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4WH Newton-Smith, ed., A Companion to the Philosophy of Science Reviewed (review)Philosophy in Review 22 (2): 136-128. 2002.
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36Does science have a moving target?American Philosophical Quarterly 42 (1): 47-58. 2005.Kuhn argues that science does not aim at the truth. Alexander Bird raises concerns form Kuhn's view. I defend Kuhn's claim and argue that insofar as science has a goal it is a moving target.
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39The Cambridge Companion to Bacon Markku Peltonen, editor Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996, xv + 372 pp., $54.95, $18.95 paper (review)Dialogue 37 (3): 643-. 1998.This is a book review of Markku Peltonen's edited volume, The Cambridge Companion to Bacon, a collection of papers on the philosophy of Francis Bacon.
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15Metascience: reflections on the symposiumMetascience 25 (2): 161-162. 2016.This is an editorial.
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76Systematicity and the Continuity ThesisSynthese 196 (3): 819-832. 2019.Hoyningen-Huene develops an account of what science is, distinguishing it from common sense. According to Hoyningen-Huene, the key distinguishing feature is that science is more systematic. He identifies nine ways in which science is more systematic than common sense. I compare Hoyningen-Huene’s view to a view I refer to as the “Continuity Thesis.” The Continuity Thesis states that scientific knowledge is just an extension of common sense. This thesis is associated with Quine, Planck, and others…Read more
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22Specialization in philosophy: a preliminary studyScientometrics. 2013.I examine the degree of specialization in various sub-fields of philosophy, drawing on data from the PhilPapers Survey. The following three sub-fields are highly specialized: Ancient philosophy, seventeenth/eighteenth century philosophy, and philosophy of physics. The following sub-fields have a low level of specialization: metaphilosophy, philosophy of religion, philosophy of probability, philosophy of the social sciences, decision theory, and philosophy of race and gender. Highly specialized s…Read more
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147Kuhn's constructionismPerspectives on Science 18 (3): 311-327. 2010.I challenge Hacking's characterization of Kuhn's constructionism. I argue that Kuhn does not believe that nature has no joints. Rather, Kuhn believes there is no unique correct way to cut nature into kinds. I also argue that Kuhn is not an externalist. He believes that disputes in science are resolved on the basis of a consideration of the epistemic merits of the theories. Subjective factors merely ensure that competing theories are developed, and the strengths and weaknesses of the theories are…Read more
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21How Nature changed: Melinda Baldwin: Making Nature: The history of a scientific journal. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2015, 309pp, $45 HB (review)Metascience 26 (1): 169-170. 2016.This is a review of Melinda Baldwin's book Making Nature.
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34The role of solidarity in a pragmatic epistemologyPhilosophia 27 (1-2): 273-286. 1999.I critically examine Rorty's social epistemology, specifically his claim that the end of inquiry is solidarity.
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3341A defense of Longino's social epistemologyPhilosophy of Science 66 (3): 552. 1999.Though many agree that we need to account for the role that social factors play in inquiry, developing a viable social epistemology has proved to be difficult. According to Longino, it is the processes that make inquiry possible that are aptly described as "social," for they require a number of people to sustain them. These processes, she claims, not only facilitate inquiry, but also ensure that the results of inquiry are more than mere subjective opinions, and thus deserve to be called "knowled…Read more
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92Shapin's the scientific revolution: What will philosophers find? (review)Social Epistemology 13 (3 & 4). 1999.This is a book review of Steven Shapin's The Scientific Revolution.
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11David Oldroyd 1936–2014Metascience 24 (1): 3-4. 2015.David Oldroyd died in Sydney on 7 November 2014. Many readers of this journal would know of David’s impressive career as an historian of science and many would have also had the pleasure of knowing David personally. His academic career spanned across England, New Zealand and Australia, and his expertise in history of geology took him to several parts of the world for conferences and research, archival as well as geological, including Europe, China, Turkey, Russia and North America. His experienc…Read more
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2Paul Boghossian, Fear of Knowledge: Against Relativism and Constructivism Reviewed (review)Philosophy in Review 26 (5): 327-329. 2006.
