Alexander Schnell

In this article, I aim to introduce Marc Richir’s refoundation of transcendantal phenomenology. Starting from the double—“symbolic” and properly “phenomenological”—constitution of the concept of phenomenon, I present the key concepts of Richir’s “phenomenology nova methodo”: hyperbolical phenomenological epoché, schematism, affectivity, phantasy, and so on. Beneath the distinction between theory of knowledge and ontology, I seek to understand both the sense of what he calls the “endogenization” of the phenomenological field and, “beyond Husserl, Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty,” the role of temporality in the phenomenalization of the phenomenon.

Resumo Neste artigo, o autor apresenta uma ideia original de “subjectividade”, na medida em que esta se desenvolve, no contexto da recém-fundada fenomenologia transcendental, designada por “fenomenologia generativa”. Esta figura da subjectividade é caracterizada por dois aspectos fundamentais : por um lado a “vibração” ou “oscilação” entre o “eu” e o “exterior” ; uma dimensão quadrupla de “transcendência”. Palavras-chave : alteridade, imaginação, mundo, self, subjectividade, transcendênciaIn this article I would like to put forward an original figure of “subjectivity” in so far as it is developed in the context of a newly founded transcendental phenomenology called “generative phenomenology”. This figure of subjectivity is characterized by two fundamental aspects : the “vibration” or “oscillation” between the “self” and the “exterior” on the one hand and the quadruple dimension of “transcendence” on the other. Keywords : alterity, imagination, self, subjectivity, transcendence, world

This paper propounds an analysis of the Husserlian problem of time through the prism of his elaboration of succeeding time-diagrams. The author focuses his reflexions on the "Lectures on Inner Time-consciousness" (1905) and at the same time on the decisive advancements of the "Bernauer Time-Manuscripts" (1917-1918). These manuscripts complete the Husserlian description of constitution of time-consciousness by the element of protentional intentionality and the "original process" with its "core"-structure (Kernstruktur), on this side of immanent temporality, and try to work out the problem of the statute of the sense-data and of the self-awareness of the ultimately constitutive "flow" of consciousness

Alexander Schnell | : La position défendue dans cette contribution consiste à montrer que la compréhension de la phénoménologie comme philosophie transcendantale implique le recours à la philosophie allemande classique. L’auteur étudie, à ce dessein, une perspective d’abord gnoséologique puis ontologique, commandées sur différents registres par les concepts d’« intuition », de « construction » et de « possibilisation ». Dans un troisième moment, il établit comment, dans une perspective tirant les conclusions « métaphysiques » de ces élaborations phénoménologiques, ces deux volets peuvent être envisagés dans un projet unitaire où la « possibilisation » est conçue comme une « réflexion de la réflexion ». | : In this paper I defend the idea, that the comprehension of Phenomenology as “transcendental philosophy” requires to establish the link between Phenomenology and Classical German Philosophy. I analyze for this purpose an epistemological and than an ontological perspective where the concepts of “intuition”, of “construction”, and of “possibilisation” play a first role. Then I try to show — in a perspective drawing the metaphysical conclusions of these phenomenological analyses — that these two perspectives can be integrated in a common project where “possibilisation” is conceived of as a “reflexion of the reflexion”.

This essay tries to account for a certain “speculative turn” in contemporary philosophy (Q. Meillassoux, G. Harman, M. Gabriel, etc.) from a phenomenological point of view . A first objective of it will consist in exposing the link between, on the one hand, the methodological sense of Husserl’s concrete phenomenological analyses (concerning, for example, time and intersubjective structure of transcendental subjectivity,) and on the other hand, the consequences that follow from the grounding of phenomenology as first philosophy. This will allow a largely underestimated research angle to be opened up, one that I call a “constructive phenomenology,” that constitutes an essential and original figure of transcendental philosophy in general. A second objective will then consist in the attempt to sketch the foundation of knowledge as knowledge , the core of a “phenomenological metaphysics.” Whereas the first part will remain within a Husserlian framework, the second will develop some elements of a “speculative transcendentalism” in a phenomenological perspective