S. Matthew Liao

It is quite likely that parents will soon be able to use genetic engineering to select the sex of their child by directly manipulating the sex of an embryo. Some might think that this method would be a more ethical method of sex selection than present technologies such as preimplantation genetic diagnosis because, unlike PGD, it does not need to create and destroy “wrong gendered” embryos. This paper argues that those who object to present technologies on the grounds that the embryo is a person are unlikely to be persuaded by this proposal, though for different reasons.

The concept of right or fit is an important element entailed, but not fully articulated, in the concept of action or practice in Aristotle's theory of virtue; which, however, turns to be of the utmost importance in later Western ethics. Right is concerned with both feelings and actions, and is not the same for all individuals. It lies in between the two extremes of the spectrum of practical affairs, yet by no means equidistant from them. This account of the concept of fitness or right is derived from the categories of quantity, relationship, and quality rather than from that of substance. Thus, it seems that virtue is relative to vice or error within a continuous existence. If, however, the right of passion and action is environmental and concrete, is it multiple and not singular? To this question, Aristotle gives his reply on two levels: On the level of concrete practitioners, what is right and fit to one man might not be so to another man, and hence the right of practice is not singular but multiple; whereas on the level concerned with the only right choice compared with the two extremes or errors, the right of practice will always be singular. /// "正确"是隐含于亚里士多德的德性学说中的一个重要而未充分展开的，在 后来的西方伦理学中却变成极为重要的关于行为或实践的概念。"正确"与感情和 行为都相关。"正确"并不是对所有人同样的。它是两端间的那个中间，但井不始 终与两端距离相等。对适度或正确的这种说明基本上是从数量、关系与性质范畴引 出，而不是从实体范畴引出的述说。所以，德性似乎始终是在一种有连续性的存在 中相对于恶或错误而言的。感情与行为的正确如果是环境的、具体的，它是否是多 而不是一?亚里士多德在两个层面上回答这个问题。在相对于具体实践者的层面， 对我而言的适度或正确很可能不同于对你而言的，实践的正确不是一而是多:在相 对于两端或错误唯有一个正确的选择而言，实践的正确始终只是一。.

Philosophers today are inclined to propose virtues are either something subjective or something universal. However, Confucius and Aristotle, who made the most profound investigations into virtues, did not develop such theses. The deep-seated reason lies in their belief that there is always a possibility for a human being to become a man of practice, which cancels the need of proposing subjectivity thesis. The reason for their not raising the universality thesis of virtues is that they do not think that virtues are directly universal to all contemporarily existing minds. Rather, in their view, virtues involve a possible universality that may present in a virtuous mind. We can summarize Aristotle’s view into the concept of possible universality of virtue understood in terms of the perfect state of mind, since he explains the perfect state of mind in terms of perfect state of activity, and makes his investigations with an eye to the interactions between people with similar states of virtues. The view of Confucius can be summarized into the concept of possible universality of virtue understood in terms of the history of mind, since his investigations are made from the point of view of the states of mind reached through virtuous practices, i.e., a historical process of human life in which one’s pre-dispositions and feelings gradually reach some state of natural harmony and gains continual enrichment, and with an eye to the interactions between virtuous people and common people. From that similarly expressed view we can reasonably infer that virtues do possess the character called by today’s philosophers as universality, but it is a possible universality whose possibility is based on practice and on the development of virtuous minds.

The concept of right or fit is an important element entailed, but not fully articulated, in the concept of action or practice in Aristotle’s theory of virtue; which, however, turns to be of the utmost importance in later Western ethics. Right is concerned with both feelings and actions, and is not the same for all individuals. It lies in between the two extremes of the spectrum of practical affairs, yet by no means equidistant from them. This account of the concept of fitness or right is derived from the categories of quantity, relationship, and quality rather than from that of substance. Thus, it seems that virtue is relative to vice or error within a continuous existence. If, however, the right of passion and action is environmental and concrete, is it multiple and not singular? To this question, Aristotle gives his reply on two levels: On the level of concrete practitioners, what is right and fit to one man might not be so to another man, and hence the right of practice is not singular but multiple; whereas on the level concerned with the only right choice compared with the two extremes or errors, the right of practice will always be singular.

This chapter first considers how the right to be loved should be prioritized. It argues that even if children’s being loved is not as urgent as, for instance, being fed, it is still very urgent; that governments do not give absolute priority to whatever is most necessary for action; and that to develop institutional arrangements that can adequately provide for children’s various fundamental conditions, it is important to take into account all of their fundamental conditions, including their need for love. This chapter then draws the book to a close by pointing out that the proclamation that children have a right to be loved is not merely empty rhetoric and that in fact this right can be justified in the same way as other rights.

This chapter argues that there is a duty to adopt many of the children without adequate parents, and that we can derive this duty straightforwardly from the right of children to be loved. It first considers and rejects the Easy Rescue view, according to which those who want to have children have a duty to adopt rather than have biological children, because, among other things, the cost of adoption will not be much more than the cost of having a biological child. It then defends the Human Right view, according to which the duty to adopt belongs to every able person in appropriate circumstances. This chapter concludes by proposing a potential way of encouraging more people who are motivated to adopt actually to adopt.

