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Natural kindsIn Edward Craig (ed.), Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy: Genealogy to Iqbal, Routledge. pp. 682-5. 1998.
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111II—Persistent Philosophical DisagreementProceedings of the Aristotelian Society 117 (1): 23-40. 2017.
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To beIn Robin Le Poidevin, Simons Peter, McGonigal Andrew & Ross P. Cameron (eds.), The Routledge Companion to Metaphysics, Routledge. 2009.
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1883Moral Error Theory and the Problem of EvilEuropean Journal for Philosophy of Religion 1 (2). 2009.Moral error theory claims that no moral sentence is (nonvacuously) true. Atheism claims that the existence of evil in the world is incompatible with, or makes improbable, the existence of God. Is moral error theory compatible with atheism? This paper defends the thesis that it is compatible against criticisms by Nicholas Sturgeon
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3Universals and Property Instances: The Alphabet of BeingPhilosophical Books 37 (4): 266-267. 2009.
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15Universals and Property Instances: The Alphabet of BeingPhilosophical Books 37 (4): 266-267. 1996.
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99So where's the explanation?In Helen Beebee & Julian Dodd (eds.), Truthmakers: The Contemporary Debate, Clarendon Press. pp. 85. 2005.
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53Fictionalism in Metaphysics - Edited by Mark Eli KalderonPhilosophical Books 48 (3): 272-274. 2007.
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219The methodology of genuine modal realismSynthese 162 (1): 37-52. 2008.David Lewis’s genuine modal realism is a controversial thesis in modal metaphysics. Charles Chihara and Ross Cameron have each argued that Lewis’s defence of his thesis involves his committing serious methodological errors; in particular, that his replies to two well-known and important objections are question-begging. Scott Shalkowski has further argued that Lewis’s attempt to analyse modal talk in non-modal terms is viciously circular. This paper considers the methodology which Lewis uses to a…Read more
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186What are physical properties?Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 79 (3): 196-217. 1998.This paper concerns an issue in the metaphysics of properties. The issue is: what are physical properties? What distinguishes physical properties from all other properties? My conclusions will be ‘downbeat’. I will argue that some major recent approaches to this issue prove unsatisfactory, and that the issue is much more intractable than has widely been supposed. The moral I draw is that there is no principled and well‐defined distinction between physical properties and all other properties, and…Read more
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28Modality and Acquaintance with PropertiesThe Monist 81 (1): 44-68. 1998.What is required for you to know what a certain property is? And what is required for you to have the concept of that property? Hume held that a person who has never tasted a pineapple cannot know what the property tasting like a pineapple is. He also thought that this person cannot have the corresponding concept. A subsequent tradition in empiricism generalises these claims at least to all the so-called "secondary qualities." I will argue that this tradition is mistaken. I will argue that there…Read more
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78An Introduction to Philosophical MethodsBroadview Press. 2010.An Introduction to Philosophical Methods is the first book to survey the various methods that philosophers use to support their views. Rigorous yet accessible, the book introduces and illustrates the methodological considerations that are involved in current philosophical debates. Where there is controversy, the book presents the case for each side, but highlights where the key difficulties with them lie. While eminently student-friendly, the book makes an important contribution to the debate re…Read more
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169The metaphysics within physics • by Tim MaudlinAnalysis 69 (2): 374-375. 2009.The basic idea of Maudlin's superb book is methodological: ‘metaphysics, insofar as it is concerned with the natural world, can do no better than to reflect on physics. Physical theories provide us with the best handle we have on what there is, and the philosopher's proper task is the interpretation and elucidation of those theories. In particular, when choosing the fundamental posits of one's ontology, one must look to scientific practice rather than to philosophical prejudice’ .The apparently …Read more
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80Defending promiscuous realism about natural kindsPhilosophical Quarterly 46 (185): 496-500. 1996.
Areas of Interest
Metaphysics |
Philosophy of Mathematics |