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72Bait and switch philosophyAnalysis 75 (3): 372-379. 2015.Many philosophers employ an intellectual division of labour. Philosophy tells us what the truth conditions of various philosophically interesting sentences are. For example, atomic sentences containing numerals are sentences containing singular terms putatively referring to numbers; sentences about what could be are sentences quantifying over possible worlds and so on. Some discipline outside of philosophy tells us that certain of these sentences are true. The purported result is that such philo…Read more
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284Scepticism about GroundingIn Fabrice Correia & Benjamin Schnieder (eds.), Metaphysical Grounding: Understanding the Structure of Reality, Cambridge University Press. pp. 81. 2012.
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Natural kindsIn Edward Craig (ed.), The Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Routledge. pp. 682-5. 1998.
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109II—Persistent Philosophical DisagreementProceedings of the Aristotelian Society 117 (1): 23-40. 2017.
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To beIn Robin Le Poidevin, Simons Peter, McGonigal Andrew & Ross P. Cameron (eds.), The Routledge Companion to Metaphysics, Routledge. 2009.
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1840Moral Error Theory and the Problem of EvilEuropean Journal for Philosophy of Religion 1 (2). 2009.Moral error theory claims that no moral sentence is (nonvacuously) true. Atheism claims that the existence of evil in the world is incompatible with, or makes improbable, the existence of God. Is moral error theory compatible with atheism? This paper defends the thesis that it is compatible against criticisms by Nicholas Sturgeon
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3Universals and Property Instances: The Alphabet of BeingPhilosophical Books 37 (4): 266-267. 2009.
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15Universals and Property Instances: The Alphabet of BeingPhilosophical Books 37 (4): 266-267. 1996.
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99So where's the explanation?In Helen Beebee & Julian Dodd (eds.), Truthmakers: The Contemporary Debate, Clarendon Press. pp. 85. 2005.
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49Fictionalism in Metaphysics - Edited by Mark Eli KalderonPhilosophical Books 48 (3): 272-274. 2007.
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215The methodology of genuine modal realismSynthese 162 (1): 37-52. 2008.David Lewis’s genuine modal realism is a controversial thesis in modal metaphysics. Charles Chihara and Ross Cameron have each argued that Lewis’s defence of his thesis involves his committing serious methodological errors; in particular, that his replies to two well-known and important objections are question-begging. Scott Shalkowski has further argued that Lewis’s attempt to analyse modal talk in non-modal terms is viciously circular. This paper considers the methodology which Lewis uses to a…Read more
Areas of Interest
Metaphysics |
Philosophy of Mathematics |