This chapter explores the topic of whether we should institute some kind of parental licensing scheme, that is, require biological parents to demonstrate certain competence and character before they are permitted to parent their biological children. Existing concerns regarding parental licensing tend to be practical concerns such as whether there can be a reliable way of determining who is a competent parent and whether the parental licensing scheme can be enforced. These practical concerns leave open the possibility that parental licensing is theoretically correct. This chapter presents a new, theoretical case against parental licensing. In particular, it is argued that biological parenting should not be licensed because biological parenting is a fundamental right and fundamental rights should not be licensed.

This chapter examines the issue of who has the duty to love a child, supposing that there is a right to be loved. It makes the striking claim that everyone has this duty, even when the biological parents are available. It explains that everyone’s having this duty does not mean that everyone has to do the same thing, and that biological parents should be given the status of primary dutybearers while others have associate duties to assist the primary dutybearers in carrying out this duty. This chapter also considers how demanding the duty to love a child should be and it argues that while there are limits as to how much we are required to sacrifice to fulfill this duty, we may be required to sacrifice more than what common sense morality supposes.

This chapter addresses a number of objections against the possibility of a duty to love. Some people believe that a duty to love is an absurdity because duty requires that one can command the action required by the duty, but love is an emotion and is therefore not commandable. This chapter argues that in fact love is commandable even if it is an emotion. This chapter also responds to the concern that really to love a person, we must be motivated to do so for the person’s sake, but to have a duty to love a person means that we would not be motivated to love the person for the person’s sake but for the sake of the duty; and the concern that someone may behave as if he loves a child when in fact he does not in order to satisfy the duty to love.

That children need to be loved is a claim that many people would find intuitive and obvious. However, some people have questioned this claimed. Psychologists have long theorized about the importance of early relationships for all aspects of children’s later development. Drawing on their theories, this chapter offers some theoretical explanations of why being loved is a fundamental condition for children to pursue a good life—that is, why children need to be loved. In addition, there is a vast array of ongoing scientific research devoted toward understanding why children need to be loved, both at the psychological level and at the biological level. To further support the claim that children need to be loved, this chapter presents some of the key findings and details some of the latest results from this research.

To a lay audience, it might seem surprising that it has to be shown that children are rightholders, since, for instance, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights explicitly states that “all human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights,” which would seem to include children as rightholders. However, the claim that all human beings are rightholders is in fact surprisingly difficult to defend. When philosophers try to explain how all human beings are rightholders, they end up adopting what Peter Singer calls a “speciesist” position, where speciesism is defined as morally favoring a particular species—in this case, human beings—over others without sufficient justification. This chapter develops the “genetic basis for moral agency” account of rightholding and explains how this account can allow all human beings, including very young children, to be rightholders without being speciesist.

The book’s introduction points out that many international declarations claim that children have a right to be loved, but that philosophically speaking, there are a number of reasons to question whether there is in fact such a right. The introduction then lays out a plan to show that children have a right to be loved by answering questions such as whether children can have rights, what grounds the right to be loved, whether love is an appropriate object of a right, who has the corresponding duty to love a child, how demanding the duty to love should be, whether biological parenting should be licensed, and whether there is a duty to adopt those children who do not have adequate parents.

Despite the therapeutic potential of human embryonic stem cells, many people believe that HES cell research should be banned. The reason is that the present method of extracting HES cells involves the destruction of the embryo, which for many is the beginning of a person. This paper examines a number of compromise solutions such as parthenogenesis, the use of defective embryos, genetically creating a “pseudo embryo” that can never form a placenta, and determining embryo death, and argues that none of these proposals are likely to satisfy embryoists, that is, those who regard the embryo as a person. This paper then proposes a method of extracting HES cells, what might be called the Blastocyst Transfer Method, that meets the ethical requirements of embryoists, and it considers some possible concerns regarding this method. It concludes by encouraging future HES cell research to investigate this method.

What grounds human rights? How do we determine that something is a genuine human right? This chapter offers a new answer: human beings have human rights to the fundamental conditions for pursuing a good life. The fundamental conditions for pursuing a good life are certain goods, capacities, and options that human beings qua human beings need whatever else they qua individuals might need in order to pursue a characteristically good human life. This chapter explains how this Fundamental Conditions Approach is better than James Griffin’s Agency Approach as well as Martha Nussbaum’s Central Capabilities Approach. It also shows how it can be compatible with the increasingly popular Political Conceptions of human rights defended by John Rawls, Charles Beitz, and Joseph Raz.

Radical experimentalists argue that we should give up using intuitions as evidence in philosophy. In this paper, I first argue that the studies presented by the radical experimentalists in fact suggest that some intuitions are reliable. I next consider and reject a different way of handling the radical experimentalists' challenge, what I call the Argument from Robust Intuitions. I then propose a way of understanding why some intuitions can be unreliable and how intuitions can conflict, and I argue that on this understanding, both moderate experimentalism and the standard philosophical practice of using intuitions as evidence can help resolve these conflicts

A number of international organizations have claimed that children have a right to be loved, but there is a worry that this claim may just be an empty rhetoric. In this paper, I seek to show that there could be such a right by providing a justification for this right in terms of human rights, by demonstrating that love can be an appropriate object of a duty, and by proposing that biological parents should normally be made the primary bearers of this duty, while all other able persons in appropriate circumstances have the associate duties to help biological parents discharge their duties. I also consider some policy implications of this right.

