Paolo Becchi

The essay traces some of the decisive stages that have characterized, in modern times, the genesis and development of the idea of Europe, leading up to a critical interrogation of today’s European Union, analyzed from the point of view of the great European cultural season. In the essay the author employs the expression “European coup” in reference to the single currency and throws into sharp relief all the aporias and contradictions connected with it and made possible by the “European treaties”.

In this paper we offer an overall account of the complex and multilayered Italian reception of Hans Jonas’ philosophy, with an eye to its specific features compared to what happened elsewhere. After an introductory foreword the paper is structured in four sections and a brief conclusion, each of which deals with a peculiar aspect of Jonas’ thought: ethics and bioethics, philosophical biology and ontology of life, gnostic and religious studies, studies in the history of philosophy. In the final section we sum up the overall meaning of the «Wirkungsgeschichte» of Jonas’ philosophy in Italy and highlight possible lines of research still to be accomplished.

Die Wurde des Menschen wird oft in einen direkten Zusammenhang mit Autonomie gestellt: Wurde werde geachtet und geschutzt, indem man den Anderen in seiner freien Selbstbestimmung agieren und ihn seine selbstgesetzten Ziele verwirklichen lasse. Wenn man als Postulat der Wurde ausgibt, der andere durfe nicht zum blossen Objekt gemacht und vollstandig instrumentalisiert werden und er musse in seiner Selbstachtung geschutzt werden, ist meist dieser Bezug zur Autonomie hergestellt. Dennoch wird zu recht darauf hingewiesen, dass gerade Personen, die ihr Leben nicht selbst bestimmen konnen, wie geistig schwerstbehinderte Menschen oder Kleinkinder, im Hinblick auf ihre Menschenwurde als ganz besonders schutzbedurftig gelten. Eine den Begriff der Wurde ausschliesslich auf die Sicherung von Autonomie grundende Sicht gerat zudem insbesondere dort in Schwierigkeiten, wo Ethik und Recht auch die Wurde von Tieren oder Pflanzen zum Gegenstand haben, wie etwa im Schutz einer "Wurde der Kreatur" in der Schweizer Bundesverfassung. Die Autoren des Bandes suchen das schwierige Verhaltnis von Wurde und Autonomie klarer zu bestimmen und fragen nach einem moglichen Gehalt von Wurde im Zusammenhang von sowie jenseits von Autonomie.

According to Hans Jonas (1903–1993), the modern technological progress endowed humanity with wondrous power, which in the long run risks altering the nature of human action. This is especially true for the realm of collective action, the effects of which evidence an unpredicted issue: the ecological crisis, which is the “critical vulnerability” of nature to technological intervention. This discovery brings to light that the whole biosphere of the planet has been added to that which human beings must be responsible for because of their power over it. There is, however, a further dimension of vulnerability (and responsibility) to be considered, namely the one which characterizes organic life as such. Indeed, the essence of all living organisms–human beings included–is characterized by vulnerability, given their precarious and unstable condition of “needful freedom” towards the environment. Nevertheless, terrestrial life fl ourished through a multifaceted and unplanned (thus, again, vulnerable) evolution of living forms, ranging from bacteria to human beings – these evidencing a unique degree of freedom, which Jonas refers to as a “metaphysical gap” towards other living beings. The problem is that the present-day technology provides the possibility to manipulate the very essence of life and human nature. Is this process to be accepted and accomplished? And what about the related risks? Indeed, according to Jonas, issues such as genetic manipulation, euthanasia, organ transplantation, assisted reproduction, exploitation of other living beings etc., raise ethical dilemmas which can be addressed thanks to the idea of vulnerability.

The article deals with present day challenges related to the employ of technology in order to reduce the exposition of the human being to the risks and vulnerability of his or her existential condition. According to certain transhumanist and posthumanist thinkers, as well as some supporters of human enhancement, essential features of the human being, such as vulnerability and mortality, ought to be thoroughly overcome. The aim of this article is twofold: on the one hand, we wish to carry out an enquiry into the ontological and ethical thinking of Hans Jonas, who was among the first to address these very issues with great critical insight; on the other hand, we endeavour to highlight the relevance of Jonas’ reflections to current challenges related to bioscience and biotechnological progress. In this regard, we believe that the transcendent and metaphysical relevance of the «image of man» introduced by Jonas is of paramount importance to understand his criticism against those attempts to ameliorate the human being by endangering his or her essence.

Jonas beginnt seine Gedanken zur Sterbehilfe mit der grundsätzlichen Frage, ob es sinnvoll ist, von einem »Recht zu sterben« zu sprechen, wo doch das bedeutendste und grundlegendste aller Rechte gerade das Gegenteil schützt, denn das »Recht zu leben« ist der »Keim aller Rechtsordnung«. Sein einschlägiger Beitrag zu diesem Problem mit dem Titel: »Techniken des Todesaufschubs und das Recht zu sterben«, erschien erstmals 1978 in englischer Sprache unter der Überschrift »The Right to Die«, 1985 dann auf Deutsch.

In Italien erlangte Hans Jonas, ähnlich wie in andersen Ländern, öffentliche Anerkennung dank seines Werks Das Prinzip Verantwortung, das 1990 ins Italienische übersetzt wurde. Die Übersetzung weckte das Interesse einer breiten Öffentlichkeit sowohl an seinem bioethischen Ansatz als auch an seinen früheren philosophisch-biologischen Schriften. Die Besonderheit des italienischen Kontexts besteht jedoch darin, dass der Philosoph in der akademischen Welt bereits lange vor seiner eingangs erwähnten allgemeinen Anerkennung und ›Entdeckung‹ in der Öffentlichkeit durch seine Arbeiten über die spätantike Gnosis gut bekannt war.

This contribution analyses how the principle of human dignity is defined in the Italian Constitution and case law of the Constitutional Court. In this context, it is noteworthy that the Italian Constitution heavily focuses on the social dimension of human dignity. However, the developments in legislation and case law have let the concept of human dignity in Italy become more and more complex. It is used in different situations – for the right of the worker to receive a salary and for the fight against euthanasia as well. This discrepancy has resulted in a lively debate in Italy.

The Principality of Andorra is a special case within the European Community. Just in 1993, it became fully independent and, as a consequence, obtained its first constitution. Human dignity, however, had already been part of several Andorran statutes before 1993.Additionally, it is remarkable that the constitution defines human dignity as “untouchable” in an abstract manner, while at the same time it is linked to several concrete categories such as education and labour. The latter is also provided for in legislation and case law. On top of all this, public Andorran law stipulates sort of a “professional dignity”, which is completely separate from the abstract term of human dignity. Accordingly, Andorra is a good example of how various terms of dignity can evolve in a small country.