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297Scientific realism and the semantic incommensurability thesisStudies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 40 (2): 196-202. 2009.This paper reconsiders the challenge presented to scientific realism by the semantic incommensurability thesis. A twofold distinction is drawn between methodological and semantic incommensurability, and between semantic incommensurability due to variation of sense and due to discontinuity of reference. Only the latter presents a challenge to scientific realism. The realist may dispose of this challenge on the basis of a modified causal theory of reference, as argued in the author’s 1994 book, Th…Read more
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198James Franklin: What science knows and how it knows it (review)Metascience 19 (2): 289-292. 2010.This is a review of James Franklin's book, What Science Knows and How It Know It.
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181Thomas Nickles (ed.): Thomas Kuhn (review)Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2003 (3). 2003.This volume of essays about Thomas Kuhn contains new work by key figures in the area of Kuhn-studies. The essays treat Kuhn primarily as a philosopher rather than historian of science. They analyze the background setting of Kuhn’s ideas, and cover such topics as his account of scientific practice, cognitive aspects of scientific reasoning and conceptual change, and Kuhn’s influence on feminist philosophy of science. While the volume is principally conceived as an introduction to Kuhn for the …Read more
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447Kuhn, Normativity and History and Philosophy of ScienceEpistemologia 103-111. 2012.This paper addresses the relationship between the history and philosophy of science by way of the issue of epistemic normativity. After brief discussion of the relationship between history and philosophy of science in Kuhn’s own thinking, the paper focuses on the implications of the history of science for epistemic normativity. There may be historical evidence for change of scientific methodology, which may seem to support a position of epistemic relativism. However, the fact that the methods…Read more
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848Methodological pluralism, normative naturalism and the realist aim of scienceIn Howard Sankey & Robert Nola (eds.), After Popper, Kuhn and Feyerabend: Recent Issues in Theories of Scientific Method, Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 211-229. 2000.There are two chief tasks which confront the philosophy of scientific method. The first task is to specify the methodology which serves as the objective ground for scientific theory appraisal and acceptance. The second task is to explain how application of this methodology leads to advance toward the aim(s) of science. In other words, the goal of the theory of method is to provide an integrated explanation of both rational scientific theory choice and scientific progress.
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257The language of science: Meaning variance and theory comparisonLanguage Sciences 22 (2): 117-136. 2000.The paper gives an overview of key themes of twentieth century philosophical treatment of the language of science, with special emphasis on the meaning variance of scientific terms and the comparison of alternative theories. These themes are dealt with via discussion of the topics of: (a) the logical positivist principle of verifiability and the problem of the meaning of theoretical terms, (b) the postpositivist thesis of semantic incommensurability, and (c) the scientific realist response to in…Read more
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183Incommensurability and the indeterminacy of translationAustralasian Journal of Philosophy 69 (2). 1991.In this paper it is argued that the concept of translation failure involved in Kuhn's thesis of incommensurability is distinct from that of translational indeterminacy in Quine's sense. At most, Kuhnian incommensurability constitutes a weak form of indeterminacy, quite distinct from Quine's. There remains, however, a convergence between the two views of translation, namely, that there is no single adequate translation between languages
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394Epistemic relativism and the problem of the criterionStudies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 42 (4): 562-570. 2011.This paper explores the relationship between scepticism and epistemic relativism in the context of recent history and philosophy of science. More specifically, it seeks to show that significant treatments of epistemic relativism by influential figures in the history and philosophy of science draw upon the Pyrrhonian problem of the criterion. The paper begins with a presentation of the problem of the criterion as it occurs in the work of Sextus Empiricus. It is then shown that significant treatme…Read more
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729After Popper, Kuhn and Feyerabend: Recent Issues in Theories of Scientific Method (edited book)Kluwer Academic Publishers. 2000.Some think that issues to do with scientific method are last century's stale debate; Popper was an advocate of methodology, but Kuhn, Feyerabend, and others are alleged to have brought the debate about its status to an end. The papers in this volume show that issues in methodology are still very much alive. Some of the papers reinvestigate issues in the debate over methodology, while others set out new ways in which the debate has developed in the last decade. The book will be of interest to phi…Read more
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568Scientific realism: An elaboration and a defenceTheoria A Journal of Social and Political Theory 98 (98): 35-54. 2001.This paper describes the position of scientific realism and presents the basic lines of argument for the position. Simply put, scientific realism is the view that the aim of science is knowledge of the truth about observable and unobservable aspects of a mind-independent, objective reality. Scientific realism is supported by several distinct lines of argument. It derives from a non-anthropocentric conception of our place in the natural world, and it is grounded in the epistemology and metaphysic…Read more
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94Measurability invariance, continuity and a portfolio representationMeasurement 46 (1): 89-96. 2013.
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83Interview with Paul Hoyningen-HueneMetascience 5 (2): 59-70. 1996.Interview of Paul Hoyningen-Huene conducted by Howard Sankey in 1996 in Tuscany.
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309The semantic stance of scientific entity realismPhilosophia 24 (3-4): 405-415. 1995.The paper examines the role played by the notion of truth in the version of scientific realism known as scientific entity realism. Scientific entity realism is the thesis that the unobservable entities postulated by scientific theories are real. As such, it is an ontological thesis about the existence of certain entities. By contrast, scientific realism is often characterised as a thesis primarily involving the truth of theories. Sometimes scientific realism is expressed as the thesis that theor…Read more
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26El cambio en el concepto de incommensurabilidad de KuhnCuadernos de Epistemologia 4 11-31. 2010.El año 1962 vio la introducción, por parte de Kuhn y Feyerabend, de la tesis de la inconmensurabilidad de las teorías científicas . Desde entonces, la tesis ha sido debatida ampliamente y ha atraído muchos críticos. Su influencia aún es considerable, particularmente en las áreas de la historia y la filosofía de la ciencia interesadas en el cambio y la elección de teorías. Esta influencia se debe, en gran medida, a la inmensa popularidad de la obra maestra de Kuhn, La Estructura de las revoluci…Read more
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Epistemology |
General Philosophy of Science |
Areas of Interest
Scientific Realism |
Metaphysical Realism |
Incommensurability in Science |
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