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331Counterfactuals and causal explanationInternational Studies in the Philosophy of Science 18 (1). 2002.This article defends the use of interventionist counterfactuals to elucidate causal and explanatory claims against criticisms advanced by James Bogen and Peter Machamer. Against Bogen, I argue that counterfactual claims concerning what would happen under interventions are meaningful and have determinate truth values, even in a deterministic world. I also argue, against both Machamer and Bogen, that we need to appeal to counterfactuals to capture the notions like causal relevance and causal mecha…Read more
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1609The causal mechanical model of explanationMinnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 13 359-83. 1989.
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53Are Singular Causal Explanations Implicit Covering-Law Explanations?Canadian Journal of Philosophy 16 (2). 1986.My focus in this essay is on those singular causal explanations which purport to explain the occurrence of some particular event by means of a claim of the following general sort The occurrence of event caused the occurrence of event.Examples include sentences like The short circuit caused the fire’ and The impact of the hammer caused the shattering of the glass,’ Many philosophers hold that there is a sharp distinction to be drawn between singular causal explanations and those sentences which s…Read more
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47Logic of discovery or psychology of invention?Foundations of Physics 22 (2): 187-203. 1992.It is noted that Popper separates the creation of concepts, conjectures, hypotheses and theories—the context of invention—from the testing thereof—the context of justification—arguing that only the latter is susceptible of rigorous logical analysis. Efforts on the part of others to shift or eradicate the demarcation established by this distinction are discussed and the relationship of these considerations to the claims of “strong artificial intelligence” is pointed out. It is argued that the mod…Read more
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541Explanation and invariance in the special sciencesBritish Journal for the Philosophy of Science 51 (2): 197-254. 2000.This paper describes an alternative to the common view that explanation in the special sciences involves subsumption under laws. According to this alternative, whether or not a generalization can be used to explain has to do with whether it is invariant rather than with whether it is lawful. A generalization is invariant if it is stable or robust in the sense that it would continue to hold under a relevant if it is stable or robust in the sense that it would continue to hold under a relevant cla…Read more
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52Comment: Levels of Explanation and Variable ChoiceIn Kenneth S. Kendler & Josef Parnas (eds.), Philosophical Issues in Psychiatry: Explanation, Phenomenology, and Nosology, Johns Hopkins University Press. pp. 216. 2008.
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82Book review: Doubt and certainty, by Tony Rothman and George Sudarshan (review)Foundations of Physics 29 (5): 819-843. 1999.
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265Realism about lawsErkenntnis 36 (2): 181-218. 1992.This paper explores the idea that laws express relationships between properties or universals as defended in Michael Tooley's recent book Causation: A Realist Approach. I suggest that the most plausible version of realism will take a different form than that advocated by Tooley. According to this alternative, laws are grounded in facts about the capacities and powers of particular systems, rather than facts about relations between universals. The notion of lawfulness is linked to the notion of i…Read more
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2Philosophical Perspectives on Causal Reasoning in Biology (edited book)University of Minnesota Press. forthcoming.
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264Cause and explanation in psychiatry: An interventionist perspectiveIn Kenneth S. Kendler & Josef Parnas (eds.), Philosophical Issues in Psychiatry: Explanation, Phenomenology, and Nosology, Johns Hopkins University Press. 2008.This paper explores some issues concerning the nature and structure of causal explanation in psychiatry and psychology from the point of view of the “interventionist” theory defended in my book, Making Things Happen. Among the issues is explored is the extent to which candidate causal explanations involving “upper level” or relatively coarse-grained or macroscopic variables such as mental/psychological states (e.g. highly self critical beliefs or low self esteem) or environmental factors (e.g. p…Read more
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336There is No Such Thing as a Ceteris Paribus LawErkenntnis 57 (3). 2002.In this paper I criticize the commonly accepted idea that the generalizations of the special sciences should be construed as ceteris paribus laws. This idea rests on mistaken assumptions about the role of laws in explanation and their relation to causal claims. Moreover, the major proposals in the literature for the analysis of ceteris paribus laws are, on their own terms, complete failures. I sketch a more adequate alternative account of the content of causal generalizations in the special scie…Read more
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203Mechanisms revisitedSynthese 183 (3): 409-427. 2011.This paper defends an interventionist treatment of mechanisms and contrasts this with Waskan (forthcoming). Interventionism embodies a difference-making conception of causation. I contrast such conceptions with geometrical/mechanical or “actualist” conceptions, associating Waskan’s proposals with the latter. It is argued that geometrical/mechanical conceptions of causation cannot replace difference-making conceptions in characterizing the behavior of mechanisms, but that some of the intuitions b…Read more
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117Manipulation and the causal Markov conditionPhilosophy of Science 71 (5): 846-856. 2004.This paper explores the relationship between a manipulability conception of causation and the causal Markov condition (CM). We argue that violations of CM also violate widely shared expectations—implicit in the manipulability conception—having to do with the absence of spontaneous correlations. They also violate expectations concerning the connection between independence or dependence relationships in the presence and absence of interventions.
