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805After Popper, Kuhn and Feyerabend: Recent Issues in Theories of Scientific Method (edited book)Kluwer Academic Publishers. 2000.Some think that issues to do with scientific method are last century's stale debate; Popper was an advocate of methodology, but Kuhn, Feyerabend, and others are alleged to have brought the debate about its status to an end. The papers in this volume show that issues in methodology are still very much alive. Some of the papers reinvestigate issues in the debate over methodology, while others set out new ways in which the debate has developed in the last decade. The book will be of interest to phi…Read more
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594Scientific realism: An elaboration and a defenceTheoria A Journal of Social and Political Theory 98 (98): 35-54. 2001.This paper describes the position of scientific realism and presents the basic lines of argument for the position. Simply put, scientific realism is the view that the aim of science is knowledge of the truth about observable and unobservable aspects of a mind-independent, objective reality. Scientific realism is supported by several distinct lines of argument. It derives from a non-anthropocentric conception of our place in the natural world, and it is grounded in the epistemology and metaphysic…Read more
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84Interview with Paul Hoyningen-HueneMetascience 5 (2): 59-70. 1996.Interview of Paul Hoyningen-Huene conducted by Howard Sankey in 1996 in Tuscany.
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94Measurability invariance, continuity and a portfolio representationMeasurement 46 (1): 89-96. 2013.
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342The semantic stance of scientific entity realismPhilosophia 24 (3-4): 405-415. 1995.The paper examines the role played by the notion of truth in the version of scientific realism known as scientific entity realism. Scientific entity realism is the thesis that the unobservable entities postulated by scientific theories are real. As such, it is an ontological thesis about the existence of certain entities. By contrast, scientific realism is often characterised as a thesis primarily involving the truth of theories. Sometimes scientific realism is expressed as the thesis that theor…Read more
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73El cambio en el concepto de incommensurabilidad de KuhnCuadernos de Epistemologia 4 11-31. 2010.El año 1962 vio la introducción, por parte de Kuhn y Feyerabend, de la tesis de la inconmensurabilidad de las teorías científicas . Desde entonces, la tesis ha sido debatida ampliamente y ha atraído muchos críticos. Su influencia aún es considerable, particularmente en las áreas de la historia y la filosofía de la ciencia interesadas en el cambio y la elección de teorías. Esta influencia se debe, en gran medida, a la inmensa popularidad de la obra maestra de Kuhn, La Estructura de las revoluci…Read more
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219William J. Devlin and Alisa Bokulich: Kuhn’s structure of scientific revolutions: 50 years on (review)Metascience 25 (1): 65-70. 2015.This is an essay review of W. J. Devlin and A. Bokulich (eds.) Kuhn's Structure of Scientific Revolutions 50 years on
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166Translation failure between theoriesStudies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 22 (2): 223-236. 1991.This paper considers the issue of translation failure between theories from the perspective of a modified causal theory of reference. It is argued that translation failure between theories is in fact a consequence of such a modified causal theory of reference. The paper attempts to show what is right about the incommensurability thesis from the perspective of such a theory of reference. Since relations of co-reference may obtain between theories in the absence of translation, incomparability …Read more
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116Causation and Laws of Nature (edited book)Kluwer Academic Publishers. 1999.This is a collection of articles which represents current research on the metaphysics of causation and laws of nature, mostly by authors working in or active in the Australasian region. The book provides an overview of current work on the theory of causation, including counterfactual, singularist, nomological and causal process approaches. It also covers work on the nature of laws of nature, with special emphasis on the scientific essentialist theory that laws of nature are, at base, the fundame…Read more
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209Scientific Realism And The Inevitability Of ScienceStudies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 39 (2): 259-264. 2008.This paper examines the question of whether scientific realism is committed to the inevitability of science or is consistent with claims of the contingency of science. In order to address this question, a general characterization of the position of scientific realism is presented. It is then argued that scientific realism has no evident implications with regard to the inevitability of science. A historical case study is presented in which contingency plays a significant role, and the appropriate…Read more
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499Relativism, Particularism and Reflective EquilibriumJournal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 45 (2): 281-292. 2014.In previous work, I have sought to show that the basic argument for epistemic relativism derives from the problem of the criterion that stems from ancient Pyrrhonian scepticism. Because epistemic relativism depends upon a sceptical strategy, it is possible to respond to relativism on the basis of an anti-sceptical strategy. I argue that the particularist response to scepticism proposed by Roderick Chisholm may be combined with a naturalistic and reliabilist conception of epistemic warrant as the…Read more
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212Normative naturalism and the challenge of relativism: Laudan versus Worrall on the justification of methodological principlesInternational Studies in the Philosophy of Science 10 (1). 1996.In a recent exchange, John Worrall and Larry Laudan have debated the merits of the model of rational scientific change proposed by Laudan in his book Science and Values. On the model advocated by Laudan, rational change may take place at the level of scientific theory and methodology, as well as at the level of the epistemic aims of science. Moreover, the rationality of a change which occurs at any one of these three levels may be dependent on considerations at the remaining levels. Yet, in spit…Read more
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222Why is it rational to believe scientific theories are true?In Colin Cheyne & John Worrall (eds.), Rationality and Reality: Conversations with Alan Musgrave, Springer. pp. 109-132. 2006.Alan Musgrave is one of the foremost contemporary defenders of scientific realism. He is also one of the leading exponents of Karl Popper’s critical rationalist philosophy. In this paper, my main focus will be on Musgrave’s realism. However, I will emphasize epistemological aspects of realism. This will lead me to address aspects of his critical rationalism as well.
