•  1273
    Kuhn, Relativism and Realism
    In Juha Saatsi (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Scientific Realism, Routledge. pp. 72-83. 2018.
    The aim of this chapter is to explore the relationship between Kuhn’s views about science and scientific realism. I present an overview of key features of Kuhn’s model of scientific change. The model suggests a relativistic approach to the methods of science. I bring out a conflict between this relativistic approach and a realist approach to the norms of method. I next consider the question of progress and truth. Kuhn’s model is a problem-solving model that proceeds by way of puzzles and an…Read more
  •  932
    Subject and Object in Scientific Realism
    In Paula Angelova, Jassen Andreev & Emil Lensky (eds.), Das Interpretative Universum, Konigshausen & Neumann. pp. 293-306. 2017.
    In this paper, I explore the relationship between the subject and the object from the perspective of scientific realism. I first characterize the scientific realist position that I adopt. I then address the question of the nature of scientific knowledge from a realist point of view. Next I consider the question of how to locate the knowing subject within the context of scientific realism. After that I consider the place of mind in an objective world. I close with some general remarks on the…Read more
  •  43
    Over-Measurement
    with K. R. Sawyer and R. Lombardo
    Measurement 93 379-384. 2016.
    Measurement is a special type of evaluation that is more exact than either opinion or estimation. In the social sciences, in particular, most evaluations are not measures, but rather mixtures of opinion and estimation. Over-measurement represents anchoring to evaluations which are not measures. For an over-measured characteristic, single measures are used when instead a portfolio of possible measures should be used. There are three implications. First, measurements of characteristics which depen…Read more
  •  88
  •  634
    Ciencia, Sentido Comun Y Realidad
    Discusiones Filosóficas 11 (16): 41-58. 2010.
    ¿La ciencia otorga conocimiento de la realidad? En este artículo ofrezco una respuesta positiva a esta pregunta. Rechazo la pretensión anti-realista según la cual somos incapaces de adquirir conocimiento de la realidad; al contrario, apoyo la visión realista que afirma que la ciencia produce conocimiento del mundo externo. Pero: ¿cuál mundo es ese? Algunos sostienen que la ciencia conduce a la superación de nuestra visión del mundo dada por el sentido común. El sentido común es la “metafísica de…Read more
  •  311
    This paper presents a naturalistic response to the challenge of epistemic relativism. The case of the Azande poison oracle is employed as an example of an alternative epistemic norm which may be used to justify beliefs about everyday occurrences. While a distinction is made between scepticism and relativism, an argument in support of epistemic relativism is presented that is based on the sceptical problem of the criterion. A response to the resulting relativistic position is then provided on the…Read more
  •  100
    A Curious Disagreement: response to Hoyningen-Huene and Oberheim
    Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 40 (2): 210-212. 2009.
    In this response, doubts are expressed relating to the treatment by Hoyningen-Huene and Oberheim of the relation between incommensurability and content comparison. A realist response is presented to their treatment of ontological replacement. Further questions are raised about the coherence of the neo-Kantian idea of the world-in-itself as well as the phenomenal worlds hypothesis. The notion of common sense is clarified. Meta-incommensurability is dismissed as a rhetorical device which obstructs…Read more
  •  527
    Scientific Realism and Basic Common Sense
    Kairos. Revista de Filosofia and Ciência 10 11-24. 2014.
    This paper considers the relationship between science and common sense. It takes as its point of departure, Eddington’s distinction between the table of physics and the table of common sense, as well as Eddington’s suggestion that science shows common sense to be false. Against the suggestion that science shows common sense to be false, it is argued that there is a form of common sense, basic common sense, which is not typically overthrown by scientific research. Such basic common sense is st…Read more
  •  3187
    Qu'est-ce que le realisme scientifique?
    Reseaux 94 69-82. 2002.
