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204Making models countPhilosophy of Science 75 (3): 383-404. 2008.What sort of claims do scientific models make and how do these claims then underwrite empirical successes such as explanations and reliable policy interventions? In this paper I propose answers to these questions for the class of models used throughout the social and biological sciences, namely idealized deductive ones with a causal interpretation. I argue that the two main existing accounts misrepresent how these models are actually used, and propose a new account. *Received July 2006; revised …Read more
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3Values and the science of well-being : a recipe for mixingIn Harold Kincaid (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Social Science, Oxford University Press. 2012.
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38High-fidelity economicsIn J. B. Davis & D. W. Hands (eds.), Elgar Companion to Recent Economic Methodology, Edward Elgar Publishers. pp. 94. 2011.
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104Well‐being and Philosophy of SciencePhilosophy Compass 10 (3): 219-231. 2015.This article is a mutual introduction of the science of well-being to philosophy of science and an explanation of how the two disciplines can benefit each other. In the process, I argue that the science of well-being is not helpfully viewed as a social or a natural, but rather as a mixed, science. Hence, its methodology will have to attend to its specific features. I discuss two of its methodological problems: justifying the role of values, and validating measures. I suggest that tackling them c…Read more
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146Connecting economic models to the real world: Game theory and the fcc spectrum auctionsPhilosophy of the Social Sciences 36 (2): 173-192. 2006.Can social phenomena be understood by analyzing their parts? Contemporary economic theory often assumes that they can. The methodology of constructing models which trace the behavior of perfectly rational agents in idealized environments rests on the premise that such models, while restricted, help us isolate tendencies, that is, the stable separate effects of economic causes that can be used to explain and predict economic phenomena. In this paper, I question both the claim that models in econo…Read more
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61Value-added scienceForum for European Philosophy Blog (24 Oct 2016). Website. 2016.Anna Alexandrova on value judgements and the measurement of well-being.
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131Is Well-being Measurable After All?Public Health Ethics 10 (2). 2017.In Valuing Health, Dan Hausman argues that well-being is not measurable, at least not in the way that science and policy would require. His argument depends on a demanding conception of well-being and on a pessimistic verdict upon the existing measures of subjective well-being. Neither of these reasons, I argue, warrant as much skepticism as Hausman professes.
Cambridge, Cambridgeshire, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
Areas of Specialization
Science, Logic, and Mathematics |
Philosophy of Social Science |
Well-Being |
Scientific Models |
Philosophy of Economics |
PhilPapers Editorships
Philosophy of Economics |