Olivier Perru

The article examines a number of links between the metaphorical uses of the concept of metamorphosis in literature and the various changes of the meaning of the concept that took place at the beginning of the modern scientific age between the 17th and 19th centuries, a period during which the notion of metamorphosis resurfaced in conflict with evolutionist thinking. We present the extent to which the concept of animal metamorphosis, the object of multiple redefinitions over the course of this historical period, became the vector of a very strong metaphorical meaning, which emerged in the literature of the period and survives to this day in certain children’s storybooks belonging to what we term the genre of “realistic fiction”. We intend, from a pedagogical standpoint, to identify which specific attributes of these metaphors exist in those storybooks, and to gauge the extent to which those attributes contradict the scientific characteristics and fictional representations of the concept of metamorphosis.

At first, Georges Canguilhem’s philosophy is a philosophy of medicine recognizing the main contribution of biological knowledge to medicine. However, this philosophy also questions the nature of life. Life involves biological processes, but life is also normativity. In this paper, we question the normativity and the epistemological history in Canguilhem’s works to understand their relevance for current scientific questions. According to Canguilhem, the epistemological history of the life sciences concerns an activity of constitution of (biological) scientific disciplines. The relevance of Canguilhem is the fact that a historian of science has not only to restore a history of the scientific theories or a history of the development of the sciences in context, but he also has to explore the relationship and the limits between life science and its context in the process of genesis and scientific elaboration. Scientific work is a vital activity of the human being, the history of science is the history of this axiological activity, and this implies a philosophical approach. In this paper, we propose that the history of ecology may give a valuable example of a scientific elaboration from various elements and from diverse skills: ideologies that announce or extend a scientific construction also affect this discipline.

The aim of this paper is an epistemological analysis of mutualism modeling. From the Lotka-Volterra analysis, we look for some characteristics and epistemological inadequacies of this class of models. Volterra s’mathematical work was a response to a particular ecological situation. This situation is the rupture of the equilibrium between competing associated species. Starting from equations describing variations in competing populations, a change of sign is enough to transform them into equations describing variations in numbers of mutualistic populations. In terms of modeling, competition models have attracted a lot of attention while mutualism has been relatively neglected. If the relative growths of the two populations are the same, applied to mutualism Lotka-Volterra models indicate an equilibrium point. These models are used to make a distinction between obligatory and accidental mutualism. To be considered valid these models need to give an equilibrium point and provide the dominant characteristic of biological mutualism (obligatory or accidental). From the end of the 90s, some researchers have developed more realistic bio­logical models that allow a transition from parasitism to mutualism depending on the densities of the two partners. From an epistemological viewpoint, these models remain relative to a population level. They refer to the biological pop­ulations studies but they need to be complemented by an analysis of the same biological phenomenon at an individual level.

Le concept d'association chez Durkheim se rapporte d'abord à la société vue comme réalité autonome et individualisé. Le développement de l'association sociale est mesurable par la division du travail qui constitue la solidarité sociale. Le texte discute de la validité de ce regard sur la société comme unité de vie et du fondement biologique de cette unité. Les recherches des zoologistes du XIXe siècle sur l'unification progressive du vivant permettent à Durkheim de proposer une vision organique de l'État, centre et synthèse de l'organisation. Ce fondement biologique reste cohérent avec les spécificités humaines des faits sociaux. Le point de départ de Max Weber est tout autre : c'est l'individu en tant que sujet libre d'activité et capable de coopération. Les diverses formes de coopération sont alors au fondement des structures sociales qu'analyse Weber à travers l'histoire. Les deux méthodes peuvent être comparées dans leur capacité à rendre compte de la réalité des structures associatives dans la société.In Durkheim's works, the concept of association firstly relates to society, considered as an autonomous reality. The development of this social association can be measured by the division of labour, which builds up social solidarity. This paper argues about this view of society as a unit of life and its biological foundations. Concerning the progressive unification in living beings, researches of french zoologists during the 19th century enable Durkheim to give a new organicist conception of state. However, this biological founding remains consistent with the human specificities of social facts. Max Weber's starting point is entirely different because he deals with individual as a free subject, able to cooperate. So, diverse ways to cooperate are the foundings of social structures analyzed by Weber.

Our paper focuses on Stuart Kauffman’s theory from 1993 to 2004. Kauffman is looking for an explanation of the genesis of living beings by genetic networks. From interactions to cell types, Kauffman’s viewpoint is concerned with differentiation and self-organization as network’s properties. His approach of morphogenetic processes is interesting but it is insufficient. According to Sole, Fernandez and Kauffman [2003], networks would give an explanation of the diversity in patterns and cell types. Some other authors [as Perkins et al., 2004] consider that it is necessary to explore interactions, not with logical methods only, but non-linear systems too. Network’s structure is related to biological diversity. It supposes genes’ power’s mediators within the cells and between them

Le regard théologique sur la question du mal a progressé en Occident grâce à la lecture des Noms divins de Denys, et à l'analyse scientifique de Thomas d'Aquin. Il est cependant intéressant de souligner le nouvel ordre et les rectifications que Thomas d'Aquin apporte à la pensée de Denys dont il est tributaire. Imprégné de la philosophie néoplatonicienne, Denys apparaît dans son ouvrage comme faisant une théologie de l'amour et du Bien. Le Bien y est non seulement objet d'amour, mais il appelle un ordre et une vie. Le mal ne peut être situé que par rapport à l'opération vitale défaillante. Par rapport à Denys, Thomas d'Aquin opère une inversion de pensée. Son apport propre est de dépasser les deux positions de Denys selon qui le mal n'a pas de cause propre, le Bien étant fin de tous les maux. Le mal, qui reste accidentel pour Thomas, est aussi le fruit d'une relation déséquilibrée. Conséquence du péché en tant que mal de peine, tout est-il résolu par là quant au problème du mal ? Par delà saint Thomas, n'y a-t-il pas demande aujourd'hui d'un regard lucide sur la relation réciproque, c'est-à-dire le rôle inhibiteur que joue souvent l'excès de souffrance dans la relation à Dieu ? Theology's attitude to the question of evil has progressed in the West, thanks to the study of Dionysius' Divine Names and the scientific analysis of Thomas Aquinas. It is, nevertheless, interesting to underline the new method and rectifications that Thomas Aquinas brings to the thought of Dionysius, upon which he depends. Dionysius, impregnated with neo-Platonic philosophy, seems to elaborate a theology of love and the Good in his work. He sees the Good as not only the object of love, but calling for an order and a life. Evil can only be situated in terms of a vital operation that is faulted. In comparison with Dionysius, Thomas Aquinas operates an inversion of thought. His own contribution is to go beyond the two positions of Dionysius, according to whom evil does not have its own cause, the Good being the end of all evils. Evil, which remains accidental for Thomas, is also the fruit of an unbalanced relation. The consequence of sin in terms of the evil of pain does this resolve all the problems concerning evil ? Beyond St. Thomas, isn’t there a need today of a clear perspective about reciprocal relation, the inhibiting role that the excess of suffering often plays in the relation to God ?