A major challenge to the Doctrine of Double Effect is the concern that an agent’s intention can be identified in such a fine-grained way as to eliminate an intention to harm from a putative example of an intended harm, and yet, the resulting case appears to be a case of impermissibility. This is the so-called “closeness problem.” Many people believe that one can address the closeness problem by adopting Warren Quinn’s version of the DDE, call it DDE*, which distinguishes between harmful direct agency and harmful indirect agency. In this paper, I first argue that Quinn’s DDE* is just as vulnerable to the closeness problem as the DDE is. Second, some might think that what we should therefore do is give up on intentions altogether and move towards some kind of non-state-of-mind, victim-based deontology. I shall argue against this move and explain why intentions are indispensable to an adequate nonconsequentialist theory. Finally, I shall propose a new way of answering the closeness problem.

Christopher Grau argues that the genetic basis for moral agency account of rightholding is problematic because it fails to grant all human beings the moral status of rightholding; it grants the status of rightholding to entities that do not intuitively deserve such status; and it assumes that the genetic basis for moral agency has intrinsic/final value, but the genetic basis for moral agency only has instrumental value. Grau also argues that those who are inclined to hold that all human beings are rightholders should reconsider speciesism. In this paper, I argue that Grau's objections do not undermine the genetic basis for moral agency account of rightholding, and I also offer criticisms of Grau's defense of speciesism

In explicating his version of the Organism View, Eric Olson argues that you begin to exist only after twinning is no longer possible and that you cannot survive a process of inorganic replacement. Assuming the correctness of the Organism View, but pace Olson, I argue in this paper that the Organism View does not require that you believe either proposition. The claim I shall make about twinning helps to advance a debate that currently divides defenders of the Organism View, while the claim I shall make about inorganic replacement will help to put the Organism View on a par with its rival views by allowing it to accommodate a plausible intuition that its rivals can accommodate, namely, the intuition that you can survive a process of inorganic replacement. Both claims, I shall also argue, are important for those who are interested in the identity condition of a human organism, even if they do not hold the view that you are essentially an organism.

Advances in reproductive genetic engineering have the potential to transform human lives. Not only do they promise to allow us to select children free of diseases, they can also enable us to select children with desirable traits. In this paper, I consider two clusters of arguments for the moral permissibility of reproductive genetic engineering, what I call the Perfectionist View and the Libertarian View; and two clusters of arguments against reproductive genetic engineering, what I call the Human Nature View and the Motivation View. I argue that an adequate theory of the ethics of reproductive genetic engineering should take into account insights gained from these views.

Many people believe in the intention principle, according to which an agent’s intention in performing an act can sometimes make an act that would otherwise have been permissible impermissible, other things being equal. Judith Jarvis Thomson, Frances Kamm and Thomas Scanlon have offered cases that seem to show that it can be permissible for an agent to act even when the agent has bad intentions. If valid, these cases would seem to cast doubt on the intention principle. In this paper, I point out that these cases have confounding factors that have received little attention in the literature. I argue that these confounding factors undermine the putative force of these cases against the intention principle. Indeed, when cases without these confounding factors are considered, it becomes clear, so I argue, that intentions can be relevant for the permissibility of an act.

Frances Kamm distinguishes between changes or enhancements that are made before a child exists (ex ante changes) and those that are made once a child exists (ex post changes), and she argues that ex ante changes do not show disrespect or, as Michael Sandel would put it, lack of love, for a person, since the person does not yet exist. In this paper, I argue that it is important to distinguish between ex ante enhancements that are morally neutral and those that are morally dubious, and that the latter ones are morally objectionable even if the persons do not yet exist.

S. Matthew Liao argues here that children have a right to be loved. To do so he investigates questions such as whether children are rightholders; what grounds a child's right to beloved; whether love is an appropriate object of a right; and other philosophical and practical issues. His proposal is that all human beings have rights to the fundamental conditions for pursuing a good life; therefore, as human beings, children have human rights to the fundamental conditions for pursuing a good life. Since being loved is one of those fundamental conditions, children thus have a right to be loved. Liao shows that this claim need not be merely empty rhetoric, and that the arguments for this right can hang together as a coherent whole. This is the first book to make a sustained philosophical case for the right of children to be loved. It makes a unique contribution to the fast-growing literature on family ethics, in particular, on children's rights and parental rights and responsibilities, and to the emerging field of the philosophy of human rights.

It may soon be possible to develop pills that allow parents to induce in themselves more loving behaviour, attitudes and emotions towards their children. In this paper, I consider whether pharmacologically induced parental love can satisfy reasonable conditions of authenticity; why anyone would be interested in taking such parental love pills at all, and whether inducing parental love pharmacologically promotes narcissism or results in self-instrumentalization. I also examine how the availability of such pills may affect the duty to love a child