Alexander Schnell

Les Beiträge zur Philosophie (1936-1938) ont été présentées, lors de leur publication en 1989, par l'éditeur F. -W. von Herrmann comme le "second chef-d'oeuvre" de M. Heidegger. Le présent volume rassemble des contributions parmi les plus grands spécialistes des recherches heideggériennes de la France et de l'étranger, qui permet de statuer sur la réception de cet ouvrage aussi fascinant que troublant. Il s'agit, d'une part, de préciser l'objet du texte, d'en exposer la structure, les concepts fondamentaux et son rapport avec Etre et temps (1927), ainsi qu'avec certaines élaborations ultérieures ; d'autre part, des problèmes ciblés, parfois plus techniques, sont abordés, qui permettent d'introduire à ce texte, sans doute le plus difficile de Heidegger, et d'en approfondir la lecture.

Die Phänomenologie hat mittlerweile eine über einhundertjährige Geschichte. Dieses Buch führt auf drei Wegen in die Vielfalt ihrer unterschiedlichen Ansätze ein. Dabei geht es dem Autor nicht nur um eine Darstellung der Geschichte der Phänomenologie. Er führt ausserdem vor, wie ihr Anspruch, die Sachen selbst zu untersuchen, erfüllt wird und auch eine philosophische Strömung wie der Deutsche Idealismus phänomenologisch fruchtbar gemacht werden kann. Zudem trägt Schnell zur aktuellen Debatte um den Neuen Realismus bei. Diese Einführung referiert nicht, was Phänomenologie ist: Sie ist selbst Phänomenologie.

Die Metaphysik ist seit dem 21. Jahrhundert erneut in den Fokus der Aufmerksamkeit geruckt. Alexander Schnell entwickelt eine Position, die sich von neueren "realistischen" Ansatzen unterscheidet. In den systematischen Ausarbeitungen der klassischen deutschen Philosophie verstanden sich die Deutschen Idealisten zugleich als die grossten Realisten. In der aktuellen Diskussion hingegen scheint jeder idealistische Standpunkt kompromittiert zu sein, da er auf einem uberholten Subjektivismus beruhe. Der hier verteidigte transzendentale Idealismus verfolgt eine Perspektive, in der die Frage nach dem "Sein" diesseits der hypostasierten Subjekt-Objekt-Beziehung gestellt wird. Diese Abhandlung uber die phanomenologische Metaphysik fugt sich somit in eine zeitgenossische Debatte ein, die sowohl philosophische (insbesondere dank des "neuen Realismus") als auch anthropologische (in Bezug auf den Status des "Relationismus") Relevanz hat.

La métaphysique fait de nouveau l'objet d'une attention particulière. Le présent ouvrage développe une position transcendantale qui diffère des approches 'réalistes' récentes. Dans les élaborations systématiques de la philosophie allemande classique, les 'idéalistes allemands' se comprenaient en même temps comme les plus grands réalistes. Dans le débat actuel, en revanche, toute position idéaliste semble être compromise puisque relevant d'un subjectivisme désuet. L'idéalisme transcendantal ici défendu poursuit une perspective dans laquelle la question de l' 'être' doit être posée à l'horizon de ses 'corrélations' en deçà d'un rapport sujet-objet hypostasié. Ce traité de métaphysique phénoménologique s'inscrit ainsi dans un débat contemporain qui est autant philosophique (notamment grâce au 'nouveau[x] réalisme[s]') qu'anthropologique (à propos du statut du 'relationnisme')--Page 4 of cover.

This chapter raises the question - based on the works of Marc Richir and Dominique Pradelle (in particular) - of if and how phenomenology deals with an “anti-Copernican” revolution, considering that the motif (which is initially Kantian) of a “Copernican” revolution seems to have gone through some modifications that reflect a certain deposition of the constitutive role of the subject. Its fundamental thesis is that a certain dimension “beyond” the Copernican revolution does not reestablish a “Ptolemaic” realism but rather opens a dimension “beneath:” beneath the subject and the object where a mutual relationship between an a-subjective constitutive power and a pre-empirical foundational being can take place. This dimension “beneath” means that the alternative does not concern a “pre-Copernican” realism, on the one hand, and an “idealism” - which leaves in the shadows the relationship between the transcendental method and an ontological perspective - on the other, but rather puts forward a constructive circularity between the transcendental constitution and an ontological foundation. It follows that “normativity” is not achieved on the basis of pregiven objectivity - because it would imply a petitio principia - but draws upon the “pre-immanent generativity.”

