S. Matthew Liao

Adopting a configurational perspective, this study explored the pathways for small and medium-sized enterprises to achieve high levels of radical innovation. On the basis of dynamic capabilities theory, six causal conditions for radical innovation were identified at both external and internal levels—that is, environmental turbulence and absorptive capacity. The results of a fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis of 82 Chinese SMEs identified four solutions for high radical innovation. The six causal conditions interacted interdependently and different combinations of these conditions were equally effective pathways for SMEs to achieve radical innovation. Hence, SMEs could generate radical innovation through flexibly allocating resources and capabilities based on the environmental circumstances. By using the fsQCA method, this study contributes to the related literature with an investigation of the complex causal relationship between environmental turbulence, absorptive capacity, and SMEs’ radical innovation. The results resolve some prior contradictory findings and provide new insights for future research. Other theoretical contributions, practical implications, and directions for future research are also discussed.

Our current work seeks to provide direct empirical evidence on whether Chinese international students’ experiences studying abroad promote dialectical thinking. We collected behavioral data from 258 Chinese international students studying in multiple regions. We found that there was a main effect among the four conditions. More specifically, when primed with studying abroad or typical day, participants were more likely to show tolerance for contradiction by deeming both sides of contradictory scientific statements as convincing and rating them more favorably. Therefore, it is plausible that Chinese international students’ experiences studying abroad promote their dialectical thinking. More work is needed to further this line of research by extending these effects with other measures of dialectical thinking such as perception of interconnectedness and prediction of change, adopting differing paradigms to provide more robust findings, and probing the underlying processes as to why experiences studying abroad promote dialectical thinking.

BackgroundAthletes will increase their state anxiety under stress situations, which will lead to the decline of sports performance. The improvement of anxiety by probiotics has been reported, but there is a lack of research in the athlete population. The purpose of the current study is to explore the effectiveness of probiotics in improving athletes’ state anxiety and sports performance under stress situations.MethodsWe conducted this single-arm study in Chongqing Institute of Sports Technology. In the 8-week study, 21 Chongqing young divers were given probiotic Bifidobacterium animalis subsp. lactis BB-12 daily. The state anxiety and sports performance of athletes were measured before, during, and after the intervention, and the gut microbiota of athletes was measured before and after the intervention.ResultsThe intervention results showed that cognitive state anxiety, somatic state anxiety, and anxiety emotion were improved. In terms of gut microbiota, the intervention did not change the gut microbial composition but increased the abundance of Bifidobacteriaceae. At the 8th week, the performance of athletes under stress was significantly improved.LimitationsFirst of all, due to the restriction of the number of subjects in this study, there was no control group. Secondly, although the athletes’ diet was recorded in this study, the influence of this factor on gut microbiota was not eliminated. Finally, the anxiety level of the athletes in this study was obtained through a self-report, lacking physiological data in state anxiety.ConclusionThe results show that probiotics intervention can improve the state anxiety of athletes under stress situation and improve the performance of athletes under stress situation.

Status in an organization is considered a significant antecedent to an employee's work-related behaviors. However, the relationship between knowledge workers' informal status and "taking charge" has been ignored in previous human resource management (HRM) research. Based on the self-consistency theory, this study examines the mechanisms underlying the influence of knowledge workers’ informal status on taking charge. Data were collected from 337 dyads of employees and their immediate supervisors in 24 enterprises and companies. Based on moderated mediation analysis, results indicated that knowledge workers’ informal status is positively related to taking charge and organization-based self-esteem (OBSE). OBSE fully mediated the relationship between knowledge workers’ informal status and taking charge, while person-job fit (P-J fit) and person-supervisor fit (P-S fit) each moderated the relationship between knowledge workers’ informal status and OBSE, in addition to the indirect effect of knowledge workers’ informal status on taking charge. Specifically, the indirect effect was strongest when P-J fit or P-S fit was high. The theoretical and managerial implications of the findings, limitations of the study, and future research directions are discussed.

