Simon Lumsden

Kant's account of subjectivity is ambiguous: there is an implicit critique of Descartes in Kaaat, but this is in conflict with more Cartesian aspects of his approach to subjectivity. Fichte develops the critical elements of Kant and turns them against Kant's residual Cartesianism. Fichte, in the various versions of the Wissenschaftslehre, is the first to be aware of the limitations of the reflective model of consciousness. In those texts he presents his alternative model for subjectivity by trying to conceive of selfconsciousness such that the self-relation makes no separation between thinker and thought. While Fichte's insight into the limitations of the reflective model of consciousness is generally accepted, his own account of the character of the immediate self-relation, which he presents as the alternative to the reflective model, was never satisfactorily resolved. The exposition of Fichte will examine his theory of subjectivity in relation to the central notion of striving; it will be argued that the notion of a striving subject tries to reconcile the dichotomy of idealism and realism.

Poststructuralists hold Hegel responsible for giving rise to many of modern philosophy's problematic concepts--the authority of reason, self-consciousness, the knowing subject. Yet, according to Simon Lumsden, this animosity is rooted in a fundamental misunderstanding of Hegel's thought, and resolving this tension can not only heal the rift between poststructuralism and German idealism but also point these traditions in exciting new directions. Revisiting the philosopher's key texts, Lumsden calls attention to Hegel's reformulation of liberal and Cartesian conceptions of subjectivity, identifying a critical though unrecognized continuity between poststructuralism and German idealism. Poststructuralism forged its identity in opposition to idealist subjectivity; however, Lumsden argues this model is not found in Hegel's texts but in an uncritical acceptance of Heidegger's characterization of Hegel and Fichte as "metaphysicians of subjectivity." Recasting Hegel as both post-Kantian and postmetaphysical, Lumsden sheds new light on this complex philosopher while revealing the surprising affinities between two supposedly antithetical modes of thought

Hegel’s examination of habit in his subjective spirit sits at a critical juncture between nature and spirit. This ‘second nature’ has often been interpreted as leaving nature behind. This paper argues that Hegel’s examination of habit should not be understood in this way. While habit bridges the gap between nature and spirit it cannot be understood as a mere transition point. Habit represents a distinct way of considering the spirit-nature relation that challenges the common Kantian inspired distinction between a space of reasons and a space of causes (terms by which the spirit-nature relation is often understood).

This paper examines Jean-Luc Nancy's interpretation of Hegel, focusing in particular on The Restlessness of the Negative. It is argued that Nancy's reading represents a significant break with other post-structuralist readings of Hegel by taking his thought to be non-metaphysical. The paper focuses in particular on the role Nancy gives to the negative in Hegel's thought. Ultimately Nancy's reading is limited as an interpretation of Hegel, since he gives no sustained explanation of the self-correcting function of reason.

In this paper I argue that Fichte's attempt to reconcile the dualism of concept and intuition requires the overcoming of any idea of a thing-in-itself. At the same time he preserves the idea of an external constraint on the I's self-positing. This central role for the realist constraint of the check conflicts with recent interpretations of Fichte that see his project as advocating the exclusivity of the space of reasons. The striving subject confronts and unifies the opposition between the realistic and idealistic elements in the Wissenschaftslehre. It is argued that as striving, reason's drive for self-determination is a process of self-transformation, as consciousness confronts the limitations of its inadequate explanations of the objects of experience.

In this essay, I focus on the way Hegel reconciles consciousness and self-consciousness in absolute knowing. What I want to suggest is that in absolute knowing the conscious subject comes to understand itself in terms of these conditions, providing it with the content of a new form of consciousness. It is in conceiving of itself in terms of these objective conditions for knowledge, which supersede the singularity of the self and yet are the conditions for consciousness, that the conscious subject is to be understood as self-transcending.

Hegel’s philosophy of history is fundamentally concerned with how shapes of life collapse and transition into new shapes of life. One of the distinguishing features of Hegel’s concern with how a shape of life falls apart and becomes inadequate is the role that habit plays in the transition. A shape of life is an embodied form of existence for Hegel. The animating concepts of a shape of life are affectively inscribed on subjects through complex cultural processes. This paper examines the argument Hegel puts forward in his Lectures on the Philosophy of World History for why civilizations come to atrophy and examines the decisive role habit plays in this process. The paper concludes with a discussion of the way in which the central role of second nature in historical transitions and norm formation conflicts with Brandom’s account of norm formation in Hegel’s thought

This article examines Derrida's critique of Hegel. It argues that there are two key issues that Derrida misunderstands in Hegel's thought: first, Hegel's response to the concept-intuition dichotomy that plagued Kant's critical thought; second, that Hegel's notions of reason and the dialectic, when they are conceived non-metaphysically, are not tools employed to subsume differences but are, like Derrida's différance , fundamentally concerned with thought's instability. The article shows the way in which Derrida develops the notion of singularity by an examination of the discussion of responsibility in his later writings. It is argued that the way that Hegel and Derrida consider the notion of singularity is a much better marker for distinguishing these two thinkers than Derrida's own interpretation of Hegel. Key Words: Jacques Derrida • dialectic • differance • G. W. F. Hegel • normativity • reason • responsibility • singularity.