This paper raises the question – based on the works of Marc Richir and Dominique Pradelle – if and how phenomenology deals with an “anti-Copernican” revolution, considering that the motif of a “Copernican” revolution seems to have gone through some modifications that reflect a certain deposition of the constitutive role of the subject. Its fundamental thesis is that a certain dimension “beyond” the Copernican revolution does not reestablish a “Ptolemaic” realism but rather opens a dimension “beneath”: beneath the subject and the object where can take place a mutual relationship between an a-subjective constitutive power and a pre-empirical foundational being. This dimension “beneath” means that the alternative does not concern a “pre-Copernican” realism on the one hand and an “idealism” leaving in the shadows the relationship between the transcendental method and an ontological perspective on the other, but rather puts forward a constructive circularity between the transcendental constitution and an ontological foundation. It follows that “normativity” is not achieved on the basis of pre-given objectivity – because it would mean a petition principia – but draws upon the “pre-immanent generativity”.

This contribution seeks to clarify the status of Ereignis and Dasein in the Beiträge zur Philosophie and to question, in particular, the relationship between these two concepts. The angle that will be preferred here is that of the discussion with transcendentalism. The author defends the thesis that there is an alteration in the meaning of “Dasein” between Sein und Zeit and the Beiträge zur Philosophie, having repercussions on the relationship between “Seyn” and “Da-sein”. At the very heart of this new meaning of Da-sein in the Beiträge stands the conception of an “out-standing standing-within” that must be analyzed in detail.

From a phenomenological point of view the ‘real’ is neither to be identified with the ‘given’ nor with the ‘withdrawn’. It rather has to be examined in its relatedness to the factual. This in turn requires the reflection of the basic correlation of being and thought. By engaging in this task the author of this essay distinguishes five modalities: 1. the possibility of the accessibility of the world, 2. the actual modes of constitution of appearance 3. the genetic moment of phenomenalization, 4. The eventfulness and singularity of every case, 5. the existence of the world as such. These modalities constitute the realm of the transcendental and they allow us to differentiate how the real ‘exists’. In this sense the essay continues the work of Richir’s “phenomenology of the real”, at the same time it goes beyond Richir’s work. The standpoint of “phenomenological constructivism” allows the integration of skepticist insights into the concept of the transcendental.

In the present contribution, the phenomenological unconscious is approached not in the sense of the psychoanalytic unconscious but on an “infra-conscious” level, below the “given,” as it were. I outline a threefold account of the “pre-conscious.” The three fundamental types of the phenomenological unconscious (in the narrow sense of the word) are: the genetic phenomenological unconscious, the hypostatic phenomenological unconscious, and the reflexive phenomenological unconscious. I explore how the phenomenological unconscious intervenes in the articulation between consciousness and self-consciousness. It is the Husserlian model of an “omni-intentionality” with its “nuclei” that makes it possible to clarify the status of self-consciousness (at the level of the phenomenological unconscious). I end by highlighting the plurality of fields corresponding to different “spheres” of the phenomenological unconscious.

In this study, the author develops an original reading of the Fifth Cartesian Meditation. This text, far from giving rise to a “transcendental solipsism”, as classical commentators claim, leads to a constitution of intersubjectivity on various levels . In its center, a “phenomenological construction” operates, i.e. a methodological piece that masters the genetic approach of intersubjectivity. Closely following the “almost mathematical” rigour of this crucial text of Husserl’s phenomenology, the author equally tackles the issue of the constitution of the experience of the other and the truly intersubjective structure of transcendental subjectivity. The article concludes with the metaphysical results of the analysis of the experience of the other

English summary: This essay demonstrates that phenomenon is a philosophical concept in itself. Following on Kants use of the term, and its complexity under German idealism and phenomenology, the authors argues that the concept of phenomenon is an excellent window onto German philosophy. French description: Repondre a la question de savoir ce qu'est le phenomene peut paraitre un peu etrange de prime abord: n'aurait-on pas tendance, spontanement, a se demander ce qu'est un phenomene? Cet essai se propose de montrer que le phenomene est un concept philosophique a part entiere. Introduit par Kant pour etablir ce qu'il est possible de connaitre, cette notion change de sens et se complexifie dans les traditions philosophiques post-kantiennes (notamment dans l'idealisme allemand et dans la phenomenologie). L'auteur se propose d'ouvrir differentes pistes, relatives a cette notion, qui se degagent dans le debat avec l'auteur de la Critique de la raison pure et qui interrogent la portee et les limites du transcendantalisme kantien. Il apparait par la que le phenomene constitue une excellente introduction a la problematique de la philosophie allemande.

