Chris Bertram

This article distinguishes between three methodologies for thinking about justice: principle-based, model-based and ‘realist’, concentrating mainly on the differences between the first two. Both model-based and realist approaches pride themselves on taking institutions seriously and argue that institutions make a fundamental difference to justice. This claim is at best not proven, and it may be possible to account for the difference that institutions make to what justice requires while retaining a non-institutional account of what justice is.

States claim the right to choose who can come to their country. They put up barriers and expose migrants to deadly journeys. Those who survive are labelled ‘illegal’ and find themselves vulnerable and unrepresented. The international state system advantages the lucky few born in rich countries and locks others into poor and often repressive ones. In this book, Christopher Bertram skilfully weaves a lucid exposition of the debates in political philosophy with original insights to argue that migration controls must be justifiable to everyone, including would-be and actual immigrants. Until justice prevails, states have no credible right to exclude and no-one is obliged to obey their immigration rules. Bertram’s analysis powerfully cuts through the fog of political rhetoric that obscures this controversial topic. It will be essential reading for anyone interested in the politics and ethics of migration.

States claim the right to choose who can come to their country. They put up barriers and expose migrants to deadly journeys. Those who survive are labelled ‘illegal’ and find themselves vulnerable and unrepresented. The international state system advantages the lucky few born in rich countries and locks others into poor and often repressive ones. In this book, Christopher Bertram skilfully weaves a lucid exposition of the debates in political philosophy with original insights to argue that migration controls must be justifiable to everyone, including would-be and actual immigrants. Until justice prevails, states have no credible right to exclude and no-one is obliged to obey their immigration rules. Bertram’s analysis powerfully cuts through the fog of political rhetoric that obscures this controversial topic. It will be essential reading for anyone interested in the politics and ethics of migration.

This paper looks at a recent challenge to the liberal inclusivist view that everyone on the state’s territory should have a path to citizenship. Economists have argued that giving immigrants an inferior legal status would persuade wealthy countries to admit more, with beneficial consequences for global justice. Whilst this trade-off might seem appealing from the impersonal perspective of the policymaker it generates incoherence from the perpective of the collective of democratic citizens, since it requires them to treat their own unjust attitudes as an objective constraint. The paper also rejects the idea that a voluntary choice to migrate can be taken as consent to an inferior status.

RESUMO:Os estudiosos vêm se dividindo acirradamente sobre a relevância da política e da história de Genebra na filosofia política de Rousseau. Eu busco chegar a uma visão coerente do compromisso de Rousseau com Genebra, uma que rejeita tanto a ideia de que ela é simplesmente irrelevante ao núcleo das doutrinas políticas do autor, quanto a que essencialmente lê tudo como uma intervenção na política genebrina. Nenhuma dessas concepções parece correta. De fato, Genebra, como Rousseau a concebeu, é uma presença constante que informa seu pensamento de modos diferentes. Rousseau não foi tão ingênuo a ponto de pensar que Genebra encarnava seus princípios, mas também não viu a verdadeira natureza da cidade como uma oligarquia hereditária. Ele a julgou defeituosa, porém remediável, uma avaliação talvez marcada pela aversão ao conflito civil, ao menos até que a realidade genebrina colidisse com suas ilusões. ABSTRACT:Scholars have been sharply divided over the relevance of Genevan politics and history to Rousseau’s political philosophy. In this article, I try to achieve a coherent view of Rousseau’s engagement with Geneva, one that rejects the idea that Geneva is simply irrelevant to his core political doctrines, but that also rejects the view that essentially reads everything as a political intervention in Genevan politics. Neither of these views seem accurate. Rather, Geneva is a constant presence that informs his thinking in different ways. Rousseau was not so naive as to think that Geneva incarnated his principles, but neither did he see its true nature as a hereditary oligarchy. He judged it flawed but remediable, a judgement perhaps informed by a loathing of civil conflict, at least until Genevan reality collided with his illusions.

The institutional theory of property is that view that property rights are entirely and essentially conventional and are the creatures of states and coercively backed legal systems. In this paper, I argue that, although states and legal systems have a valuable role in defining property rights, the institutional story is not the whole story. Rather, the property rights hat we have reason to recognize as part of justice are partly conventional in character and partly rooted in universal human interests and dispositions.

It is often claimed that states enjoy, as a consequence of their sovereign status, the right to control the passage of outsiders through their territory and that they have a discretion to admit or to refuse to admit outsiders, whether those outsiders be tourists, business travelers, would-be economic migrants, or even refugees. Or, to be more exact, such limitations on that right to control are derived from the agreement of states to treaties and conventions, agreement which they could have withheld and could yet revoke. As a statement of the legal position this is not completely uncontroversial,1 but my aim in this paper is not to make a contribution to international law or law at all. Rather, my concern is with political philosophy and with the issue of whether..

This chapter demonstrates that Rousseau sets out no systematic moral theory of his own but rather a series of theories about other matters which contain remarks and opinions relevant to ethics, beginning with a discussion of his theory of psychological development. It then explores a number of possible answers to the questions: what, according to Rousseau is morality, and why should we be moral? Next, the chapter explains the meaning of Rousseau's natural goodness thesis. It presents two main accounts of how individuals can achieve a flourishing and satisfied life, the first of which is Rousseau's educational theory, as articulated in Emile; the second is the political philosophy he advances in the Social Contract.

Jean-Jacques Rousseau remains an important figure in the history of philosophy, both because of his contributions to political philosophy and moral psychology and because of his influence on later thinkers. Rousseau's own view of philosophy and philosophers was firmly negative, seeing philosophers as the post-hoc rationalizers of self-interest, as apologists for various forms of tyranny, and as playing a role in the alienation of the modern individual from humanity's natural impulse to compassion. The concern that dominates Rousseau's work is to find a way of preserving human freedom in a world where human beings are increasingly dependent on one another for the satisfaction of their needs. This concern has two dimensions: material and psychological, of which the latter has greater importance. In the modern world, human beings come to derive their very sense of self from the opinion of others, a fact which Rousseau sees as corrosive of freedom and destructive of individual authenticity. In his mature work, he principally explores two routes to achieving and protecting freedom: the first is a political one aimed at constructing political institutions that allow for the co-existence of free and equal citizens in a community where they themselves are sovereign; the second is a project for child development and education that fosters autonomy and avoids the development of the most destructive forms of self-interest. However, though Rousseau believes the co-existence of human beings in relations of equality and freedom is possible, he is consistently and overwhelmingly pessimistic that humanity will escape from a dystopia of alienation, oppression, and unfreedom. In addition to his contributions to philosophy, Rousseau was active as a composer and a music theorist, as the pioneer of modern..