David Lewin

This article aims to articulate the richness of the pedagogical relation and pedagogical tact in an age of the near ubiquitous presence of digital education. Drawing on Citton, we argue that there is an ecology of attentional influence that is pedagogically decisive. Our argument proceeds as follows: first, we introduce Citton’s theoretical frame; second, we examine the general conception of education that is established and articulated through the pedagogical relations between educator, student and world; third, we consider the concept of pedagogical tact and analyse how Citton’s framing of attention gives shape to understanding pedagogical tact; last, we connect attention to education, arguing that education concerns drawing attention to aspects of the world through pedagogically tactful action. We conclude by calling for greater reflection on aspects of education which are difficult to render digitally, and which rely on the speculative and interpretive capacities of the educator.

Where do a child’s morals come from? Interactions with other human beings provide arguably the primary contexts for moral development: family, friends, teachers and other people. It is the artistic products of human activity that this essay considers: literature, film, art, music. Specifically, I will consider some philosophical issues concerning the influence of folk and fairy tales on moral development. I will discuss issues of representation and reduction: in particular, how far should stories for children elide the complexities inherent to many folk and fairy tales? Drawing on a distinction between a problematic reductionism and an appropriate pedagogical reduction, I suggest that pedagogical issues of representation require us to think about how to represent complexity in ways that are reductive without being reductionist, that can delight and engage without being horrifying or tedious. While there is a place for horror and for boredom, it is primarily a matter of timing...

New Perspectives in Philosophy of Education seeks to build a bridge between philosophical reflection and socio-political action by developing a range of critical discussions in the areas of ethics, politics and religion. This volume brings together established authorities and a new generation of scholars to ask whether philosophy of education can contribute to political and social discourse, or whether it is destined to remain the marginal gadfly of mainstream ideology. The philosophy of education stands in danger of becoming a neglected field at precisely the moment we need to be able to reflect upon the increasingly apparent costs of the technocratic attitude to education. While many of the educational policy discussions of recent years seem far-reaching and radical, critical debate surrounding these initiatives remain largely at a populist level. New Perspectives in Philosophy of Education provides contemporary responses to philosophical issues that bear upon educational studies, policies and practices, contributing to the debate on the role of philosophy of education in an increasingly fractured intellectual milieu.

Resonances between Heidegger's philosophy and Eastern religious traditions have been widely discussed by scholars. The significance of Heidegger's thinking for education has also become increasingly clear over recent years. In this article I argue that an important aspect of Heidegger's work, the relevance of which to education is relatively undeveloped, relates to his desire to overcome Western metaphysics, a project that invites an exploration of his connections with Eastern thought. I argue that Heidegger's desire to deconstruct the West implies the deconstruction of conventional views of learning because both aim to undercut the representational nature of thinking in order to recover thinking as a form of contemplation. Consequently, education should not be conceived as the acquisition of a more or less correct mental picture, but suggests the opposite: the relinquishing of all images in a contemplative aporia

Educators continually ask about the best means to engage students and how best to capture attention. These concerns often make the problematic assumption that students can directly govern their own attention. In order to address the role and limits of attention in education, some theorists have sought to recover the significance of silence or mindfulness in schools, but I argue that these approaches are too simplistic. A more fundamental examination of our conceptions of identity and agency reveals a Cartesian and Kantian foundationalism. This assumed subjectivity establishes too simplistic a conception of the agency of students in directing attention. I critically engage with these conceptions by drawing on a range of diverse sources, primarily modern Continental philosophy and Christian mystical theology