"Featuring seventeen original essays on the ethics of Artificial Intelligence by some of the most prominent AI scientists and academic philosophers today, this volume represents the state-of-the-art thinking in this fast-growing field and highlights some of the central themes in AI and morality such as how to build ethics into AI, how to address mass unemployment as a result of automation, how to avoiding designing AI systems that perpetuate existing biases, and how to determine whether an AI is conscious. As AI technologies progress, questions about the ethics of AI, in both the near-future and the long-term, become more pressing than ever. Should a self-driving car prioritize the lives of the passengers over the lives of pedestrians? Should we as a society develop autonomous weapon systems that are capable of identifying and attacking a target without human intervention? What happens when AIs become smarter and more capable than us? Could they have greater than human moral status? Can we prevent superintelligent AIs from harming us or causing our extinction? At a critical time in this fast-moving debate, thirty leading academics and researchers at the forefront of AI technology development come together to explore these existential questions, including Aaron James, Allan Dafoe, Andrea Loreggia, Andrew Critch, Azim Shariff, Carrick Flynn, Cathy O'Neil, Eliezer Yudkowsky, Eric Schwitzgebel, Frances Kamm, Francesca Rossi, Hanna Gunn, Iyad Rahwan, Jessica Taylor, JF Bonnefon, K. Brent Venable, Kate Devlin, Mara Garza, Nicholas Mattei, Nick Bostrom, Patrick LaVictoire, Peter Asaro, Peter Railton, S. Matthew Liao, Shannon Vallor, Stephen Wolfram, Steve Petersen, Stuart Russell, Susan Schneider, Wendell Wallach "--

It is important to re-investigate Aristotle’s concept of nous. This concept basically denotes some telos-related thinking/reasoning activity of the human intellect, which proceeds both upward and downward: upward to grasp a comprehension of the telos one has acquired, and downward to reach some ultimate end. It differs from the theoretical thinking/reasoning of science in its upward-proceeding inquiries in that it constitutes a comprehension of the very first principles; it differs from technique in its downward-proceeding reasoning in that it always proceeds with a certain comprehension of or insight into the telos of human beings. As it aims to attain some ultimate end, in practical affairs it is construed to proceed with downward reasoning. This downward reasoning zigzags around the issues being faced, until reaching some ultimate point, at which we need no more thinking and simply act. To see how this helps us in finding a way to the good life, we must adopt a special perspective on living, i.e., that of the good man, because it contains and is addressed to greater truth.

Recently, Gerhard Øverland and Alec Walen have developed novel and interesting theories of nonconsequentialism. Unlike other nonconsequentialist theories such as the Doctrine of Double Effect, each of their theories denies that an agent’s mental states are relevant for determining how stringent their moral reasons are against harming others. Instead, Øverland and Walen seek to distinguish morally between instances of harming in terms of the circumstances of the people who will be harmed, rather than in features of the agent doing the harming. In this paper, we argue that these theories yield counterintuitive verdicts across a broad range of cases that other nonconsequentialist theories handle with relative ease. We also argue that Walen’s recent attempt to reformulate this type of theory so that it does not have such implications is unsuccessful.

This paper relates human rights to public health ethics and policies by discussing the nature and moral justification of human rights generally, and the right to health in particular. Which features of humanity ground human rights? To answer this question, as an alternative to agency and capabilities approaches, the paper offers the “fundamental conditions approach,” according to which human rights protect the fundamental conditions for pursuing a good life. The fundamental conditions approach identifies “basic health”—the adequate functioning of the various parts of our organism needed for the development and exercise of the fundamental capacities—as the object of a human right. A human right to basic health entails human rights to the essential resources for promoting and maintaining basic health, including adequate nutrition, basic health care, and basic education. Duty bearers include every able person in appropriate circumstances, as well as governments and government agencies, private philanthropic foundations, and transnational corporations.

