•  65
  •  115
    Should we tolerate people who split?
    Southern Journal of Philosophy 30 (1): 1-17. 1992.
    Thought-experiments in which one person divides into two have been important in the literature on personal identity. I consider three influential arguments which aim to undermine the force of these thought-experiments – arguments from David Wiggins, Patricia Kitcher and Kathleen Wilkes. I argue that all three fail, leaving us to face the consequences of splitting, whatever those may be.
  •  112
    Interrogating the ‘Ticking Bomb Scenario’: Reassessing the Thought Experiment
    International Journal of Applied Philosophy 29 (1): 53-70. 2015.
    The aim of this paper is to re-evaluate the manner in which the Ticking Bomb Scenario (TBS), a thought experiment in philosophical enquiry, has been used in the discussion of the justifiability or otherwise of forward-looking interrogational torture (FLIT). The paper argues that criticisms commonly raised against the thought experiment are often inappropriate or irrelevant. A great many criticisms misunderstand the way in which thought experiments in general, and the TBS in particular, are supp…Read more
  •  6
    Editorial
    with Deane-Peter Baker and David Spurrett
    South African Journal of Philosophy 23 (4). 2004.
  •  413
    Counterfactuals and the law
    South African Journal of Philosophy 12 (3). 1993.
    This article is concerned with the place counterfactual reasoning occupies in South African law, and how philosophy might be able to help the law. I point out some of the more important and unavoidable uses of counterfactual reasoning in our law. Following this I make some suggestions as to how philosophy, and especially informal logic, can be of help to the law. Finally, I make some suggestions as to how the law in turn can help philosophy.
  •  3077
    The Misunderstandings of the Self-Understanding View
    Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 20 (1): 33-42. 2013.
    There are two currently popular but quite different ways of answering the question of what constitutes personal identity: the one is usually called the psychological continuity theory (or Psychological View) and the other the narrative theory.1 Despite their differences, they do both claim to be providing an account—the correct account—of what makes someone the same person over time. Marya Schechtman has presented an important argument in this journal (Schechtman 2005) for a version of the narra…Read more