Class Consciousness, he laid out a wide-ranging critique of the phenomenon of “reification” in capitalism and formulated a vision of Marxism as a self-conscious transformation of society. This text became a reference point both for critical social theory and for many currents of countercultural thought. Even though his later work did not capture the imagination of the intellectual public to the same extent as his earlier writings, Lukács remained a prolific writer and an influential theorist in his later career and published hundreds of articles on literary theory and aesthetics, not to mention numerous books, including two massive works on aesthetics and ontology. He was also active as a politician in Hungary in both the revolution of 1919 and during the events of 1956. Today, his work remains of philosophical interest not only because it contains the promise of an undogmatic, non-reductionist reformulation of Marxism, but also because it combines a philosophical approach that draws on Neo-Kantianism, Hegel, and Marx with an acute cultural sensitivity and a powerful critique of modern life inspired by Weber’s and Simmel’s sociological analyses of modern rationalization.

It is sometimes argued that ideal theories in political philosophy are a form of ideology. This article examines arguments building on the work of Charles Mills and Raymond Geuss for the claim that ideal theories are cognitively distorting belief systems that have the effect of stabilizing unjust social arrangements. I argue that Mills and Geuss neither succeed in establishing that the content of ideal theories is necessarily cognitively defective in the way characteristic for ideologies, nor can they make plausible which mechanisms ensure the alleged negative effects of the widespread acceptance of ideal theorizing. This does not mean that all hope is lost for the ideology objection, however. By turning to a second Marxian model of ideology, I argue that the ideological character of ideal theories is not so much a matter of their content, but rather of their form. Ideal theories falsely present the normative concepts that they use as semantically practice-independent and thereby block potential challenges from subordinate groups to dominant ideologies. It is therefore not the normative content of ideal theories which proves to be objectionable, but the particular role their concepts play in wider political discourse.

There are few aphorisms in Minima Moralia that display a less sympathetic attitude towards their subject than “They, the people”(§ 7). Adorno denounces the “amor intellectualis for [the] kitchen personnel” in the subsequent aphorism, but “They, the people” already seems to confirm all suspicions about the alleged elitism of critical theory. The idea that intellectuals mostly encounter those less educated when “illiterates come to intellectuals wanting letters written for them” is laughable, even for the 1950s, and the claim that, among the “underdogs”,“envy and spite surpass anything seen among literati or musical directors”(ibid.) oozes with contempt, no matter how much Adorno insists that these alleged character deficits result from the social structures in which uneducated, working class people find themselves. Yet the point of Adorno’s remarks is not to disprove a deferential form of a Lukácsian “standpoint theory …

The claim that recognition is ambivalent is best understood as meaning that social recognition is both a precondition for individual freedom and a source of freedom-undermining domination.1 The first part of the claim entails that we can only be truly autonomous or realize ourselves once we receive a certain kind of recognition from other people. The second part of the claim — at least on what I view as the dominant reading — entails that recognition (necessarily or at least potentially) constrains our freedom as we need to seek recognition not on our terms but on those of others. Recognition can therefore also be a source of domination. As I will argue, there are multiple versions of the ambivalence claim. A simple version of that claim merely holds that subjects need recognition but that such recognition is only available on terms defined by others and that the domination that this implies undermines the freedom that recognition is to secure. As I will show, this simple claim is not enough to make the case for a thoroughgoing ambivalence, as the Hegelian tradition can respond to it by means of a theory of immanent critique of forms of life. The resulting idea of ambivalence is not pernicious but rather an acknowledgment that recognition and freedom are linked by a process which is more complex than one might initially assume. There are also more nuanced and more threatening versions of the ambivalence claim, however. In particular, in the work of Louis Althusser and Judith Butler we find resources for thinking about the link between recognition and domination in a way that preempts the immanent critique response. These radical versions of the ambivalence claim point towards a specific form of domination — which I will term “constitutive domination” — and thereby pose a genuine challenge to the Hegelian tradition. However, I will argue that the Hegelian model of emancipation, once it is suitably extended, can acknowledge the power of these arguments.

Recognition is one of the most debated concepts in contemporary social and political thought. Its proponents, such as Axel Honneth, hold that to be recognized by others is a basic human need that is central to forming an identity, and the denial of recognition deprives individuals and communities of something essential for their flourishing. Yet critics including Judith Butler have questioned whether recognition is implicated in structures of domination, arguing that the desire to be recognized can motivative individuals to accept their assigned place in the social order by conforming to oppressive norms or obeying repressive institutions. Is there a way to break this impasse? Recognition and Ambivalence brings together leading scholars in social and political philosophy to develop new perspectives on recognition and its role in social life. It begins with a debate between Honneth and Butler, the first sustained engagement between these two major thinkers on this subject. Contributions from both proponents and critics of theories of recognition further reflect upon and clarify the problems and challenges involved in theorizing the concept and its normative desirability. Together, they explore different routes toward a critical theory of recognition, departing from wholly positive or negative views to ask whether it is an essentially ambivalent phenomenon. Featuring original, systematic work in the philosophy of recognition, this book also provides a useful orientation to the key debates on this important topic.

Traditional arguments for privacy in public suggest that intentionally public activities, such as political speech, do not deserve privacy protection. In this article, I develop a new argument for the view that surveillance of intentionally public activities should be limited to protect the specific good that this context provides, namely democratic legitimacy. Combining insights from Helen Nissenbaum’s contextualism and Jürgen Habermas’s theory of the public sphere, I argue that strategic surveillance of the public sphere can undermine the capacity of citizens to freely deliberate in public and therefore conflicts with democratic self-determination.