Based on the self-verification theory, this research proposed a multi-level model for exploring whether, how, and when differentiated leadership had curvilinear effects on relationship conflict within a team and further on team members’ counterproductive work behaviors toward individuals (CWBI). Drawing on a sample of 297 team members nested in 78 teams, we found that differentiated empowering leadership had no direct curvilinear effects on relationship conflict. However, the results showed that the team competence variance could moderate the curvilinear relationship between differentiated empowering leadership and relationship conflict. Specifically, only in teams with high competence variance among members, differentiated empowering leadership had a U-shaped effect on relationship conflict. Moreover, differentiated empowering leadership interacted with team competence variance had a downstream effect on team members’ CWBI through relationship conflict. We ended up by discussing the theoretical and practical implications of these findings.

Based on implicit leadership theory, we examine the congruence effect of leader-follower power distance orientation on follower trust in a supervisor and work engagement, which in turn influences employees’ task performance. Results of Polynomial regressions on 526 dyads supported the congruence effect hypothesis. The results show that (1) the congruence of leader-follower power distance orientation leads to better performance; (2) under the condition of congruence, Subordinate task performance is higher when leader-follower power distance orientation matching in low-low ratings congruence than it is in high-high ratings congruence; (3) under the condition of asymmetrical incongruence, the follower had higher task performance when a leader’s power distance orientation is lower than a follower’s power distance orientation; (4) trust in supervisor and the work engagement mediates the effect of congruence of leader-follower power distance orientation on employees’ task performance; (5) trust in supervisor also mediates the effect of congruence of leader-follower power distance orientation on employees’ work engagement.

Advances in genomic technologies such as CRISPR‐Cas9, mitochondrial replacement techniques, and in vitro gametogenesis may soon give us more precise and efficient tools to have children with certain traits such as beauty, intelligence, and athleticism. In this paper, I propose a new approach to the ethics of reproductive genetic engineering, a human rights approach. This approach relies on two claims that have certain, independent plausibility: (a) human beings have equal moral status, and (b) human beings have human rights to the fundamental conditions for pursuing a good life. I first argue that the human rights approach gives us a lower bound of when reproductive genetic engineering would be permissible. I then compare this approach with other approaches such as the libertarian, perfectionist, and life worth living approaches. Against these approaches, I argue that the human rights approach offers a novel, and more plausible, way of assessing the ethics of reproductive genetic engineering.

It is important for philosophers to find out positive approaches for increasing mutual understanding on those fundamental questions in both the Confucian and Aristotelian traditions of doing virtue ethics. The Aristotelian concept of the good and the Confucian concept of dao pose a question about the way human beings see the final principle of ethics. Staying within the realm of human life, Confucius develops two co-related perspectives of seeing the dao of human being. The first perspective sees the dao as standing for the ultimate truth and goodness for human beings. Setting aside the Aristotelian metaphysics of nous, this conception does not stand that far removed from Aristotle’s view of the good. The second perspective sees the dao as the right way for individuals to start. This notion seems far from Aristotle’s view of right choice. The reason is that Confucius’s manner of comprehension embraces both understanding and insight, while that of Aristotle focuses solely on understanding. But Aristotle’s concept of right choice is, in some indirect way, related to Confucius’s view of the right way. For both Confucius and Aristotle, the right way refers to our initiating acting on something connected to the end with no more thinking.

David Lewis argues that centered worlds give us a way to capture de se, or self‐locating, contents in philosophy of language and philosophy of mind. In recent years, centered worlds have also gained other uses in areas ranging widely from metaphysics to ethics. This paper raises a problem for centered worlds and discusses the costs and benefits of different solutions. The present investigation into the nature of centered worlds helps to explicate potentially problematic implicit commitments of the theories that employ them. In addition, this investigation reveals that the conception of centered worlds widely attributed to David Lewis is not only problematic, but in fact not his.

