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116Beliefs, functionally discrete states, and connectionist networksBritish Journal for the Philosophy of Science 45 (3): 899-906. 1994.
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184Two Kinds of Causal ExplanationTheoria 76 (4): 287-313. 2010.To give a causal explanation is to give information about causal history. But a vast amount of causal history lies behind anything that happens, far too much to be included in any intelligible explanation. This is the Problem of Limitation for explanatory information. To cope with this problem, explanations must select for what is relevant to and adequate for answering particular inquiries. In the present paper this idea is used in order to distinguish two kinds of causal explanation, on the gro…Read more
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31Review of Hanne Andersen, Peter Barker, Xiang Chen, The Cognitive Structure of Scientific Revolutions (review)Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2007 (3). 2007.
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62Falsification and the existence of God: A discussion of Plantinga's free will defencePhilosophical Quarterly 27 (107): 114-134. 1977.
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50Right and Wrong Reasons in Folk‐Psychological ExplanationInternational Journal of Philosophical Studies 17 (4). 2009.Davidson argued that the fact we can have a reason for acting, and yet not be the reason why we act, requires explanation of action in terms of the agent's reasons to be causal. The present paper agrees with Dickenson (_Pacific Philosophical Quarterly_, 2007) in taking this argument to be an inference to the best explanation. However, its target phenomenon is the very existence of a case in which an agent has more than one reason, but acts exclusively becaue of one reason. Folk psychology appear…Read more
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