Paul Hoyningen-Huene

The paper discusses several wide-spread misunderstandings of Kuhn’s theory of scientific development, most prominently the ascription that he conceives of scientific development as irrational. The core of this ascription is an assessment of incommensurability as implying the lack of any rational possibility of theory comparison. This is supposed to be due to Gestalt switches and a quasi-religious element of conversion in theory change. Accordingly, scientific revolutions cannot be a serious matter for philosophical analysis; they furthermore foreclose any scientific progress. It is shown that such images of Kuhn’s theory rest on deep misunderstandings that are partly due to Kuhn’s writing style.

To begin, the so-called ‘selectivity of historical judgment’ is discussed. According to it, writing history requires a comparative criterion of historical relevance. This criterion contains philosophical elements. In Kuhn’s case, the criterion directs historical research and presentation away from Whiggish historiography by postulating a hermeneutic reading of historical sources. This postulate implies some sort of internalism, some sort of rationality of scientific development, and historical realism. To conclude, some consequences of Kuhn’s anti-Whiggism are discussed.

This paper deals with the following questions: What features of modern natural science are responsible for the fact that, of all forms of science, this form is technologically exploitable? The three notions: concept of nature, epistemic ideal, and experiment, suggest the most important components of my answer. I will argue, first, that only the peculiar interplay of the modern concept of nature with an epistemic ideal attuned to it can cast experiment in the specific, highly central role it plays in the pursuit of knowledge about nature. It will then become clear that the form of science in which experiment plays such a role will, necessarily, prove technologically exploitable.

Many texts on logic are written with a mathematical emphasis, and focus primarily on the development of a formal apparatus and associated techniques. In other, more philosophical texts, the topic is often presented as an indulgent collection of musings on issues for which technical solutions have long since been devised. What has been missing until now is an attempt to unite the motives underlying both approaches. Paul Hoyningen-Huene’s _Formal Logic_ seeks to find a balance between the necessity of formal considerations and the importance of full reflection and explanation about the seemingly arbitrary steps that occasionally confound even the most serious student of logic. Alex Levine’s artful translation conveys both the content and style of the German edition. Filled with examples, exercises, and a straightforward look at some of the most common problems in teaching the subject, this work is eminently suitable for the classroom.

The paper deals with the interrelations between the philosophy, sociology and historiography of science in Thomas Kuhn’s theory of scientific development. First, the historiography of science provides the basis for both the philosophy and sociology of science in the sense that the fundamental questions of both disciplines depend on the principles of the form of historiography employed. Second, the fusion of the sociology and philosophy of science, as advocated by Kuhn, is discussed. This fusion consists essentially in a replacement of methodological rules by cognitive values that influence the decisions of scientific communities. As a consequence, the question of the rationality of theory choice arises, both with respect to the actual decisions and to the possible justification of cognitive values and their change.