The prospect of using memory modifying technologies raises interesting and important normative concerns. We first point out that those developing desirable memory modifying technologies should keep in mind certain technical and user-limitation issues. We next discuss certain normative issues that the use of these technologies can raise such as truthfulness, appropriate moral reaction, self-knowledge, agency, and moral obligations. Finally, we propose that as long as individuals using these technologies do not harm others and themselves in certain ways, and as long as there is no prima facie duty to retain particular memories, it is up to individuals to determine the permissibility of particular uses of these technologies.

Along with the notion of being a person (zuo ren 做人), the notion of doing business (zuo shi 做事) in ordinary Chinese is basically an over-all notion of the norms in the practical and associative activities, carrying typically obscure meanings on practice and association affairs in some external world. Ordinary Chinese not only distinguishes these two notions but also defines a dictionary order of them, with the affairs of the internal world prior to those of the external. The fact that the notion of doing business refers to business (shi 事) rather than person (ren 人) makes this order clear at a deeper level. It shows that this notion regards the practical affairs of the external world less important to the person itself than those of the internal. Except for these qualities, the notion of doing business holds some normative meanings, although contains no definite rules. These meanings indirectly relate to the notion of person that people form in their private associations and emerge as some mixture with a tactical attitude out of the need of earning a life. The notion of person gives birth to some obscure requirements, for instance, the requirement of 'doing business in accordance with your conscience' and that of 'doing business seriously'. The core world of family is marginalized in the public transition of associations. There are reasons to anticipate that in this process the notion of doing business will undergo more radical changes than that of being a person

It is quite likely that parents will soon be able to use genetic engineering to select the sex of their child by directly manipulating the sex of an embryo. Some might think that this method would be a more ethical method of sex selection than present technologies such as preimplantation genetic diagnosis because, unlike PGD, it does not need to create and destroy “wrong gendered” embryos. This paper argues that those who object to present technologies on the grounds that the embryo is a person are unlikely to be persuaded by this proposal, though for different reasons.

The concept of right or fit is an important element entailed, but not fully articulated, in the concept of action or practice in Aristotle's theory of virtue; which, however, turns to be of the utmost importance in later Western ethics. Right is concerned with both feelings and actions, and is not the same for all individuals. It lies in between the two extremes of the spectrum of practical affairs, yet by no means equidistant from them. This account of the concept of fitness or right is derived from the categories of quantity, relationship, and quality rather than from that of substance. Thus, it seems that virtue is relative to vice or error within a continuous existence. If, however, the right of passion and action is environmental and concrete, is it multiple and not singular? To this question, Aristotle gives his reply on two levels: On the level of concrete practitioners, what is right and fit to one man might not be so to another man, and hence the right of practice is not singular but multiple; whereas on the level concerned with the only right choice compared with the two extremes or errors, the right of practice will always be singular. /// "正确"是隐含于亚里士多德的德性学说中的一个重要而未充分展开的，在 后来的西方伦理学中却变成极为重要的关于行为或实践的概念。"正确"与感情和 行为都相关。"正确"并不是对所有人同样的。它是两端间的那个中间，但井不始 终与两端距离相等。对适度或正确的这种说明基本上是从数量、关系与性质范畴引 出，而不是从实体范畴引出的述说。所以，德性似乎始终是在一种有连续性的存在 中相对于恶或错误而言的。感情与行为的正确如果是环境的、具体的，它是否是多 而不是一?亚里士多德在两个层面上回答这个问题。在相对于具体实践者的层面， 对我而言的适度或正确很可能不同于对你而言的，实践的正确不是一而是多:在相 对于两端或错误唯有一个正确的选择而言，实践的正确始终只是一。.

