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37Paradigms in Structure: Finally, a CountScientometrics 125. 2020.Following the publication of Thomas Kuhn’s Structure of Scientific Revolutions the term paradigm became ubiquitous. It is now commonplace in academic writing across the disciplines. Though much has been written about Kuhn’s use of the term and its impact on other fields, there has not yet been a systematic study of how frequently Kuhn used the term in Structure. My aim in this paper is to provide such an analysis. I aim to answer the following questions: (1) How many times does Kuhn actually use…Read more
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6A Note on Measuring Normal ScienceScientometrics 117 647-650. 2018.Petrovich provides an insightful study on analytic philosophy (AP) with the intention of determining whether this sub-field of philosophy has been operating within what Kuhn calls a normal science framework. Through a citation analysis, Petrovich concludes that AP does not exhibit the sort of pattern that we would expect of a field operating in a normal science phase. I take issue with Petrovich’s way of measuring normal science. I provide some insight into how we might better measure normal sci…Read more
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17How is a revolutionary scientific paper cited?: the case of Hess’ “History of Ocean Basins”Scientometrics 124. 2020.I examine the citation patterns to a revolutionary scientific paper, Hess’ “History of Ocean Basins”, which played a significant role in the plate tectonics revolution in the geosciences. I test two predictions made by the geoscientist Menard (in Science: growth and change. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1971): (1) that the peak year of citations for Hess’ article will be 1968; and (2) that the rate of citations to the article will then reach some lower level, continuing on accumulating ci…Read more
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3Defending Longino’s Social EpistemologyThe Paideia Archive: Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy 45 277-284. 1998.Though many agree that we need to account for the role that social factors play in inquiry, developing a viable social epistemology has proved to be a difficult task. According to Longino, it is the processes that make inquiry possible that are aptly described as social, for they require a number of people to sustain them. These processes not only facilitate inquiry, but also ensure that the results of inquiry are more than mere subjective opinions, and thus deserve to be called knowledge. In th…Read more
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51In recent years, the full text of papers are increasingly available electronically which opens up the possibility of quantitatively investigating citation contexts in more detail. In this study, we introduce a new form of citation analysis, which we call citation concept analysis (CCA). CCA is intended to reveal the cognitive impact certain concepts—published in a highly-cited landmark publication—have on the citing authors. It counts the number of times the concepts are mentioned (cited) in the…Read more
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62Still resisting: replies to my criticsMetascience 29 (1): 33-40. 2020.This is a reply piece to a series of book symposium contributions to my book, Resisting Scientific Realism. The contributions were by Steven French, Peter Vickers, Stathis Psillos, and Kyle Stanford.
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Kuhn and the History of ScienceIn M. Fricker, N. J. L. L. Pedersen, D. Henderson & P. J. Graham (eds.), Routledge Handbook of Social Epistemology, Routledge. pp. 40-48. 2019.The article examines Thomas Kuhn's work in the history of science with special attention to its relevance to subsequent developments in social epistemology. The article begins with a discussion of Kuhn's historical work, and the so-called historical turn in philosophy of science. It then examines Kuhn's views on textbook science, followed by an analysis of Kuhn's views on the relationship between the history of science and the philosophy of science. Then it discusses Kuhn's contributions to our …Read more
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23What to make of Mendeleev’s predictions?Foundations of Chemistry 21 (2): 139-143. 2018.I critically examine Stewart’s suggestion that we should weigh the various predictions Mendeleev made differently. I argue that in his effort to justify discounting the weight of some of Mendeleev’s failures, Stewart invokes a principle that will, in turn, reduce the weight of some of the successful predictions Mendeleev made. So Stewart’s strategy will not necessarily lead to a net gain in Mendeleev’s favor.
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12Retractions in ScienceScientometrics 117 (3): 2009-2019. 2018.Retractions are rare in science, but there is growing concern about the impact retracted papers have. We present data on the retractions in the journal Science, between 1983 and 2017. Each year, approximately 2.6 papers are retracted; that is about 0.34% of the papers published in the journal. 30% of the retracted papers are retracted within 1 year of publication. Some papers are retracted almost 12 years after publication. 51% of the retracted papers are retracted due to honest mistakes. Smalle…Read more
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27Detecting Errors that Result in RetractionsSocial Studies of Science 46 (6): 942-954. 2019.We present a taxonomy of errors in the scientific literature and an account of how the errors are distributed over the categories. We have developed the taxonomy by studying substantial errors in the scientific literature as described in retraction notices published in the journal Science over the past 35 years. We then examine how the sorts of errors that lead to retracted papers can be prevented and detected, considering the perspective of collaborating scientists, journal editors and referees…Read more
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66Reporting the discovery of new chemical elements: working in different worlds, only 25 years apartFoundations of Chemistry 22 (2): 137-146. 2019.In his account of scientific revolutions, Thomas Kuhn suggests that after a revolutionary change of theory, it is as if scientists are working in a different world. In this paper, we aim to show that the notion of world change is insightful. We contrast the reporting of the discovery of neon in 1898 with the discovery of hafnium in 1923. The one discovery was made when elements were identified by their atomic weight; the other discovery was made after scientists came to classify elements by thei…Read more
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12Essay review: Another great 19th century creation: The Scientific JournalStudies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 75 62-64. 2019.