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23Philosophy of science viewed through the lense of “Referenced Publication Years Spectroscopy” (RPYS)Scientometrics 102 (3): 1987-1996. 2015.We examine the sub-field of philosophy of science using a new method developed in information science, Referenced Publication Years Spectroscopy (RPYS). RPYS allows us to identify peak years in citations in a field, which promises to help scholars identify the key contributions to a field, and revolutionary discoveries in a field. We discovered that philosophy of science, a sub-field in the humanities, differs significantly from other fields examined with this method. Books play a more important…Read more
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1James Robert Brown, Who Rules in Science?: An Opinionated Guide to the Wars Reviewed (review)Philosophy in Review 23 (2): 84-86. 2003.A critical examination of James Brown's Who Rules in Science?
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88Discarded theories: the role of changing interestsSynthese 196 (2): 553-569. 2019.I take another look at the history of science and offer some fresh insights into why the history of science is filled with discarded theories. I argue that the history of science is just as we should expect it to be, given the following two facts about science: theories are always only partial representations of the world, and almost inevitably scientists will be led to investigate phenomena that the accepted theory is not fit to account for. Together these facts suggest that most scientific the…Read more
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98The Epistemic Cultures of Science and WIKIPEDIA: A ComparisonEpisteme 6 (1): 38-51. 2009.I compare the epistemic culture of Wikipedia with the epistemic culture of science, with special attention to the culture of collaborative research in science. The two cultures differ markedly with respect to (1) the knowledge produced, (2) who produces the knowledge, and (3) the processes by which knowledge is produced. Wikipedia has created a community of inquirers that are governed by norms very different from those that govern scientists. Those who contribute to Wikipedia do not ground their…Read more
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12Supporting the “metascientific” communityMetascience 24 (3): 341-342. 2015.This is an editorial.
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702Science, biases, and the threat of global pessimismProceedings of the Philosophy of Science Association 2001 (3). 2001.Philip Kitcher rejects the global pessimists' view that the conclusions reached in inquiry are determined by the interests of some segment of the population, arguing that only some inquiries, for example, inquiries into race and gender, are adversely affected by interests. I argue that the biases Kitcher believes affect such inquiries are operative in all domains, but the prevalence of such biases does not support global pessimism. I argue further that in order to address the global pessimists' …Read more
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77The Influence of James B. Conant on Kuhn’s Structure of Scientific RevolutionsHopos: The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science 6 (1): 1-23. 2016.I examine the influence of James B. Conant on the writing of Kuhn’s Structure of Scientific Revolutions. By clarifying Conant’s influence on Kuhn, I also clarify the influence that others had on Kuhn’s thinking. And by identifying the various influences that Conant had on Kuhn’s view of science, I identify Kuhn’s most original contributions in Structure. On the one hand, I argue that much of the framework and many of the concepts that figure in Structure were part of Conant’s picture of science,…Read more
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40Method and Continuity in ScienceJournal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 47 (2): 363-375. 2016.Devitt has developed an interesting defense of realism against the threats posed by the Pessimistic Induction and the Argument from Unconceived Alternatives. Devitt argues that the best explanation for the success of our current theories, and the fact that they are superior to the theories they replaced, is that they were developed and tested with the aid of better methods than the methods used to develop and test the many theories that were discarded earlier in the history of science. It is no …Read more
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24Introduction: Collective Knowledge and ScienceEpisteme 7 (3): 181-184. 2010.The literature on collective belief and collective intentionality has grown rapidly and is now quite extensive. Philosophers have applied the concepts of “collective belief” and “collective intentionality” in a variety of contexts, including political and legal contexts as well as scientific contexts, specifically to model the behavior of research teams and scientific specialties
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The Role of Community in Inquiry: A Philosophical StudyDissertation, The University of Western Ontario (Canada). 1997.I examine a number of recent challenges to traditional individualist epistemologies. In chapter I, I examine Margaret Gilbert's claim that certain types of communities, "plural subjects," are capable of having what she calls "collective beliefs." In chapter II, I examine Lynn Hankinson Nelson's claim that communities, and not individuals, are the primary epistemological agents. In chapter III, I examine Miriam Solomon's claim that scientific rationality is a property of communities, not individu…Read more
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13A look behind the curtain: the editorial boardMetascience 25 (3): 341-342. 2016.This is an editorial.