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103Maria Cristina Amoretti and Nicla Vassallo: Reason and rationality (review)Metascience 22 (3): 677-679. 2013.This article is a book review of: M. C. Amoretti and N. Vassallo (eds.), Reason and Rationality.
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243Incommensurability, translation and understandingPhilosophical Quarterly 41 (165): 414-426. 1991.This paper addresses the issue of how it is possible to understand the language of an incommensurable theory. The aim is to defend the idea of translation failure against the objection that it incoherently precludes understanding.
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1289The problem of rational theory-choiceEpistemologia 18 (2): 299-312. 1995.The problem of rational theory-choice is the problem of whether choice of theory by a scientist may be objectively rational in the absence of an invariant scientific method. In this paper I offer a solution to the problem, but the solution I propose may come as something of a surprise. For I wish to argue that the work of the very authors who have put the rationality of such choice in question, Thomas Kuhn and Paul Feyerabend, contains all that is needed to solve the problem.
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465Est-il rationnel de chercher la vérité?Revue Philosophique De Louvain 98 (3): 589-602. 2000.This paper addresses the question of whether it is rational for scientists to pursue the realist aim of truth. The point of departure is a pair of objections to the aim of truth due to the anti-realist author, Larry Laudan: first, it is not rational to pursue an aim such as truth which we cannot know we have reached; second, truth is not a legitimate aim for science because it cannot be shown to be attained. Against Laudan, it is argued not only that it is possible to achieve theoretical knowled…Read more
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300Scepticism, relativism and the argument from the criterionStudies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 43 (1): 182-190. 2012.This article explores the relationship between epistemic relativism and Pyrrhonian scepticism. It is argued that a fundamental argument for contemporary epistemic relativism derives from the Pyrrhonian problem of the criterion. Pyrrhonian scepticism is compared and contrasted with Cartesian scepticism about the external world and Humean scepticism about induction. Epistemic relativism is characterized as relativism due to the variation of epistemic norms, and is contrasted with other forms of co…Read more
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106A Curious Disagreement: response to Hoyningen-Huene and OberheimStudies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 40 (2): 210-212. 2009.In this response, doubts are expressed relating to the treatment by Hoyningen-Huene and Oberheim of the relation between incommensurability and content comparison. A realist response is presented to their treatment of ontological replacement. Further questions are raised about the coherence of the neo-Kantian idea of the world-in-itself as well as the phenomenal worlds hypothesis. The notion of common sense is clarified. Meta-incommensurability is dismissed as a rhetorical device which obstructs…Read more
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564Scientific Realism and Basic Common SenseKairos. Revista de Filosofia and Ciência 10 11-24. 2014.This paper considers the relationship between science and common sense. It takes as its point of departure, Eddington’s distinction between the table of physics and the table of common sense, as well as Eddington’s suggestion that science shows common sense to be false. Against the suggestion that science shows common sense to be false, it is argued that there is a form of common sense, basic common sense, which is not typically overthrown by scientific research. Such basic common sense is st…Read more
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3332Qu'est-ce que le realisme scientifique?Reseaux 94 69-82. 2002.Les tables, les chaises, les gens assis sur des chaises, à des tables sont des objets composés de matière. Selon la science, la matière se compose principalement d'atomes. Les atomes sont faits d'électrons, de neutrons et de protons. Les neutrons et les protons forment un noyau autour duquel orbitent les électrons. Outre ces particules, les physiciens en ont découvert un grand nombre d'autres, comme les photons, les quarks et les neutrinos.
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Thinking About Religion: Examining Progress in Religious CognitionIn Gregory W. Dawes & James Maclaurin (eds.), A New Science of Religion, Routledge. 2013.
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1081Kuhn's ontological relativismScience & Education 9 (1-2): 59-75. 2000.In this paper, I provide an interpretation of ontological aspects of Kuhn's theory of science.
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127Sherrilyn Roush: Tracking truth: Knowledge, evidence, and science (review)Review of Metaphysics 61 (1): 158-159. 2007.This book is a comprehensive defence of a modified Nozickian tracking account of knowledge. The account is presented as an analysis of knowledge, rather than justification. Roush allows that a tracking analysis of justification may be possible. But she denies that justification is required for knowledge. Her view is externalist, but not reliabilist.
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471El realismo cientifico y el punto de vista del Ojo de DiosRevista Disertaciones 2 59-74. 2011.Según el realismo científico, el propósito de la ciencia es descubrir la verdad acerca de los aspectos observables e inobservables de la realidad objetiva e independiente de la mente, en la cual habitamos. Putnam y otros han objetado que tal posición realista metafísica presupone un punto de vista del Ojo de Dios, del cual no puede establecerse ningún sentido coherente. En este artículo defenderé dos posiciones: primera, que el realismo científico no requiere la adopción de un punto de vista del…Read more
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378Taxonomic incommensurabilityInternational Studies in the Philosophy of Science 12 (1). 1998.In a shift of position that has gone largely unnoticed by the great majority of commentators, Thomas Kuhn's version of the incommensurability thesis underwent a major transformation over the last decade and a half of his life. In his later work, Kuhn argued that incommensurability is a relation of translation failure between local subsets of interdefined theoretical terms, which encapsulate the taxonomic structure of a theory. Incommensurability arises because it is impossible to transfer the na…Read more
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Scientific Realism |
Metaphysical Realism |
Incommensurability in Science |
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