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169Can faith be a doxastic venture?Religious Studies 41 (4): 435-445. 2005.In a recent article in this journal, John Bishop argues in defence of conceiving of Christian faith as a ‘doxastic venture’. That is, he defends the claim that, in exercising faith, agents believe beyond ‘what can be established rationally on the basis of evidence and argument’. Careful examination reveals that Bishop fails adequately to show that faith in the face of inadequate epistemic reasons for believing is, or can even be, a uniquely doxastic venture. I argue that faith is best conceived …Read more
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122An action theoretic problem for intralevel mental causationPhilosophical Issues 22 (1): 89-105. 2012.I take it that the following is a desideratum of our theories in the philosophy of mind. A theory in the philosophy of mind should help us better understand ourselves as agents and aid in our theorizing about the nature of action and agency. In this paper I discuss a strategy adopted by some defenders of nonreductive physicalism in response to the problem of causal exclusion. The strategy, which I refer to as “intralevelism,” relies on treating mental causation as intra level mental to mental ca…Read more
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137Intentions are mental statesPhilosophical Explorations 9 (2). 2006.Richard Scheer has recently argued against what he calls the 'mental state' theory of intentions. He argues that versions of this theory fail to account for various characteristics of intention. In this essay we reply to Scheer's criticisms and argue that intentions are mental states.
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299Agency, consciousness, and executive controlPhilosophia 37 (1): 21-30. 2009.On the Causal Theory of Action (CTA), internal proper parts of an agent such as desires and intentions are causally responsible for actions. CTA has increasingly come under attack for its alleged failure to account for agency. A recent version of this criticism due to François Schroeter proposes that CTA cannot provide an adequate account of either the executive control or the autonomous control involved in full-fledged agency. Schroeter offers as an alternative a revised understanding of the pr…Read more
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Peter Forrest, Developmental Theism: From Pure Will to Unbounded Love (review)Philosophy in Review 28 (3): 190-192. 2008.
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155Intralevel mental causationFrontiers of Philosophy in China 6 (3): 402-425. 2011.This paper identifies and critiques a theory of mental causation defended by some proponents of nonredutive physicalism that I call “intralevelism.” Intralevelist theories differ in their details. On all versions, the causal outcome of the manifestation of physical properties is physical and the causal outcome of the manifestation of mental properties is mental. Thus, mental causation on this view is intralevel mental to mental causation. This characterization of mental causation as intralevel i…Read more
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143Escaping hell but not heavenInternational Journal for Philosophy of Religion 77 (3): 247-253. 2015.Benjamin Matheson has recently critiqued the escapist account of hell that we have defended. In this paper we respond to Matheson. Building on some of our work in defense of escapism that Matheson does not discuss we show that the threat posed by Matheson’s critique is chimerical. We begin by summarizing our escapist theory of hell. Next, we summarize both Matheson’s central thesis and the main arguments offered in its defense. We then respond to those arguments
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63Bruno Verbeek (ed.), Reasons and Intentions (Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing, 2008), 243 pages. ISBN: 9780754660040 (hbk.). Hardback: £65.00 (review)Journal of Moral Philosophy 9 (2): 308-310. 2012.
APA Eastern Division
Poughkeepsie, NY, United States of America
Areas of Specialization
Metaphysics |
Philosophy of Action |
Philosophy of Mind |
Philosophy of Religion |
PhilPapers Editorships
Action Theory |
Causal Theory of Action |
Pantheism |
Panentheism |