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55Explaining Explanation (review)Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (2): 477-482. 1996.David-Hillel Ruben’s interesting and engaging book, Explaining Explanation, is in part an historical study, in part a commentary on the contemporary literature on explanation, and in part a presentation of Ruben’s own theory. The early chapters trace ideas about explanation Ruben finds in Plato, Aristotle, and Mill and connect these up with themes in the contemporary literature—for example, Plato’s criticisms of explanation by and of opposites are brought to bear on present-day issues concerning…Read more
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57Critical review: Horwich on the ravens, projectability and induction (review)Philosophical Studies 47 (3). 1985.
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35Book Review: The Fabric of the Cosmos. By Brian Greene, Alfred A. Knopf, New York, U.S.A., 2004, xii + 569 pp., $28.95 (hardcover) (review)Foundations of Physics 34 (8): 1267-1273. 2004.
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298Scientific explanationBritish Journal for the Philosophy of Science 30 (1): 41-67. 1979.Issues concerning scientific explanation have been a focus of philosophical attention from Pre- Socratic times through the modern period. However, recent discussion really begins with the development of the Deductive-Nomological (DN) model. This model has had many advocates (including Popper 1935, 1959, Braithwaite 1953, Gardiner, 1959, Nagel 1961) but unquestionably the most detailed and influential statement is due to Carl Hempel (Hempel 1942, 1965, and Hempel & Oppenheim 1948). These papers a…Read more
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231A Functional Account of Causation; or, A Defense of the Legitimacy of Causal Thinking by Reference to the Only Standard That Matters—UsefulnessPhilosophy of Science 81 (5): 691-713. 2014.This essay advocates a “functional” approach to causation and causal reasoning: these are to be understood in terms of the goals and purposes of causal thinking. This approach is distinguished from accounts based on metaphysical considerations or on reconstruction of “intuitions.”
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458Interventionism and Causal ExclusionPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 91 (2): 303-347. 2015.A number of writers, myself included, have recently argued that an “interventionist” treatment of causation of the sort defended in Woodward, 2003 can be used to cast light on so-called “causal exclusion” arguments. This interventionist treatment of causal exclusion has in turn been criticized by other philosophers. This paper responds to these criticisms. It describes an interventionist framework for thinking about causal relationships when supervenience relations are present. I contend that th…Read more
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82Data, Phenomena, Signal, and NoisePhilosophy of Science 77 (5): 792-803. 2010.This essay attempts to provide additional motivation for the data/phenomena framework advocated in Bogen and Woodward, “Saving the Phenomena”.
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335Causation and manipulabilityStanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 2008.Manipulablity theories of causation, according to which causes are to be regarded as handles or devices for manipulating effects, have considerable intuitive appeal and are popular among social scientists and statisticians. This article surveys several prominent versions of such theories advocated by philosophers, and the many difficulties they face. Philosophical statements of the manipulationist approach are generally reductionist in aspiration and assign a central role to human action. These …Read more
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191The mind is not (just) a system of modules shaped (just) by natural selectionIn Christopher Hitchcock (ed.), Contemporary debates in philosophy of science, Blackwell. pp. 312-34. 2004.
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738Making things happen: a theory of causal explanationOxford University Press. 2003.Woodward's long awaited book is an attempt to construct a comprehensive account of causation explanation that applies to a wide variety of causal and explanatory claims in different areas of science and everyday life. The book engages some of the relevant literature from other disciplines, as Woodward weaves together examples, counterexamples, criticisms, defenses, objections, and replies into a convincing defense of the core of his theory, which is that we can analyze causation by appeal to the…Read more
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150Modularity and the causal Markov condition: A restatementBritish Journal for the Philosophy of Science 55 (1): 147-161. 2004.expose some gaps and difficulties in the argument for the causal Markov condition in our essay ‘Independence, Invariance and the Causal Markov Condition’ ([1999]), and we are grateful for the opportunity to reformulate our position. In particular, Cartwright disagrees vigorously with many of the theses we advance about the connection between causation and manipulation. Although we are not persuaded by some of her criticisms, we shall confine ourselves to showing how our central argument can be r…Read more
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70This paper employs an interventionist framework to elucidate some issues having to do with explanation in neurobiology and with the differences between mechanistic and non-mechanistic explanations.
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, United States of America
Areas of Interest
Philosophy of Biology |
General Philosophy of Science |