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Zach Weber

University of Otago
  •  Home
  •  Publications
    35
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 More details
  • University of Otago
    Department of Philosophy
    Assistant Professor
University of Melbourne
School of Historical And Philosophical Studies
PhD, 2009
Homepage
Dunedin, Otago, New Zealand
Areas of Specialization
Logic and Philosophy of Logic
Philosophy of Mathematics
Areas of Interest
Logic and Philosophy of Logic
Philosophy of Mathematics
  • All publications (35)
  •  2
    Jc Beall: Spandrels of Truth
    Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 16 (2). 2010.
    Liar ParadoxDialetheism
  •  117
    Explanation And Solution In The Inclosure Argument
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (2): 353-357. 2010.
    In a recent article, Emil Badici contends that the inclosure schema substantially fails as an analysis of the paradoxes of self-reference because it is question-begging. The main purpose of this note is to show that Badici's critique highlights a necessity condition for the success of dialectic about paradoxes. The inclosure argument respects this condition and remains solvent
    Russell's ParadoxLiar ParadoxParadoxes, Misc
  •  139
    A Note on Contraction-Free Logic for Validity
    with Colin R. Caret
    Topoi 34 (1): 63-74. 2015.
    This note motivates a logic for a theory that can express its own notion of logical consequence—a ‘syntactically closed’ theory of naive validity. The main issue for such a logic is Curry’s paradox, which is averted by the failure of contraction. The logic features two related, but different, implication connectives. A Hilbert system is proposed that is complete and non-trivial.
    Logical Consequence and EntailmentParadoxes, MiscSubstructural Logic
  •  318
    Transfinite Cardinals in Paraconsistent Set Theory
    Review of Symbolic Logic 5 (2): 269-293. 2012.
    This paper develops a (nontrivial) theory of cardinal numbers from a naive set comprehension principle, in a suitable paraconsistent logic. To underwrite cardinal arithmetic, the axiom of choice is proved. A new proof of Cantor’s theorem is provided, as well as a method for demonstrating the existence of large cardinals by way of a reflection theorem.
    Logic and Philosophy of LogicLogic and Philosophy of Logic, MiscellaneousAxioms of Set TheoryCardina…Read more
    Logic and Philosophy of LogicLogic and Philosophy of Logic, MiscellaneousAxioms of Set TheoryCardinals and Ordinals
  •  148
    On closure and truth in substructural theories of truth
    Synthese 199 (Suppl 3): 725-739. 2016.
    Closure is the idea that what is true about a theory of truth should be true in it. Commitment to closure under truth motivates non-classical logic; commitment to closure under validity leads to substructural logic. These moves can be thought of as responses to revenge problems. With a focus on truth in mathematics, I will consider whether a noncontractive approach faces a similar revenge problem with respect to closure under provability, and argue that if a noncontractive theory is to be genuin…Read more
    Closure is the idea that what is true about a theory of truth should be true in it. Commitment to closure under truth motivates non-classical logic; commitment to closure under validity leads to substructural logic. These moves can be thought of as responses to revenge problems. With a focus on truth in mathematics, I will consider whether a noncontractive approach faces a similar revenge problem with respect to closure under provability, and argue that if a noncontractive theory is to be genuinely closed, then it must be free of all contraction, even in the metatheory.
    Liar ParadoxProof TheorySubstructural Logic
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