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140Escaping hell but not heavenInternational Journal for Philosophy of Religion 77 (3): 247-253. 2015.Benjamin Matheson has recently critiqued the escapist account of hell that we have defended. In this paper we respond to Matheson. Building on some of our work in defense of escapism that Matheson does not discuss we show that the threat posed by Matheson’s critique is chimerical. We begin by summarizing our escapist theory of hell. Next, we summarize both Matheson’s central thesis and the main arguments offered in its defense. We then respond to those arguments
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63Bruno Verbeek (ed.), Reasons and Intentions (Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing, 2008), 243 pages. ISBN: 9780754660040 (hbk.). Hardback: £65.00 (review)Journal of Moral Philosophy 9 (2): 308-310. 2012.
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300Acceptance and deciding to believeJournal of Philosophical Research 29 173-190. 2004.ABSTRACT: Defending the distinction between believing and accepting a proposition, I argue that cases where agents allegedly exercise direct voluntary control over their beliefs are instances of agents exercising direct voluntary control over accepting a proposition. The upshot is that any decision to believe a proposition cannot result directly in one’s acquiring the belief. Accepting is an instrumental mental action the agent performs that may trigger belief. A model of the relationship betwee…Read more
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157The Primacy of the Mental in the Explanation of Human ActionDisputatio 3 (26). 2009.The mentalistic orthodoxy about reason-explanations of action in the philosophy of mind has recently come under renewed attack. Julia Tanney is among those who have critiqued mentalism. The alternative account of the folk practice of giving reason-explanations of actions she has provided affords features of an agent’s external environment a privileged role in explaining the intentional behaviour of agents. The authors defend the mentalistic orthodoxy from Tanney’s criticisms, arguing that Tanney…Read more
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209Doxastic decisions and controlling beliefActa Analytica 21 (1): 102-114. 2006.I critique Matthias Steupâs account of exercising direct voluntary control over coming to have doxastic attitudes via doxastic decisions. I show that the sort of agency Steup argues is exercised in doxastic decision-making is not sufficient for agents to exercise direct voluntary control over their doxastic attitudes. This counts against such putative decisions being the locus of direct control in doxastic agency. Finally, I briefly consider what, if any, consequences the failure of Steupâs …Read more
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174Mental overpopulation and mental action: Protecting intentions from mental birth controlCanadian Journal of Philosophy 37 (1): 49-65. 2007.Many philosophers of action afford intentions a central role in theorizing about action and its explanation. Furthermore, current orthodoxy in the philosophy of action has it that intentions play a causal role with respect to the etiology and explanation of action. But action theory is not without its heretics. Some philosophers have challenged the orthodox view. In this paper I examine and critique one such challenge. I consider David-Hillel Ruben's case against the need for intentions to …Read more
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234How (not) to think about mental actionPhilosophical Explorations 8 (1): 83-89. 2005.I examine Galen Strawson's recent work on mental action in his paper, 'Mental Ballistics or The Involuntariness of Spontaneity'. I argue that his account of mental action is too restrictive. I offer a means of testing tokens of mental activity types to determine if they are actional. The upshot is that a good deal more mental activity than Strawson admits is actional.
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92Causalisms ReconsideredDialogue 43 (1): 147-. 2004.We reply to Andrew Sneddon’s recent criticism of the causal theory of action (CTA) and critically examine Sneddon’s preferred alternative, minimal causalism. We show that Sneddon’s criticism of CTA is problematic in several respects, and therefore his conclusion that “the prospects for CTA look poor” is unjustified. Moreover, we show that the minimal causalism that Sneddon advocates looks rather unpromising and its merits that Sneddon mentions are untenable.
APA Eastern Division
Poughkeepsie, NY, United States of America
Areas of Specialization
Metaphysics |
Philosophy of Action |
Philosophy of Mind |
Philosophy of Religion |
PhilPapers Editorships
Action Theory |
Causal Theory of Action |
Pantheism |
Panentheism |