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1609The causal mechanical model of explanationMinnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 13 359-83. 1989.
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53Are Singular Causal Explanations Implicit Covering-Law Explanations?Canadian Journal of Philosophy 16 (2). 1986.My focus in this essay is on those singular causal explanations which purport to explain the occurrence of some particular event by means of a claim of the following general sort The occurrence of event caused the occurrence of event.Examples include sentences like The short circuit caused the fire’ and The impact of the hammer caused the shattering of the glass,’ Many philosophers hold that there is a sharp distinction to be drawn between singular causal explanations and those sentences which s…Read more
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47Logic of discovery or psychology of invention?Foundations of Physics 22 (2): 187-203. 1992.It is noted that Popper separates the creation of concepts, conjectures, hypotheses and theories—the context of invention—from the testing thereof—the context of justification—arguing that only the latter is susceptible of rigorous logical analysis. Efforts on the part of others to shift or eradicate the demarcation established by this distinction are discussed and the relationship of these considerations to the claims of “strong artificial intelligence” is pointed out. It is argued that the mod…Read more
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541Explanation and invariance in the special sciencesBritish Journal for the Philosophy of Science 51 (2): 197-254. 2000.This paper describes an alternative to the common view that explanation in the special sciences involves subsumption under laws. According to this alternative, whether or not a generalization can be used to explain has to do with whether it is invariant rather than with whether it is lawful. A generalization is invariant if it is stable or robust in the sense that it would continue to hold under a relevant if it is stable or robust in the sense that it would continue to hold under a relevant cla…Read more
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52Comment: Levels of Explanation and Variable ChoiceIn Kenneth S. Kendler & Josef Parnas (eds.), Philosophical Issues in Psychiatry: Explanation, Phenomenology, and Nosology, Johns Hopkins University Press. pp. 216. 2008.
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, United States of America
Areas of Interest
Philosophy of Biology |
General Philosophy of Science |