    Les tables, les chaises, les gens assis sur des chaises, à des tables sont des objets composés de matière. Selon la science, la matière se compose principalement d'atomes. Les atomes sont faits d'électrons, de neutrons et de protons. Les neutrons et les protons forment un noyau autour duquel orbitent les électrons. Outre ces particules, les physiciens en ont découvert un grand nombre d'autres, comme les photons, les quarks et les neutrinos.
  •  105
    Sherrilyn Roush: Tracking truth: Knowledge, evidence, and science (review)
    Review of Metaphysics 61 (1): 158-159. 2007.
    This book is a comprehensive defence of a modified Nozickian tracking account of knowledge. The account is presented as an analysis of knowledge, rather than justification. Roush allows that a tracking analysis of justification may be possible. But she denies that justification is required for knowledge. Her view is externalist, but not reliabilist.
  •  434
    El realismo cientifico y el punto de vista del Ojo de Dios
    Revista Disertaciones 2 59-74. 2011.
    Según el realismo científico, el propósito de la ciencia es descubrir la verdad acerca de los aspectos observables e inobservables de la realidad objetiva e independiente de la mente, en la cual habitamos. Putnam y otros han objetado que tal posición realista metafísica presupone un punto de vista del Ojo de Dios, del cual no puede establecerse ningún sentido coherente. En este artículo defenderé dos posiciones: primera, que el realismo científico no requiere la adopción de un punto de vista del…Read more
  •  1034
    Kuhn's ontological relativism
    Science & Education 9 (1-2): 59-75. 2000.
    In this paper, I provide an interpretation of ontological aspects of Kuhn's theory of science.
  •  337
    Taxonomic incommensurability
    International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 12 (1). 1998.
    In a shift of position that has gone largely unnoticed by the great majority of commentators, Thomas Kuhn's version of the incommensurability thesis underwent a major transformation over the last decade and a half of his life. In his later work, Kuhn argued that incommensurability is a relation of translation failure between local subsets of interdefined theoretical terms, which encapsulate the taxonomic structure of a theory. Incommensurability arises because it is impossible to transfer the na…Read more
  •  96
    Hilary Putnam’s Internal Realism
    Cogito 12 (1): 33-39. 1998.
  •  263
    Markus Seidel: Epistemic relativism: A constructive critique (review)
    Metascience 24 (2): 265-269. 2014.
    Traditional epistemology is haunted by the spectre of scepticism. Yet the more pressing concern in the contemporary intellectual scene must surely be relativism rather than scepticism. This has been the case in the history and philosophy of science since the work of Thomas Kuhn and Paul Feyerabend, to say nothing of the emergence of the sociology of scientific knowledge. In Epistemic Relativism: A Constructive Critique, Markus Seidel comes firmly to grips with this modern spectre. Though Seidel …Read more
  •  189
    Scientific Realism and the God’s Eye Point of View
    Epistemologia 27 (2): 211-226. 2003.
    According to scientific realism, the aim of science is to discover the truth about both observable and unobservable aspects of the mind-independent, objective reality, which we inhabit. It has been objected by Putnam and others that such a metaphysically realist position presupposes a God’s Eye point of view, of which no coherent sense can be made. In this paper, I will argue for two claims. First, scientific realism does not require the adoption of a God’s Eye point of view. Instead, scientific…Read more
  •  31
    Incommensurability and Related Matters (edited book)
    Kluwer Academic Publishers. 2001.
    Incommensurability and Related Matters draws together some of the most distinguished contributors to the critical literature on the problem of the incommensurability of scientific theories. It addresses all the various problems raised by the problem of incommensurability, such as meaning change, reference of theoretical terms, scientific realism and anti-realism, rationality of theory choice, cognitive aspects of conceptual change, as well as exploring the broader implications of incommensurabil…Read more
  •  436
    Realism, Progress and the Historical Turn
    Foundations of Science 22 (1): 201-214. 2017.
