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483A Selective Survey of Theories of Scientific MethodIn Robert Nola & Howard Sankey (eds.), After Popper, Kuhn and Feyerabend: Recent Issues in Theories of Scientific Method, Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 1-65. 2000.This is a survey of theories of scientific method which opens the book "After Popper, Kuhn and Feyerabend: Recent Issues in Theories of Scientific Method".
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Lakatos's Idea of Scientific Research ProgramsIn Gregory A. Good (ed.), Sciences of the Earth: An encyclopedia of Events, People and Phenomena, Volume 2, Garland. pp. 499-502. 1998.Introductory discussion of Lakatos's idea of scientific research programmes, and an application to the case-study of continental drift.
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182Truth and reality in social constructivismArena Journal 2 233-252. 1993/1994.This is a co-authored dialogue which explores epistemological and metaphysical questions raised by a social constructivist approach to science.
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Rationality, Relativism and Methodological PluralismExplorations in Knowledge 13 (1): 18-36. 1996.Readers interested in this paper will find it is reprinted as chapter nine of my book, Rationality, Relativism and Incommensurability.
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351Judgement and Rational Theory-ChoiceMethodology and Science 27 (3): 167-182. 1994.It is argued that in the absence of an algorithm of theory-choice, a role must be played by deliberative judgement in the process of choosing rationally between theories.
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283In defence of untranslatabilityAustralasian Journal of Philosophy 68 (1). 1990.This paper addresses criticisms of the concept of untranslatability which Davidson and Putnam have raised against the incommensurability thesis.
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373Il Problema Dell'Incommensurabilita Delle Teorie ScientificheNuova Secondaria 5 61-66. 1997.This is an Italian translation of a lecture on incommensurability given at the University of Genoa.
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344Alexander Bird: Thomas Kuhn (review)Philosophical Quarterly 52 (209): 654-657. 2002.This is a review of Alexander Bird's book on Thomas Kuhn.
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365To believe is to believe truePrincipia: An International Journal of Epistemology 23 (1): 131-136. 2019.It is argued that to believe is to believe true. That is, when one believes a proposition one thereby believes the proposition to be true. This is a point about what it is to believe rather than about the aim of belief or the standard of correctness for belief. The point that to believe is to believe true appears to be an analytic truth about the concept of belief. It also appears to be essential to the state of belief that to believe is to believe true. This is not just a contingent fact about …Read more
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499Bojana Mladenovic: Kuhn's Legacy: Epistemology, Metaphilosophy, and Pragmatism (review)Philosophical Review 127 (4): 532-535. 2018.This is a book review of Bojana Mladenovic, Kuhn's Legacy: Epistemology, Metaphilosophy, and Pragmatism
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297Some Reflections on Experimental IncommensurabilityIn Lena Soler, Howard Sankey & Paul Hoyningen-Huene (eds.), Rethinking Scientific Change and Theory Comparison: Stabilities, Ruptures, Incommensurabilities?, Springer. pp. 341-347. 2008.This is a comment on Lena Soler's 'The Incommensurability of Experimental Practices'
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115Paul Horwich (ed.): World Changes: Thomas Kuhn and the Nature of Science (review)Metascience 8 140-142. 1995.This is a book review of Paul Horwich (ed.) World Changes
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317IncommensurabilityIn Sahotra Sarkar & Jessica Pfeifer (eds.), The Philosophy of Science: An Encyclopedia, Routledge. pp. 370-373. 2005.This is a short introductory discussion of the idea of incommensurability as it is used in the philosophy of science.
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166Comment on Scientific Objectivity with a Human FaceIn Martin Carrier, Johannes Roggenhofer, Günter Küppers & Philippe Blanchard (eds.), Knowledge and the World: Challenges Beyond the Science Wars, Springer. pp. 95-98. 2011.This is a comment on Professor Holm Tetens' paper, 'Scientific Objectivity with a Human Face'
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924Scientific methodIn Stathis Psillos & Martin Curd (eds.), The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Science, Routledge. pp. 248-258. 2008.This is an introductory overview of theories of scientific method.
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438What is Scientific Realism?Divinatio 12 103-120. 2000.This is an introduction to the position of scientific realism, which outlines a number of core doctrines of scientific realism, and indicates a number of optional and non-core doctrine. It also sketches the basic argument for scientific realism, known as the success argument.
