-
76Defending promiscuous realism about natural kindsPhilosophical Quarterly 46 (185): 496-500. 1996.
-
131Two Anti-Platonist StrategiesMind 119 (476): 1107-1116. 2010.This paper considers two strategies for undermining indispensability arguments for mathematical Platonism. We defend one strategy (the Trivial Strategy) against a criticism by Joseph Melia. In particular, we argue that the key example Melia uses against the Trivial Strategy fails. We then criticize Melia’s chosen strategy (the Weaseling Strategy.) The Weaseling Strategy attempts to show that it is not always inconsistent or irrational knowingly to assert p and deny an implication of p . We argue…Read more
-
42The Palgrave Handbook of Philosophical Methods (edited book)Palgrave-Macmillan. 2015.The Palgrave Handbook of Philosophical Methods contains twenty-six original and substantive papers examining a wide selection of philosophical methods. Drawing upon an international range of leading contributors, this Handbook will help shape future debates about how philosophy should be done. Topics explored include philosophical disagreement, thought experiments, intuitions, rational reflection, conceptual analysis, explanation, parsimony, and experimental philosophy. Written in a clear and ac…Read more
-
287Mathematical explanation and indispensability argumentsPhilosophical Quarterly 59 (237): 641-658. 2009.We defend Joseph Melia's thesis that the role of mathematics in scientific theory is to 'index' quantities, and that even if mathematics is indispensable to scientific explanations of concrete phenomena, it does not explain any of those phenomena. This thesis is defended against objections by Mark Colyvan and Alan Baker.
-
72Bait and switch philosophyAnalysis 75 (3): 372-379. 2015.Many philosophers employ an intellectual division of labour. Philosophy tells us what the truth conditions of various philosophically interesting sentences are. For example, atomic sentences containing numerals are sentences containing singular terms putatively referring to numbers; sentences about what could be are sentences quantifying over possible worlds and so on. Some discipline outside of philosophy tells us that certain of these sentences are true. The purported result is that such philo…Read more
-
284Scepticism about GroundingIn Fabrice Correia & Benjamin Schnieder (eds.), Metaphysical Grounding: Understanding the Structure of Reality, Cambridge University Press. pp. 81. 2012.
-
Natural kindsIn Edward Craig (ed.), The Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Routledge. pp. 682-5. 1998.
-
109II—Persistent Philosophical DisagreementProceedings of the Aristotelian Society 117 (1): 23-40. 2017.
-
To beIn Robin Le Poidevin, Simons Peter, McGonigal Andrew & Ross P. Cameron (eds.), The Routledge Companion to Metaphysics, Routledge. 2009.
-
1841Moral Error Theory and the Problem of EvilEuropean Journal for Philosophy of Religion 1 (2). 2009.Moral error theory claims that no moral sentence is (nonvacuously) true. Atheism claims that the existence of evil in the world is incompatible with, or makes improbable, the existence of God. Is moral error theory compatible with atheism? This paper defends the thesis that it is compatible against criticisms by Nicholas Sturgeon
-
3Universals and Property Instances: The Alphabet of BeingPhilosophical Books 37 (4): 266-267. 2009.
-
15Universals and Property Instances: The Alphabet of BeingPhilosophical Books 37 (4): 266-267. 1996.
-
99So where's the explanation?In Helen Beebee & Julian Dodd (eds.), Truthmakers: The Contemporary Debate, Clarendon Press. pp. 85. 2005.
Areas of Interest
Metaphysics |
Philosophy of Mathematics |