    The contemporary debate between scientific realism and anti-realism is conditioned by a polarity between two opposing arguments: the realist’s success argument and the anti-realist’s pessimistic induction. This polarity has skewed the debate away from the problem that lies at the source of the debate. From a realist point of view, the historical approach to the philosophy of science which came to the fore in the 1960s gave rise to an unsatisfactory conception of scientific progress. One of the m…Read more
  •  149
    The volume is a collection of essays devoted to the analysis of scientific change and stability. It explores the balance and tension that exist between commensurability and continuity on the one hand, and incommensurability and discontinuity on the other. Moreover, it discusses some central epistemological consequences regarding the nature of scientific progress, rationality and realism. In relation to these topics, it investigates a number of new avenues, and revisits some familiar issues, with…Read more
  •  184
    This is a book review of Vasso Kindi and Theodore Arabatzis (Eds.), Kuhn’s The Structure of Scientific Revolutions Revisited.
  •  164
    On Relativism and Pluralism: Response to Steven Bland
    Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 47 98-103. 2014.
    This paper responds to criticism presented by Steven Bland of my naturalistic approach to epistemic relativism. In my view, the central argument for epistemic relativism derives from the Pyrrhonian problem of the criterion. This opens relativism to an anti-sceptical response. I combine Roderick Chisholm’s particularist response to the problem of the criterion with a reliabilist conception of epistemic warrant. A distinction is made between epistemic norms which provide genuine warrant and th…Read more
  •  237
    The Scope and Multidimensionality of the Scientific Realism Debate
    with Dimitri Ginev
    Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 42 (2): 263-283. 2011.
    At stake in the classical realism-debate is the clash between realist and anti-realist positions. In recent years, the classical form of this debate has undergone a double transformation. On the one hand, the champions of realism began to pay more attention to the interpretative dimensions of scientific research. On the other hand, anti-realists of various sorts realized that the rejection of the hypostatization of a “reality out there” does not imply the denial of working out a philosophically …Read more
  •  1339
    Ciencia, realidad y racionalidad
    University of Cauca Press. 2015.
    This is a collection of my essays in the philosophy of science which have been translated into Spanish.
  •  689
    Incommensurability: The current state of play
    Theoria 12 (3): 425-445. 1997.
    The incommensurability thesis is the thesis that the content of some alternative scientific theories is incomparable due to translation failure between the vocabulary the theories employ. This paper presents an overview of the main issues which have arisen in the debate about incommensurability. It also briefly outlines a response to the thesis based on a modified causal theory of reference which allows change of reference subsequent to initial baptism, as well as a role to description in the de…Read more
  •  202
    Translation and languagehood
    Philosophia 21 (3-4): 335-337. 1992.
    According to one influential view, something which we might have reason to think is a language, is not proven to be such until it has been translated. I will try to show, to the contrary, that it is necessary to appeal to factors which are independent of translation in order to establish that it is indeed a language which has been translated in the first place. If this is right, it follows that proof of languagehood, so far from depending on translation, is in fact logically prior to translatio…Read more
  •  145
    Feyerabend and the Description Theory of Reference
    Journal of Philosophical Research 16 223-232. 1991.
    In his early work Feyerabend argues that certain theories are incommensurable due to semantic variance. In this paper it is argued that Feyerabend relies on a description theory of reference in the course of his argument for incommensurability and in his analysis of the relevant kind of semantic variance. Against this it is objected that such reliance on the description theory eliminates ostensive reference determination and obscures the presence of theoretical conflict.
  •  89
    A Dialogue on Scientific Rationality
    Cogito 5 (3): 135-140. 1991.
  •  437
    Scepticism, Relativism and a Naturalistic Particularism
    Social Epistemology 29 (4): 395-412. 2015.
    This paper presents a particularist and naturalist response to epistemic relativism. The response is based on an analysis of the source of epistemic relativism, according to which epistemic relativism is closely related to Pyrrhonian scepticism. The paper starts with a characterization of epistemic relativism. Such relativism is explicitly distinguished from epistemological contextualism. Next the paper presents an argument for epistemic relativism that is based on the Pyrrhonian problem of the …Read more