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16Two symposia worth reading: science, religion, and the history of mechanicsMetascience 28 (2): 179-180. 2019.
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1Resisting Scientific RealismCambridge University Press. 2018.In this book K. Brad Wray provides a comprehensive survey of the arguments against scientific realism. In addition to presenting logical considerations that undermine the realists' inferences to the likely truth or approximate truth of our theories, he provides a thorough assessment of the evidence from the history of science. He also examines grounds for a defence of anti-realism, including an anti-realist explanation for the success of our current theories, an account of why false theories can…Read more
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16What happens when an anti-realist and a realist read each other’s book?Metascience 28 (1): 1-2. 2019.This is an editorial.
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92Explaining Science's Success, by John Wright: Understanding How Scientific Knowledge Works, Durham: Acumen, 2013, pp. 256, £40.00 (review)Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (4): 833-834. 2013.This is a book review of Wright's Explaining Science's Success.
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20Another great 19th century creation: The scientific journalStudies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 75 62-64. 2019.This review examines Alex Csiszar's book, The Scientific Journal: Authorship and the Politics of Knowledge in the Nineteenth Century.
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55Kuhn, the History of Chemistry, and the Philosophy of ScienceHopos: The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science 9 (1): 75-92. 2019.I draw attention to one of the most important sources of Kuhn’s ideas in Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Contrary to the popular trend of focusing on external factors in explaining Kuhn’s views, factors related to his social milieu or personal experiences, I focus on the influence of the books and articles he was reading and thinking about in the history of science, specifically, sources in the history of chemistry. I argue that there is good reason to think that the history of chemistry …Read more
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14Identifying a classic in history, philosophy, and social studies of scienceMetascience 27 (2): 181-182. 2018.This is an editorial.
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21Reinterpreting §56 of Frege's The Foundations of ArithmeticAuslegung 20 (2): 76-82. 1995.I defend an alternative reading of §56 of Frege's Grundlagen, one that rescues Frege from Dummett's charge that this section is the weakest in the whole book. On my reading, Frege is not presenting arguments against the adjectival strategy. Rather, Frege presents the definitions in §55 in order to convince his reader that numbers must be objects. In §56 Frege suggests that these definitions contain two shortcomings that adequate definitions of numbers must overcome. And these short-comings, he…Read more
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124Kuhn's Evolutionary Social EpistemologyCambridge University Press. 2011.Kuhn's Structure of Scientific Revolutions has been enduringly influential in philosophy of science, challenging many common presuppositions about the nature of science and the growth of scientific knowledge. However, philosophers have misunderstood Kuhn's view, treating him as a relativist or social constructionist. In this book, Brad Wray argues that Kuhn provides a useful framework for developing an epistemology of science that takes account of the constructive role that social factors play i…Read more
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19What to make of Mendeleev’s predictions?Foundations of Chemistry 21 (2): 139-143. 2018.I critically examine Stewart’s suggestion that we should weigh the various predictions Mendeleev made differently. I argue that in his effort to justify discounting the weight of some of Mendeleev’s failures, Stewart invokes a principle that will, in turn, reduce the weight of some of the successful predictions Mendeleev made. So Stewart’s strategy will not necessarily lead to a net gain in Mendeleev’s favor.
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57Robert J. Richards and Lorraine Daston, eds., Kuhn’s Structure of Scientific Revolutions at Fifty: Reflections on a Science Classic. Chicago: University of Chicago Press , 202 pp., $25.00 ; $75.00 (review)Philosophy of Science 84 (1): 184-188. 2017.
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75A new twist to the No Miracles Argument for the success of scienceStudies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 69 86-89. 2018.J. D. Trout has recently developed a new defense of scientific realism, a new version of the No Miracles Argument. I critically evaluate Trout’s novel defense of realism. I argue that Trout’s argument for scientific realism and the related explanation for the success of science are self-defeating. In the process of arguing against the traditional realist strategies for explaining the success of science, he inadvertently undermines his own argument.
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45The Relevance of Evidence from the History of Science in the Contemporary Realism/Anti-realism DebateSpontaneous Generations 9 (1): 143-145. 2018.It is widely assumed that it is the anti-realist who stakes his case on evidence from the history of science. I argue that realists have failed to recognize the need to collect evidence from the history of science to support their methodological claims, and anti-realists do not rely on evidence from the history of science to the extent that many suggest.
K. Brad Wray
Aarhus University
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Aarhus UniversityCentre For Science StudiesRegular Faculty
Aarhus, Denmark
Areas of Specialization
General Philosophy of Science |
Epistemology |
Science, Logic, and Mathematics |
Areas of Interest
General Philosophy of Science |
Epistemology |