• Jc Beall: Spandrels of Truth
    Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 16 (2). 2010.
  •  57
    Explanation And Solution In The Inclosure Argument
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (2): 353-357. 2010.
    In a recent article, Emil Badici contends that the inclosure schema substantially fails as an analysis of the paradoxes of self-reference because it is question-begging. The main purpose of this note is to show that Badici's critique highlights a necessity condition for the success of dialectic about paradoxes. The inclosure argument respects this condition and remains solvent
  •  84
    This note motivates a logic for a theory that can express its own notion of logical consequence—a ‘syntactically closed’ theory of naive validity. The main issue for such a logic is Curry’s paradox, which is averted by the failure of contraction. The logic features two related, but different, implication connectives. A Hilbert system is proposed that is complete and non-trivial
  •  9
    Jc Beall. Spandrels of truth. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2009, xiv + 154 pp (review)
    Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 16 (2): 284-286. 2010.
  •  78
    On closure and truth in substructural theories of truth
    Synthese 199 (Suppl 3): 725-739. 2016.
    Closure is the idea that what is true about a theory of truth should be true in it. Commitment to closure under truth motivates non-classical logic; commitment to closure under validity leads to substructural logic. These moves can be thought of as responses to revenge problems. With a focus on truth in mathematics, I will consider whether a noncontractive approach faces a similar revenge problem with respect to closure under provability, and argue that if a noncontractive theory is to be genuin…Read more