L'objectif de cet ouvrage est d'introduire le lecteur a la pensee du premier Heidegger a travers un commentaire d'Etre et temps (publie en 1927) et des cours professes a la fin des annees 1920 (en particulier les Fondements metaphysiques de la logique et les Concepts fondamentaux de la metaphysique). L'auteur expose d'abord le projet heideggerien d'une ontologie phenomenologique - en rapport (et en rupture) avec la phenomenologie husserlienne - mettant en oeuvre une analytique existentiale de l'etre-la humain qui est reconstituee selon ses moments structurels. Le chapitre central du livre est consacre au probleme du temps, chez Heidegger, au sujet duquel l'auteur propose une interpretation inedite. Les deux derniers chapitres presentent la metaphysique de l'etre-la et la metaphysique du monde avec lesquelles Heidegger s'eloigne de son projet initial et prepare le fameux tournant des annees 1930.

In this article, I aim to introduce Marc Richir’s refoundation of transcendantal phenomenology. Starting from the double—“symbolic” and properly “phenomenological”—constitution of the concept of phenomenon, I present the key concepts of Richir’s “phenomenology nova methodo”: hyperbolical phenomenological epoché, schematism, affectivity, phantasy, and so on. Beneath the distinction between theory of knowledge and ontology, I seek to understand both the sense of what he calls the “endogenization” of the phenomenological field and, “beyond Husserl, Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty,” the role of temporality in the phenomenalization of the phenomenon.

Resumo Neste artigo, o autor apresenta uma ideia original de “subjectividade”, na medida em que esta se desenvolve, no contexto da recém-fundada fenomenologia transcendental, designada por “fenomenologia generativa”. Esta figura da subjectividade é caracterizada por dois aspectos fundamentais : por um lado a “vibração” ou “oscilação” entre o “eu” e o “exterior” ; uma dimensão quadrupla de “transcendência”. Palavras-chave : alteridade, imaginação, mundo, self, subjectividade, transcendênciaIn this article I would like to put forward an original figure of “subjectivity” in so far as it is developed in the context of a newly founded transcendental phenomenology called “generative phenomenology”. This figure of subjectivity is characterized by two fundamental aspects : the “vibration” or “oscillation” between the “self” and the “exterior” on the one hand and the quadruple dimension of “transcendence” on the other. Keywords : alterity, imagination, self, subjectivity, transcendence, world

This paper propounds an analysis of the Husserlian problem of time through the prism of his elaboration of succeeding time-diagrams. The author focuses his reflexions on the "Lectures on Inner Time-consciousness" (1905) and at the same time on the decisive advancements of the "Bernauer Time-Manuscripts" (1917-1918). These manuscripts complete the Husserlian description of constitution of time-consciousness by the element of protentional intentionality and the "original process" with its "core"-structure (Kernstruktur), on this side of immanent temporality, and try to work out the problem of the statute of the sense-data and of the self-awareness of the ultimately constitutive "flow" of consciousness

Alexander Schnell | : La position défendue dans cette contribution consiste à montrer que la compréhension de la phénoménologie comme philosophie transcendantale implique le recours à la philosophie allemande classique. L’auteur étudie, à ce dessein, une perspective d’abord gnoséologique puis ontologique, commandées sur différents registres par les concepts d’« intuition », de « construction » et de « possibilisation ». Dans un troisième moment, il établit comment, dans une perspective tirant les conclusions « métaphysiques » de ces élaborations phénoménologiques, ces deux volets peuvent être envisagés dans un projet unitaire où la « possibilisation » est conçue comme une « réflexion de la réflexion ». | : In this paper I defend the idea, that the comprehension of Phenomenology as “transcendental philosophy” requires to establish the link between Phenomenology and Classical German Philosophy. I analyze for this purpose an epistemological and than an ontological perspective where the concepts of “intuition”, of “construction”, and of “possibilisation” play a first role. Then I try to show — in a perspective drawing the metaphysical conclusions of these phenomenological analyses — that these two perspectives can be integrated in a common project where “possibilisation” is conceived of as a “reflexion of the reflexion”.