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338The Demise of the Incommensurability ThesisIn Moti Mizrahi (ed.), The Kuhnian Image of Science: Time for a Decisive Transformation?, Rowman and Littlefield. pp. 75-91. 2016.The paper briefly reviews the main formulations of the incommensurability thesis by Feyerabend and Kuhn, as well as the main criticisms leveled against it. The question is then raised of whether there is a "phenomenon" of incommensurability that has been "discovered". It is argued that there is no such phenomenon.
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1394Kuhn, Relativism and RealismIn Juha Saatsi (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Scientific Realism, Routledge. pp. 72-83. 2018.The aim of this chapter is to explore the relationship between Kuhn’s views about science and scientific realism. I present an overview of key features of Kuhn’s model of scientific change. The model suggests a relativistic approach to the methods of science. I bring out a conflict between this relativistic approach and a realist approach to the norms of method. I next consider the question of progress and truth. Kuhn’s model is a problem-solving model that proceeds by way of puzzles and an…Read more
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1002Subject and Object in Scientific RealismIn Paula Angelova, Jassen Andreev & Emil Lensky (eds.), Das Interpretative Universum, Konigshausen & Neumann. pp. 293-306. 2017.In this paper, I explore the relationship between the subject and the object from the perspective of scientific realism. I first characterize the scientific realist position that I adopt. I then address the question of the nature of scientific knowledge from a realist point of view. Next I consider the question of how to locate the knowing subject within the context of scientific realism. After that I consider the place of mind in an objective world. I close with some general remarks on the…Read more
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45Over-MeasurementMeasurement 93 379-384. 2016.Measurement is a special type of evaluation that is more exact than either opinion or estimation. In the social sciences, in particular, most evaluations are not measures, but rather mixtures of opinion and estimation. Over-measurement represents anchoring to evaluations which are not measures. For an over-measured characteristic, single measures are used when instead a portfolio of possible measures should be used. There are three implications. First, measurements of characteristics which depen…Read more
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657Ciencia, Sentido Comun Y RealidadDiscusiones Filosóficas 11 (16): 41-58. 2010.¿La ciencia otorga conocimiento de la realidad? En este artículo ofrezco una respuesta positiva a esta pregunta. Rechazo la pretensión anti-realista según la cual somos incapaces de adquirir conocimiento de la realidad; al contrario, apoyo la visión realista que afirma que la ciencia produce conocimiento del mundo externo. Pero: ¿cuál mundo es ese? Algunos sostienen que la ciencia conduce a la superación de nuestra visión del mundo dada por el sentido común. El sentido común es la “metafísica de…Read more
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337Witchcraft, Relativism and the Problem of the CriterionErkenntnis 72 (1): 1-16. 2010.This paper presents a naturalistic response to the challenge of epistemic relativism. The case of the Azande poison oracle is employed as an example of an alternative epistemic norm which may be used to justify beliefs about everyday occurrences. While a distinction is made between scepticism and relativism, an argument in support of epistemic relativism is presented that is based on the sceptical problem of the criterion. A response to the resulting relativistic position is then provided on the…Read more
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127How the epistemic relativist may use the sceptic’s strategy: A reply to Markus SeidelStudies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 44 (1): 140-144. 2013.This paper is a response to an objection that Markus Seidel has made to my analysis of epistemic relativism. Seidel argues that the epistemic relativist is unable to base a relativist account of justification on the sceptical problem of the criterion in the way that I have suggested in earlier work. In response to Seidel, I distinguish between weak and strong justification, and argue that all the relativist needs is weak justification. In addition, I explain my reasons for employing the idiom of…Read more
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1381The Incommensurability ThesisTaylor and Francis. 1994.This book presents a critical analysis of the semantic incommensurability thesis of Thomas Kuhn and Paul Feyerabend. In putting forward the thesis of incommensurability, Kuhn and Feyerabend drew attention to complex issues concerning the phenomenon of conceptual change in science. They raised serious problems about the semantic and logical relations between the content of theories which deploy unlike systems of concepts. Yet few of the more extreme claims associated with incommensurability st…Read more
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359Descartes's Language Test and Ape Language ResearchTeorema: International Journal of Philosophy 29 (2): 111-123. 2010.Some philosophers (e.g. Descartes) argue that there is an evidential relationship between language and thought, such that presence of language is indicative of mind. Recent language acquisition research with apes such as chimpanzees and bonobos attempts to demonstrate the capacity of these primates to acquire at least rudimentary linguistic capacity. This paper presents a case study of the ape language research and explores the consequences of the research with respect to the argument that ani…Read more
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3755Scientific Realism and the Rationality of ScienceAshgate. 2008.Scientific realism is the position that the aim of science is to advance on truth and increase knowledge about observable and unobservable aspects of the mind-independent world which we inhabit. This book articulates and defends that position. In presenting a clear formulation and addressing the major arguments for scientific realism Sankey appeals to philosophers beyond the community of, typically Anglo-American, analytic philosophers of science to appreciate and understand the doctrine. The bo…Read more
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165T.S. Kuhn: The road since ‘structure’: Philosophical essays, 1970–1993, with an autobiographical interview (review)British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 53 (1): 137-142. 2002.