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197A Less Than Direct Connection Indeed: Reply to JakowljewitschDivinatio 24 157-168. 2006.This is a response to Dragan Jakowljewitsch's 'The Successes of Science and Scientific-Theoretical Realism: A Less Than Direct Connection'
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183Realism Without LimitsDivinatio 20 145-165. 2004.This is a sequel to my paper, ‘What is Scientific Realism?’, which appeared in an earlier issue of this journal (Sankey, 2000a). A number of papers by other authors on topics relating to scientific realism have followed in subsequent issues. In this paper I revisit some of the themes developed in my earlier paper in the light of these later papers. I begin by restating the key ideas of the earlier paper. Next, I mention a number of afterthoughts which I have had since the appearance of the paper…Read more
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857Incommensurability and Theory ChangeIn Steven D. Hales (ed.), A Companion to Relativism, Wiley-blackwell. pp. 456-474. 2011.The paper explores the relativistic implications of the thesis of incommensurability. A semantic form of incommensurability due to semantic variation between theories is distinguished from a methodological form due to variation in methodological standards between theories. Two responses to the thesis of semantic incommensurability are dealt with: the first challenges the idea of untranslatability to which semantic incommensurability gives rise; the second holds that relations of referential c…Read more
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134Paul Hoyningen-Huene: Reconstructing Scientific Revolutions: Thomas S. Kuhn's Philosophy of Science (review)Australasian Journal of Philosophy 73 (3): 487-489. 1995.This is a book review of Paul Hoyningen-Huene's Reconstructing Scientific Revolutions: Thomas S. Kuhn's Philosophy of Science.
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1435Scientific Realism and the Conflict with Common SenseIn Wenceslao J. Gonzalez (ed.), New Approaches to Scientific Realism, De Gruyter. pp. 68-83. 2020.In this paper, I explore the purported conflict between science and common sense within the context of scientific realism. I argue for a version of scientific realism which retains commitment to realism about common sense rather than seeking to eliminate it.
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353Errol Morris: The Ashtray (Or The Man who Denied Reality) (review)Metascience 28 (1): 65-67. 2018.This is a book review of Errol Morris's book on Kuhn, The Ashtray (Or the Man Who Denied Reality)
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1282Does science provide knowledge of reality? In this paper, I offer a positive response to this question. I reject the anti-realist claim that we are unable to acquire knowledge of reality in favour of the realist view that science yields knowledge of the external world. But what world is that? Some argue that science leads to the overthrow of our commonsense view of the world. Common sense is “stone-age metaphysics” to be rejected as the false theory of our primitive ancestors. Against such elimi…Read more
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1336Putnam's Internal Realism in RetrospectAnálisis. Revista de Investigación Filosófica 5 (1): 27-50. 2018.As is well known, Putnam changed his philosophical position on a number of occasions throughout his career. In this paper, I reconsider the position of internal realism which Putnam defended from the mid-1970’s until around 1990. The paper opens with a discussion of the position that Putnam called “metaphysical realism”, since his internal realism emerged out of a critique of that position. The paper then briefly presents the internal realist view as one which involves an epistemic conception…Read more
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737Induction and Natural Kinds RevisitedIn Stathis Psillos, Benjamin Hill & Henrik Lagerlund (eds.), Causal Powers in Science: Blending Historical and Conceptual Perspectives, Oxford University Press. pp. 284-299. 2021.In ‘Induction and Natural Kinds’, I proposed a solution to the problem of induction according to which our use of inductive inference is reliable because it is grounded in the natural kind structure of the world. When we infer that unobserved members of a kind will have the same properties as observed members of the kind, we are right because all members of the kind possess the same essential properties. The claim that the existence of natural kinds is what grounds reliable use of induction is…Read more
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215Incommensurability: An OverviewDivinatio 10 135-48. 1999.Opening remarks delivered at "Incommensurability (and related matters)" conference, Hanover, June 1999
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221Induction and Natural KindsPrincipia: An International Journal of Epistemology 1 (2): 239-254. 1997.The paper sketches an ontological solution to an epistemological problem in the philosophy of science. Taking the work of Hilary Kornblith and Brian Ellis as a point of departure, it presents a realist solution to the Humean problem of induction, which is based on a scientific essentialist interpretation of the principle of the uniformity of nature. More specifically, it is argued that use of inductive inference in science is rationally justified because of the existence of real, natural kinds o…Read more
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327Lakatosian ParticularismLogos and Episteme 9 (1): 49-59. 2018.This paper explores a particularist element in the theory of method of Imre Lakatos, who appealed to the value-judgements of élite scientists in the appraisal of competing theories of method. The role played by such value-judgements is strongly reminiscent of the epistemological particularism of Roderick Chisholm. Despite the existence of a clear parallel between the particularist approaches of both authors, it is argued that Lakatos’s approach is subject to a weakness that does not affect the…Read more
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325A Dilemma for the Scientific RealistSpontaneous Generations 9 (1): 65-67. 2018.This note poses a dilemma for scientific realism which stems from the apparent conflict between science and common sense. On the one hand, we may accept scientific realism and agree that there is a conflict between science and common sense. If we do this, we remove the evidential basis for science and have no reason to accept science in the first place. On the other hand, we may accept scientific realism and endorse common sense. If we do this, we must reject the conflict between science and com…Read more
Melbourne, Victoria, Australia
Areas of Specialization
Epistemology |
General Philosophy of Science |
Areas of Interest
Scientific Realism |
Metaphysical Realism |
Incommensurability in Science |
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