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1047Deciding to Believe ReduxIn Rico Vitz & Jonathan Matheson (eds.), The Ethics of Belief: Individual and Social, Oxford University Press. pp. 33-50. 2014.The ways in which we exercise intentional agency are varied. I take the domain of intentional agency to include all that we intentionally do versus what merely happens to us. So the scope of our intentional agency is not limited to intentional action. One can also exercise some intentional agency in omitting to act and, importantly, in producing the intentional outcome of an intentional action. So, for instance, when an agent is dieting, there is an exercise of agency both with respect to the ag…Read more
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597Omniscience, the Incarnation, and Knowledge de seEuropean Journal for Philosophy of Religion 4 (4): 59--71. 2012.A knowledge argument is offered that presents unique difficulties for Christians who wish to assert that God is essentially omniscient. The difficulties arise from the doctrine of the incarnation. Assuming that God the Son did not necessarily have to become incarnate, then God cannot necessarily have knowledge de se of the content of a non-divine mind. If this is right, then God’s epistemic powers are not fixed across possible worlds and God is not essentially omniscient. Some options for Christ…Read more
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57Helen Steward , A Metaphysics for Freedom . Reviewed byPhilosophy in Review 33 (6): 493-495. 2013.
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30Can the Agency Theory Be Salvaged?Philosophia Christi 3 (1): 217-224. 2001.Some of the most salient features of Randolph Clarke's causal agent-causal theory of free action are explicated and his theory critiqued. It is shown that invoking agent-causation is unnecessary and makes his theory cumbersome. For insofar as Clarke seeks to render the agency theory more intelligible by appealing to event-causation as contributing to the generation of basic actions, his theory gravitates closer to a causal indeterminist theory of free action.
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70An Essay on Doxastic AgencyDissertation, University of Rochester. 2005.The problem of doxastic agency concerns what sort of agency humans can exercise with regard to forming doxastic attitudes such as belief. In this essay I defend a version of what James Montmarquet calls "The Asymmetry Thesis": Coming to believe and action are asymmetrical with respect to direct voluntary control. I argue that normal adult human agents cannot exercise direct voluntary control over the acquisition of any of their doxastic attitudes in the same way that they exercise such control o…Read more
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40New waves in philosophy of action (edited book)Palgrave-Macmillan. 2011.Andrei A. Buckareff is Assistant Professor at Marist College, USA --
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48Maria Alvarez , Kinds of Reasons: An Essay in the Philosophy of Action . Reviewed byPhilosophy in Review 31 (4): 245-247. 2011.
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Philosophy of Action |
Philosophy of Mind |
Philosophy of Religion |
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Action Theory |
Causal Theory of Action |
Pantheism |
Panentheism |