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139The argument from underconsideration as grounds for anti‐realism: A defenceInternational Studies in the Philosophy of Science 22 (3). 2008.The anti-realist argument from underconsideration focuses on the fact that, when scientists evaluate theories, they only ever consider a subset of the theories that can account for the available data. As a result, when scientists judge one theory to be superior to competitor theories, they are not warranted in drawing the conclusion that the superior theory is likely true with respect to what it says about unobservable entities and processes. I defend the argument from underconsideration from th…Read more
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10EditorialMetascience 24 (1): 1-2. 2015.Last year Stathis and Theodore approached us about taking on the editorship of Metascience, as their 5 year term was coming to an end. We were greatly honoured but also overcome with trepidation. Metascience has become an important source for keeping abreast of the most recent books published in the history, sociology and philosophy of science. And the number of reviews published in the journal each year is prodigious. Further, it has been run with thoughtfulness and great care since its beginni…Read more
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122Pessimistic Inductions: Four VarietiesInternational Studies in the Philosophy of Science 29 (1): 61-73. 2015.The pessimistic induction plays an important role in the contemporary realism/anti-realism debate in philosophy of science. But there is some disagreement about the structure and aim of the argument. And a number of scholars have noted that there is more than one type of PI in the philosophical literature. I review four different versions of the PI. I aim to show that PIs have been appealed to by philosophers of science for a variety of reasons. Even some realists have appealed to a PI. My goal …Read more
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24Rethinking Scientific SpecializationSocial Studies of Science 35 (1): 151-164. 2005.My aim in this paper is to re-examine specialization in science. I argue that we need to acknowledge the role that conceptual changes can play in the creation of new specialties. Whereas earlier sociological accounts focus on social and instrumental changes as the cause of the creation of new specialties, I argue that conceptual changes play an important role in the creation of some scientific specialties. Specifically, I argue that conceptual developments played an important role in the creatio…Read more
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24Knowledge and Inquiry: Readings in Epistemology (edited book)Broadview Press. 2002.This anthology focuses on three areas in the theory of knowledge: epistemic justification; analyses of knowledge and scepticism; and recent development in epistemology. Each of the three sections includes a brief introduction to the readings, a series of study questions, and a list of suggested readings. Section 1 deals with coherentism, foundationalism, reliabilism, and includes articles by Chisholm, BonJour, Audi, Goldman, and Fumerton. Section 2 deals with the analysis of knowledge and Gettie…Read more
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168Epistemic Privilege and the Success of ScienceNoûs 46 (3): 375-385. 2010.Realists and anti-realists disagree about whether contemporary scientists are epistemically privileged. Because the issue of epistemic privilege figures in arguments in support of and against theoretical knowledge in science, it is worth examining whether or not there is any basis for assuming such privilege. I show that arguments that try to explain the success of science by appeal to some sort of epistemic privilege have, so far, failed. They have failed to give us reason to believe (i) that s…Read more
K. Brad Wray
Aarhus University
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Aarhus UniversityCentre For Science StudiesRegular Faculty
Aarhus, Denmark
Areas of Specialization
General Philosophy of Science |
Epistemology |
Science, Logic, and Mathematics |
Areas of Interest
General Philosophy of Science |
Epistemology |