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988Rationality, Relativism and IncommensurabilityAshgate. 1997.This book concentrates on three topics: the problem of the semantic incommensurability of theories; the non-algorithmic character of rational scientific theory choice and naturalised accounts of the rationality of methodological change. The underlying aim is to show how the phenomenon of extensive conceptual and methodological variation in science need not give rise to a thorough-going epistemic or conceptual relativism.
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1197Reference, Success and Entity RealismKairos. Revista de Filosofia and Ciência 5 31-42. 2012.The paper discusses the version of entity realism presented by Ian Hacking in his book, Representing and Intervening. Hacking holds that an ontological form of scientific realism, entity realism, may be defended on the basis of experimental practices which involve the manipulation of unobservable entities. There is much to be said in favour of the entity realist position that Hacking defends, especially the pragmatist orientation of his approach to realism. But there are problems with the pos…Read more
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286Paul Feyerabend: The tyranny of science (review)Metascience 21 (2): 471-476. 2011.This is an essay review of Paul Feyerabend's book, The Tyranny of Science.
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344Chisholm, scepticisme et relativismeBulletin d'Analyse Phénoménologique 10 (6): 32-39. 2014.Cet article esquisse une réponse particulariste et naturaliste au relativisme épistémique. La réponse est basée sur une analyse spécifique de la source de relativisme épistémique. Selon cette analyse, le relativisme épistémique doit être considérée en lien proche avec le scepticisme pyrrhonien, car le relativisme est basée sur le problème du critère qui a été propose par les ces anciens sceptiques. L’article commence avec une caractérisation du relativisme épistémique. Puis il présente un arg…Read more
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IntroductionIn Paul Hoyningen-Huene & Howard Sankey (eds.), Incommensurability and Related Matters, Kluwer Academic Publishers. 2001.
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256The semantic stance of scientific entity realism [Corrigenda]Philosophia 25 (3-4): 481-482. 1997.These are the footnotes for the article which was published in Philosophia Vol 24 1995, pp. 405-415
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222Brian Ellis Truth and Objectivity and Paul Horwich Truth (review)Philosophical Quarterly 42 (169): 496. 1992.Review of Brian Ellis's Truth and Objectivity and Paul Horwich's Truth.
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215James Franklin: What science knows and how it knows it (review)Metascience 19 (2): 289-292. 2010.This is a review of James Franklin's book, What Science Knows and How It Know It.
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311Scientific realism and the semantic incommensurability thesisStudies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 40 (2): 196-202. 2009.This paper reconsiders the challenge presented to scientific realism by the semantic incommensurability thesis. A twofold distinction is drawn between methodological and semantic incommensurability, and between semantic incommensurability due to variation of sense and due to discontinuity of reference. Only the latter presents a challenge to scientific realism. The realist may dispose of this challenge on the basis of a modified causal theory of reference, as argued in the author’s 1994 book, Th…Read more
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194Thomas Nickles (ed.): Thomas Kuhn (review)Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2003 (3). 2003.This volume of essays about Thomas Kuhn contains new work by key figures in the area of Kuhn-studies. The essays treat Kuhn primarily as a philosopher rather than historian of science. They analyze the background setting of Kuhn’s ideas, and cover such topics as his account of scientific practice, cognitive aspects of scientific reasoning and conceptual change, and Kuhn’s influence on feminist philosophy of science. While the volume is principally conceived as an introduction to Kuhn for the …Read more
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457Kuhn, Normativity and History and Philosophy of ScienceEpistemologia 103-111. 2012.This paper addresses the relationship between the history and philosophy of science by way of the issue of epistemic normativity. After brief discussion of the relationship between history and philosophy of science in Kuhn’s own thinking, the paper focuses on the implications of the history of science for epistemic normativity. There may be historical evidence for change of scientific methodology, which may seem to support a position of epistemic relativism. However, the fact that the methods…Read more
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872Methodological pluralism, normative naturalism and the realist aim of scienceIn Howard Sankey & Robert Nola (eds.), After Popper, Kuhn and Feyerabend: Recent Issues in Theories of Scientific Method, Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 211-229. 2000.There are two chief tasks which confront the philosophy of scientific method. The first task is to specify the methodology which serves as the objective ground for scientific theory appraisal and acceptance. The second task is to explain how application of this methodology leads to advance toward the aim(s) of science. In other words, the goal of the theory of method is to provide an integrated explanation of both rational scientific theory choice and scientific progress.
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194Incommensurability and the indeterminacy of translationAustralasian Journal of Philosophy 69 (2). 1991.In this paper it is argued that the concept of translation failure involved in Kuhn's thesis of incommensurability is distinct from that of translational indeterminacy in Quine's sense. At most, Kuhnian incommensurability constitutes a weak form of indeterminacy, quite distinct from Quine's. There remains, however, a convergence between the two views of translation, namely, that there is no single adequate translation between languages
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267The language of science: Meaning variance and theory comparisonLanguage Sciences 22 (2): 117-136. 2000.The paper gives an overview of key themes of twentieth century philosophical treatment of the language of science, with special emphasis on the meaning variance of scientific terms and the comparison of alternative theories. These themes are dealt with via discussion of the topics of: (a) the logical positivist principle of verifiability and the problem of the meaning of theoretical terms, (b) the postpositivist thesis of semantic incommensurability, and (c) the scientific realist response to in…Read more
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Epistemology |
General Philosophy of Science |
Areas of Interest
Scientific Realism |
Metaphysical Realism |
Incommensurability in Science |
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