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202God and first person in BerkeleyPhilosophy 82 (1): 87-114. 2007.Berkeley claims idealism provides a novel argument for the existence of God. But familiar interpretations of his argument fail to support the conclusion that there is a single omnipotent spirit. A satisfying reconstruction should explain the way Berkeley moves between first person singular and plural, as well as providing a powerful argument, once idealism is accepted. The new interpretation offered here represents the argument as an inference to the best explanation of a shared reality. Consequ…Read more
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117Beliefs, functionally discrete states, and connectionist networksBritish Journal for the Philosophy of Science 45 (3): 899-906. 1994.
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184Two Kinds of Causal ExplanationTheoria 76 (4): 287-313. 2010.To give a causal explanation is to give information about causal history. But a vast amount of causal history lies behind anything that happens, far too much to be included in any intelligible explanation. This is the Problem of Limitation for explanatory information. To cope with this problem, explanations must select for what is relevant to and adequate for answering particular inquiries. In the present paper this idea is used in order to distinguish two kinds of causal explanation, on the gro…Read more
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31Review of Hanne Andersen, Peter Barker, Xiang Chen, The Cognitive Structure of Scientific Revolutions (review)Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2007 (3). 2007.
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62Falsification and the existence of God: A discussion of Plantinga's free will defencePhilosophical Quarterly 27 (107): 114-134. 1977.
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