•  143
    A Paraconsistent Model of Vagueness
    Mind 119 (476): 1025-1045. 2010.
    Vague predicates, on a paraconsistent account, admit overdetermined borderline cases. I take up a new line on the paraconsistent approach, to show that there is a close structural relationship between the breakdown of soritical progressions, and contradiction. Accordingly, a formal picture drawn from an appropriate logic shows that any cut-off point of a vague predicate is unidentifiable, in a precise sense. A paraconsistent approach predicts and explains many of the most counterintuitive aspect…Read more
  •  699
    A Topological Sorites
    Journal of Philosophy 107 (6): 311-325. 2010.
    This paper considers a generalisation of the sorites paradox, in which only topological notions are employed. We argue that by increasing the level of abstraction in this way, we see the sorites paradox in a new, more revealing light—a light that forces attention on cut-off points of vague predicates. The generalised sorites paradox presented here also gives rise to a new, more tractable definition of vagueness.
  •  59
    Wittgenstein's Notes on Logic. By Michael Potter (review)
    Metaphilosophy 42 (1-2): 166-170. 2011.
  •  68
    Reply to Bjørdal
    Review of Symbolic Logic 4 (1): 109-113. 2011.
  •  33
    Notes on inconsistent set theory
    In Francesco Berto, Edwin Mares, Koji Tanaka & Francesco Paoli (eds.), Paraconsistency: Logic and Applications, Springer. pp. 315--328. 2013.