John Protevi

For the most part, this is a fairly literal translation, but I have opted for a few English idioms for the sake of readability. In that spirit, I have kept the original punctuation, which results in very long sentences, but I have inserted paragraph breaks for readability. I mark these inserted breaks with this sign [¶]; unmarked breaks are in the original. In addition to providing the French for difficult translations, I also interpolate a few English words for readability. Translator’s notes appear as endnotes.

Forthcoming in Cognitive Architecture: from bio-politics to noo-politics, eds. Deborah Hauptmann, Warren Neidich and Abdul-Karim Mustapha INTRODUCTION The cognitive and affective sciences have benefitted in the last twenty years from a rethinking of the long-dominant computer model of the mind espoused by the standard approaches of computationalism and connectionism. The development of this alternative, often named the “embodied mind” approach or the “4EA” approach (embodied, embedded, enactive, extended, affective), has relied on a trio of classical 20th century phenomenologists for its philosophical framework: Husserl, Heidegger, and Merleau-Ponty.[1] In this essay I propose that the French thinker Gilles Deleuze can provide the conceptual framework that will enable us to thematize some unstated presuppositions of the 4EA School, as well as to sharpen, extend and / or radicalize some of their explicit presuppositions. I highlight three areas here: 1) an ontology of distributed and differential systems, using Deleuze’s notion of the virtual; 2) a thought of multiple subjectification practices rather than a thought of “the” subject, even if it be seen as embodied and embedded; and 3) a rethinking of the notion of affect in order to thematize a notion of “political affect.”[2] I will develop this proposal with reference to Bruce Wexler’s Brain and Culture,[3] a work which resonates superbly with the Deleuzean approach.

Upon first reading, the beginning of Chapter 2 of Difference and Repetition, with its talk of ―contemplative souls‖ and ―larval subjects,‖ seems something of a bizarre biological panpsychism. Actually it does defend a sort of biological panpsychism, but by defining the kind of psyche Deleuze is talking about, I‘ll show here how we can remove the bizarreness from that concept. First, I will sketch Deleuze‘s treatment of ―larval subjects,‖ then show how Deleuze‘s discourse can be articulated with Evan Thompson‘s biologically based intervention into cognitive science, the ―mind in life‖ or ―enaction‖ position. Then I will then show how each in turn fits with contemporary biological work on E. coli chemotaxis (movement in response to changes in environment)

Cette communication explorera la nature deleuzienne de l'ontologie présupposée par Foucault dans ses cours Sécurité, Territoire, Population et Naissance de la Biopolitique. L'objectif sera d'identifier certaines formules de Foucault qui font écho à un concept clé de Différence et Répétition: l'individuation comme intégration d'une multiplicité. Dans ces textes se trouveront pas mal d'éléments de l'ontologie deleuzienne: par exemple, le couple différentiation / différenciation; l'anti-essentialisme; et le champ différentiel, pré-individuel, problématique, ou virtuel d'où émergent, par l'auto-organisation, des individus actuels. Mais, on verra aussi des difficultés conceptuelles, surtout dans sa notion de "possibilité," que subit Foucault dans quelques-unes de ses réflexions méthodologiques, difficultés qui émergent pour lui en faisant ses propres analyses de "la mise en intelligibilité en histoire" pendant qu'il présuppose l'ontologie deleuzienne.