•  9
    Keith Frankish, Mind and Supermind (review)
    Philosophy in Review 26 (4): 254-256. 2006.
  •  514
    Escapism, religious luck, and divine reasons for action
    with Allen Plug
    Religious Studies 45 (1): 63-72. 2009.
    In our paper, ‘Escaping hell: divine motivation and the problem of hell’, we defended a theory of hell that we called ‘escapism’. We argued that given God’s just and loving character it would be most rational for God to maintain an open door policy to those who are in hell, allowing them an unlimited number of chances to be reconciled with God and enjoy communion with God. In this paper we reply to two recent objections to our original paper. The first is an argument from religious luck offered …Read more
  •  142
    The doctrine of agent-causation has been suggested by many interested in defending libertarian theories of free action to provide the conceptual apparatus necessary to make the notion of incompatibility freedom intelligible. In the present essay the conceptual viability of the doctrine of agent-causation will be assessed. It will be argued that agent-causation is, insofar as it is irreducible to event-causation, mysterious at best, totally unintelligible at worst. First, the arguments for agent-…Read more
  •  205
    Action-Individuation and Doxastic Agency
    Theoria 77 (4): 312-332. 2011.
    In this article, I challenge the dominant view of the importance of the debate over action-individuation. On the dominant view, it is held that the conclusions we reach about action-individuation make little or no difference for other debates in the philosophy of action, much less in other areas of philosophy. As a means of showing that the dominant view is mistaken, I consider the implications of accepting a given theory of action-individuation for thinking about doxastic agency. In particular,…Read more
  •  597
    Omniscience, the Incarnation, and Knowledge de se
    European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 4 (4): 59--71. 2012.
    A knowledge argument is offered that presents unique difficulties for Christians who wish to assert that God is essentially omniscient. The difficulties arise from the doctrine of the incarnation. Assuming that God the Son did not necessarily have to become incarnate, then God cannot necessarily have knowledge de se of the content of a non-divine mind. If this is right, then God’s epistemic powers are not fixed across possible worlds and God is not essentially omniscient. Some options for Christ…Read more
  •  1047
    Deciding to Believe Redux
    In Rico Vitz & Jonathan Matheson (eds.), The Ethics of Belief: Individual and Social, Oxford University Press. pp. 33-50. 2014.
    The ways in which we exercise intentional agency are varied. I take the domain of intentional agency to include all that we intentionally do versus what merely happens to us. So the scope of our intentional agency is not limited to intentional action. One can also exercise some intentional agency in omitting to act and, importantly, in producing the intentional outcome of an intentional action. So, for instance, when an agent is dieting, there is an exercise of agency both with respect to the ag…Read more