Paolo Diego Bubbio

The challenge to the “universal point of view” represented by the election of Donald Trump in 2016 is treated here as a challenge to the conception of “the open society” that many had adopted after the Second World War. Karl Popper’s influential modelling of democratic decision making on an idealised conception of the achievement of scientific consensus coincides with the polarisation of the “knowledge classes” from Trump’s “forgotten people”. A different conception of philosophy and its role in modern society is required as a non-scientistic alternative for reconciling the universal point of view with the views of the broader populace.

This article demonstrates the power of the phenomenological concept of ‘world’, and so the importance of philosophical concepts and philosophers, by considering the case of the U.S. Army’s ‘cultural turn’. After invading Iraq, the U.S. military found that soldiers lacked the training necessary for longterm engagement with a civilian population. Turning to anthropology and sociology, it introduced the concepts of culture, cultural awareness, and cultural sensitivity into its training. We argue that these concepts are crude and inadequate, and that the concept of world does a better job of illuminating the differences and similarities between soldiers’ and civilians’ respective lived systems of meaning. Through this case, we can see why we need philosophers and philosophy.

In addition to the long-standing divide between so-called ‘analytic’ and so-called ‘continental’ philosophy, philosophy is challenged in the political realm and concerns about public spending for philosophy increase. This is matched with a growing effort to popularize philosophy, bringing it into the public sphere. The effort to secure support for philosophy highlights the ambiguity of philosophical demarcation tactics, especially in a post-truth era which tends to underline science and technology education contra philosophy. But as with a concern for the history of science, philosophy’s past may yet prove useful in the future. Looking at both hermeneutics and history, inviting more than the usual cast of favorite authors into our intellectual network, it may be possible to bring philosophy into more global and pluralist expressions.

This article examines how Kant’s conception of sacrifice in Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason connects with his account of the sublime in the Critique of Judgment. We argue that the analogy between sacrifice and sublimity illuminates the transformation involved in moral rebirth, whereby the old self is relinquished for the sake of the new. This transformation comprises two interrelated aspects: suppressive sacrifice, which subordinates self-centered inclinations to the moral law, and kenotic sacrifice, in which self-centeredness is relinquished as part of a radical reorientation of one’s disposition. By situating these aspects within Kant’s discussions of grace, the archetype–prototype distinction, and the imagination’s “sacrifice” during experiences of the sublime, we show how sacrifice functions as a symbol both of the moral exemplar (Vorbild) and of the conversion process. The resulting threefold analogy—between the old/new self, Christ’s kenotic self-emptying, and the imagination’s renunciation within the experience of the sublime—reveals how aesthetic experience, especially the sublime, helps exemplify and empower moral transformation in Kant’s thought, supplementing what his ethics alone can explain.

In this chapter, I address the original and thought-provoking theory of humor advanced by Karl Wilhelm Ferdinand Solger (1780–1819). After having briefly contextualized Solger within the romantic/idealist era to which he belongs (Sect. 3.1), I provide a very essential account of his metaphysics (Sect. 3.2), as it is only against the background of his “kenotic” metaphysics, centered on the notion of double negation, that Solger’s aesthetics in general, and his theory of humor in particular, can be appreciated. Then, I consider Solger’s philosophical dialogue Erwin, focusing on the inter-related notions of “ridiculous,” “humor,” and “wit,” and interpreting them in the context of his general theory of irony (Sect. 3.3). Finally, I draw a comparison with Hegel in relation to the possibility of a post-romantic art (Sect. 3.4), remarking both similarities and differences between the two thinkers and, with reference to recent scholarship, advancing the hypothesis that Solger anticipated a conception of humor that is at work in the twentieth century “modernist” approach to art.

The article delves into two closely intertwined notions that have increasingly taken centre stage in Gianni Vattimo’s thought since the mid-eighties: secularisation and kenosis. The significance of these themes in Vattimo’s late work is such that, it is argued, it amounts to an actual Kehre, or turn. However, akin to Heidegger, Vattimo’s Kehre is not a radical break but a shift in research and reflection towards themes that, although already present in his philosophy, have assumed more distinctly religious nuances and have progressively developed up to the point where they have formed an organic perspective. The article traces this development, commencing with the notion of secularisation to then explore its interweaving with themes of emancipation and the violence of metaphysics. It concludes with a reflection on the central role of kenosis and its significance in Vattimo’s thought.