Philosophers today are inclined to propose virtues are either something subjective or something universal. However, Confucius and Aristotle, who made the most profound investigations into virtues, did not develop such theses. The deep-seated reason lies in their belief that there is always a possibility for a human being to become a man of practice, which cancels the need of proposing subjectivity thesis. The reason for their not raising the universality thesis of virtues is that they do not think that virtues are directly universal to all contemporarily existing minds. Rather, in their view, virtues involve a possible universality that may present in a virtuous mind. We can summarize Aristotle’s view into the concept of possible universality of virtue understood in terms of the perfect state of mind, since he explains the perfect state of mind in terms of perfect state of activity, and makes his investigations with an eye to the interactions between people with similar states of virtues. The view of Confucius can be summarized into the concept of possible universality of virtue understood in terms of the history of mind, since his investigations are made from the point of view of the states of mind reached through virtuous practices, i.e., a historical process of human life in which one’s pre-dispositions and feelings gradually reach some state of natural harmony and gains continual enrichment, and with an eye to the interactions between virtuous people and common people. From that similarly expressed view we can reasonably infer that virtues do possess the character called by today’s philosophers as universality, but it is a possible universality whose possibility is based on practice and on the development of virtuous minds.

The concept of right or fit is an important element entailed, but not fully articulated, in the concept of action or practice in Aristotle’s theory of virtue; which, however, turns to be of the utmost importance in later Western ethics. Right is concerned with both feelings and actions, and is not the same for all individuals. It lies in between the two extremes of the spectrum of practical affairs, yet by no means equidistant from them. This account of the concept of fitness or right is derived from the categories of quantity, relationship, and quality rather than from that of substance. Thus, it seems that virtue is relative to vice or error within a continuous existence. If, however, the right of passion and action is environmental and concrete, is it multiple and not singular? To this question, Aristotle gives his reply on two levels: On the level of concrete practitioners, what is right and fit to one man might not be so to another man, and hence the right of practice is not singular but multiple; whereas on the level concerned with the only right choice compared with the two extremes or errors, the right of practice will always be singular.

This chapter first considers how the right to be loved should be prioritized. It argues that even if children’s being loved is not as urgent as, for instance, being fed, it is still very urgent; that governments do not give absolute priority to whatever is most necessary for action; and that to develop institutional arrangements that can adequately provide for children’s various fundamental conditions, it is important to take into account all of their fundamental conditions, including their need for love. This chapter then draws the book to a close by pointing out that the proclamation that children have a right to be loved is not merely empty rhetoric and that in fact this right can be justified in the same way as other rights.

This chapter argues that there is a duty to adopt many of the children without adequate parents, and that we can derive this duty straightforwardly from the right of children to be loved. It first considers and rejects the Easy Rescue view, according to which those who want to have children have a duty to adopt rather than have biological children, because, among other things, the cost of adoption will not be much more than the cost of having a biological child. It then defends the Human Right view, according to which the duty to adopt belongs to every able person in appropriate circumstances. This chapter concludes by proposing a potential way of encouraging more people who are motivated to adopt actually to adopt.

This chapter explores the topic of whether we should institute some kind of parental licensing scheme, that is, require biological parents to demonstrate certain competence and character before they are permitted to parent their biological children. Existing concerns regarding parental licensing tend to be practical concerns such as whether there can be a reliable way of determining who is a competent parent and whether the parental licensing scheme can be enforced. These practical concerns leave open the possibility that parental licensing is theoretically correct. This chapter presents a new, theoretical case against parental licensing. In particular, it is argued that biological parenting should not be licensed because biological parenting is a fundamental right and fundamental rights should not be licensed.

This chapter examines the issue of who has the duty to love a child, supposing that there is a right to be loved. It makes the striking claim that everyone has this duty, even when the biological parents are available. It explains that everyone’s having this duty does not mean that everyone has to do the same thing, and that biological parents should be given the status of primary dutybearers while others have associate duties to assist the primary dutybearers in carrying out this duty. This chapter also considers how demanding the duty to love a child should be and it argues that while there are limits as to how much we are required to sacrifice to fulfill this duty, we may be required to sacrifice more than what common sense morality supposes.