Ian Rumfitt

This paper assesses the prospects of a pragmatist theory of content. I begin by criticising the theory presented in D.H. Mellor’s essay ‘Successful Semantics’. I then identify problems and lacunae in the pragmatist theory of meaning sketched in Chapter 13 of Dummett’s The Logical Basis of Metaphysics. The prospects are brighter, I contend, for a tempered pragmatism, in which the theory of content is permitted to draw upon irreducible notions of truth and falsity. I sketch the shape of such a theory and illustrate the role of its pragmatist elements by showing how they point towards a promising account of the truth conditions of indicative conditionals. A feature of the account is that it validates Modus Ponens whilst invalidating Modus Tollens.

In what does the sense of a sentential connective consist? Like many others, I hold that its sense lies in rules that govern deductions. In the present paper, however, I argue that a classical logician should take the relevant deductions to be arguments involving affirmative or negative answers to yes-or-no questions that contain the connective. An intuitionistic logician will differ in concentrating exclusively upon affirmative answers. I conclude by arguing that a well known intuitionistic criticism of classical logic fails if the answer "No" is accorded parity with the answer "Yes".

Book synopsis: The philosophy of modality investigates necessity and possibility, and related notions--are they objective features of mind-independent reality? If so, are they irreducible, or can modal facts be explained in other terms? This volume presents new work on modality by established leaders in the field and by up-and-coming philosophers. Between them, the papers address fundamental questions concerning realism and anti-realism about modality, the nature and basis of facts about what is possible and what is necessary, the nature of modal knowledge, modal logic and its relations to necessary existence and to counterfactual reasoning. The general introduction locates the individual contributions in the wider context of the contemporary discussion of the metaphysics and epistemology of modality

In his essay ‘“Wang’s Paradox”’, Crispin Wright proposes a solution to the Sorites Paradox (in particular, the form of it he calls the ‘Paradox of Sharp Boundaries’) that involves adopting intuitionistic logic when reasoning with vague predicates. He does not give a semantic theory which accounts for the validity of intuitionistic logic (and the invalidity of stronger logics) in that area. The present essay tentatively makes good the deficiency. By applying a theorem of Tarski, it shows that intuitionistic logic is the strongest logic that may be applied, given certain semantic assumptions about vague predicates. The essay ends with an inconclusive discussion of whether those semantic assumptions should be accepted.

According to Quine, in any disagreement over basic logical laws the contesting parties must mean different things by the connectives or quantifiers implicated in those laws; when a deviant logician ‘tries to deny the doctrine he only changes the subject’. The standard semantics for intuitionism offers some confirmation for this thesis, for it represents an intuitionist as attaching quite different senses to the connectives than does a classical logician. All the same, I think Quine was wrong, even about the dispute between classicists and intuitionists. I argue for this by presenting an account of consequence, and a cognate semantic theory for the language of the propositional calculus, which respects the meanings of the connectives as embodied in the familiar classical truth-tables, does not presuppose Bivalence, and with respect to which the rules of the intuitionist propositional calculus are sound and complete. Thus the disagreement between classicists and intuitionists, at least, need not stem from their attaching different senses to the connectives; one may deny the doctrine without changing the subject. The basic notion of my semantic theory is truth at a possibility, where a possibility is a way that things might be, but which differs from a possible world in that the way in question need not be fully specific or determinate. I compare my approach with a previous theory of truth at a possibility due to Lloyd Humberstone, and with a previous attempt to refute Quine’s thesis due to John McDowell

The Logic of Gersonides, a Translation of Sefer ha‐Heggesh ha‐Yashar (The Book of the Correct Syllogism) of Rabbi Levi ben Gershom with Introduction, Commentary, and Analytical Glossary by Charles H. Manekin. New Synthese Historical Library, Vol. 40. Kluwer, Dordrecht, xii + 341 pp. ISBN 0–7923–1513–8 Luigi Firpo: Il processo di Giordano Bruno Rome (Salerno Editrice) 1993. pp. xxvii + 378. Hardback only: 44,000 liras. ISBN 88–8402–135–9. Anthony Kenny: Descartes. A Study of His Philosophy (Reissued Thoemmes Press, 1993) 256 pp. £9.99 ISBN 1 85506 236 4 A. John Simmons: The Lockean Theory of Rights Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1992 pp. ix, 387. £30.00. ISBN 0–691–08630–3 Ross Hutchison: Locke in France 1688–1734. The Voltaire Foundation, Oxford, 1991 (Studies on Voltaire and the Eighteenth Century, 290) pp. 251. £46.00. ISBN 0–7294–0418–8 Thomas Reid: Practical Ethics: Being Lectures and Tapers on Natural Religion, Self‐Government, Natural jurisprudence, and the Law of Nations Edited from the manuscripts with an Introduction and a Commentary by Knud Haakonssen. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1990. Pp. xvi + 556. £40.00. ISBN 0–691–07350–3 The Cambridge Companion to Kant ed. by Paul Guyer, Cambridge University Press, 1992. Pp. xii + 482 £40 hardback, £12.95 paperback. ISBN 0–521–36587–2 hardback, 0–521–36768–9 paperback. Gerd Buchdahl: Kant and the Dynamics of Reason Oxford: Blackwell. 1992. pp. x + 371 A. Bowie: Schelling and Modern European Philosophy: An Introduction Routledge: London and New York, 1993. Pp. 211. £37.50 hb. £11.99 pb. ISBN 0–415–10346–0 (hb), 0–415–10347–9 (pb) Miszellen zu Nietzsche. Versuche von operationalen Auslegungen von Jean‐Pierre Schobinger, Basel: Schwabe & Co. AG, 1992, 151 Seiten David Boucher and Andrew Vincent: A Radical Hegelian. The Political and Social Philosophy of Henry Jones Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 1993. Pp. x + 267. £35.00. ISBN 0–7083–1207–1 J. Alberto Coffa: The Semantic Tradition from Kant to Carnap: To the Vienna Station Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991, pbk. 1993, xii + 445 pp. £15.95. ISBN 0 521 44707 0.

In his 'paratactic' analysis of indirect speech reports, Davidson took the occurrence of 'that' in 'Galileo said that the Earth moves' to be a demonstrative expression which refers to the reporter's subsequent utterance of 'the Earth moves'. Ian McFetridge used his 'counting problem' to argue that we get a better version of the paratactic theory if we take the demonstrative 'that' to refer to the proposition expressed by the reporter's utterance, rather than to the utterance itself. In this note, I defend McFetridge's argument against an objection of Richard Holton's.