This thought-provoking study explores the philosophical resources provided by Hegel and Heidegger to grasp the nature of the "I" and combines those resources in a theoretical analysis of "I-hood" in its connection with nature and history, experience and myth. The "I" has a fleeting, almost elusive character in the philosophies of Hegel and Heidegger. Yet, both philosophers strive to make sense of what it means to be an "I". Their respective theories, though seemingly divergent, offer remarkable insights into the nature of the "I" and its relationship to the world. Through meticulous examination, this book explores the parallel journeys of Hegel and Heidegger, tracing their respective paths towards a comprehensive conception of identity beyond the subject/object dichotomy. Moreover, this study goes beyond being an exploration of Hegel's and Heidegger's conceptions of the self, by actively employing their insights to chart a path toward a novel understanding of "I-hood". Hegel, Heidegger and the Quest for the "I" will be of interest to scholars and advanced students working on Hegel, Heidegger, history of European philosophy, and contemporary theories of subjectivity and personal identity. Offering a fresh perspective on the work of these two seminal thinkers, the book contributes to the ongoing dialogue on the nature of the self and its place in the world.

This volume explores the relationship between justice and freedom in Hegel's practical philosophy, with a particular focus on the pivotal concept of reciprocal recognition. The contributors analyze the intersubjective relations between individuals and institutions through the lens of Hegel and demonstrate how his account of justice and freedom can be applied to address pressing issues in political philosophy. Despite extensive scrutiny of the concept of justice by political philosophers, Hegel's unique account has been notably overlooked. What sets Hegel apart is his emphasis on the inseparable link between justice and freedom. Freedom is inextricably tied to an account of just social relations and institutions, while justice itself is intertwined with a robust endorsement of freedom. The chapters comprising this volume examine three crucial dimensions of Hegel's framework for freedom and justice. First, the contributors address how Hegel's distinctive integration of freedom and justice sheds new light on the nature of his practical philosophy. Second, they relate Hegel's theory to other prominent accounts of justice, including Rawlsian forms of Kantian constructivism, Habermas' neo-Kantian discourse theory, republican views, neo Aristotelian accounts, and critical theory approaches. Finally, the contributors apply Hegel's reconstructed theory of justice to ongoing debates encompassing criminal justice, distributive justice, global justice, environmental justice, and issues related to racial and gender justice, as well as populism. Justice and Freedom in Hegel will appeal to scholars and advanced students engaged in research on Hegel's practical philosophy, 19th-century philosophy, and political philosophy.

This paper explores the death of God narrative through the lens of kenosis, drawing insights from thinkers such as Marcel, Heidegger, Vattimo, and Girard. It investigates the implications of kenotic thought for contemporary religious and philosophical discourse, exploring various interpretations of kenosis, ranging from Altizer and Žižek’s apocalyptic views to Vattimo’s more hopeful perspective. Through critical engagement with these viewpoints, this paper advocates for a nuanced understanding of kenosis inspired by Hegel, one that bypasses both radical theology and excessive optimism. Methodologically, this study adopts a hermeneutic approach, analyzing key texts and engaging in philosophical dialogue. This paper concludes that rethinking kenotic thought could provide a robust framework for grappling with the death of God in the contemporary context, offering avenues for ethical reflection, social critique, and speculative renewal.

This article explores Hegel's conception of experience, positing it as the entry point for grasping the implications of the philosophy of nature. The article briefly examines Hegel's view of nature, focusing on its transformative journey from externality to integration with the conscious I. Subsequently, the purpose of Hegel's philosophy of nature is discussed, and recent interpretations are compared. The article unfolds the notion of experience as a bridge between the subjective dimension explored in the Phenomenology of Spirit and the understanding of reality presented in the Encyclopedia. Experience, considered in its threefold meaning of unveiling, actively interpreting, and generating rationality within nature, dynamically shapes both the self‐conscious subject and the natural world across logic, nature, and spirit. Finally, the article highlights experience as mediating both the epistemological and the metaphysical relationship between nature and spirit. The article concludes by arguing that the transformative power of experience plays a central role in overcoming the separation between spirit and nature, fostering a mediated unity between the human subject and the natural world.

In this paper I address the issues raised by Daniele Fulvi, by focusing on the alleged anthropocentrism of my approach to kenotic thought. I defend ontological anthropocentrism (as opposed to ethical anthropocentrism), arguing that a qualified ontological anthropocentrism is not only inevitable, but also more appropriate in order to think of nature in the context of kenotic thought. Subsequently, I address the question of the relation between kenosis and truth, and the issue of how kenotic thought could, and should, relate to nature. I conclude by arguing that only by conceiving truth as mediated is it possible to develop a kenotic approach to nature that has the potential to contribute fruitfully to environmental ethics.