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Erich Rast

New University of Lisbon
  •  Home
  •  Publications
    36
    • Most Recent
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    • Topics
  •  Events
    1
  •  News and Updates
    14

 More details
  • New University of Lisbon
    Department of Philosophy
    Post-doctoral fellow
Roskilde University
Filosofi og Videnskabsteori på Roskilde Universitet
PhD, 2007
Homepage
Lisbon, Portugal
Areas of Specialization
Epistemology
Philosophy of Language
Philosophy of Mind
Logic and Philosophy of Logic
Areas of Interest
Philosophy of Language
Philosophy of Mind
Logic and Philosophy of Logic
Philosophy of Computing and Information
Philosophy of Probability
  • All publications (36)
  •  37
    Classical Possibilism and Fictional Objects
    In Franck Lihoreau (ed.), Fiction in Philosophy. pp. 77-92. 2010.
    An account of non-existing objects called 'classical possibilism', according to which objects that don't actually exist do exist in various other ways, is implemented in a two-dimensional modal logic with non-traditional predication theory. This account is very similar to Priest's, but preserves bivalence and does not endorse dialethism. The power of classical possibilism is illustrated by giving some examples that makes use of a description theory of reference. However, the same effect could al…Read more
    An account of non-existing objects called 'classical possibilism', according to which objects that don't actually exist do exist in various other ways, is implemented in a two-dimensional modal logic with non-traditional predication theory. This account is very similar to Priest's, but preserves bivalence and does not endorse dialethism. The power of classical possibilism is illustrated by giving some examples that makes use of a description theory of reference. However, the same effect could also be achieved in a more Millian fashion. It is argued that classical possibilism is ontologically more neutral than is commonly thought, because it allows for the formulation of various forms of reductionism within the object language.
    Nonclassical LogicsReferenceNonexistent Objects
  •  1048
    Harming Yourself and Others: A Note on the Asymmetry of Agency in Action Evaluations
    Polish Journal of Philosophy, Vol. VIII, No. 2 (2014) (2): 65-74. 2016.
    Principles are investigated that allow one to establish a preference ordering between possible actions based on the question of whether the acting agent himself or other agents will benefit or be harmed by the consequences of an action. It is shown that a combination of utility maximization, an altruist principle, and weak negative utilitarianism yields an ordering that seems to be intuitively appealing, although it does not necessarily reflect common everyday evaluations of actions.
    Theories of Moral Value, MiscTopics in Moral Value, MiscValue Theory, MiscMoral Principles, MiscMeta…Read more
    Theories of Moral Value, MiscTopics in Moral Value, MiscValue Theory, MiscMoral Principles, MiscMeta-Ethics, Misc
  •  1
    Meaning and Context (edited book)
    with Luiz Carlos Baptista
    Peter Lang. 2010.
    The Scope of Context-DependenceContext and Context-Dependence, MiscSemantic Minimalism
  •  737
    Book Reviews (review)
    Studia Logica 102 (1): 219-223. 2014.
    In this small book logician and mathematician Jens Erik Fenstad addresses some of the most important foundational questions of linguistics: What should a theory of meaning look like and how might we provide the missing link between meaning theory and our knowledge of how the brain works? The author’s answer is twofold. On the one hand, he suggests that logical semantics in the Montague tradition and other broadly conceived symbolic approaches do not suffice. On the other hand, he does not argue …Read more
    In this small book logician and mathematician Jens Erik Fenstad addresses some of the most important foundational questions of linguistics: What should a theory of meaning look like and how might we provide the missing link between meaning theory and our knowledge of how the brain works? The author’s answer is twofold. On the one hand, he suggests that logical semantics in the Montague tradition and other broadly conceived symbolic approaches do not suffice. On the other hand, he does not argue that the logical approach should be discarded; instead, he opts for a methodological pluralism in which symbolic approaches to meaning are combined with geo- metric ones such as Conceptual Spaces [9] and discusses ways in which these geometric accounts could be hooked up with connectionist frameworks and dynamic systems approaches in neurophysiology
    Subsymbolic ComputationMethodology of Linguistics, MiscDynamical SystemsFormal SemanticsComputationa…Read more
    Subsymbolic ComputationMethodology of Linguistics, MiscDynamical SystemsFormal SemanticsComputational SemanticsLogical Expressions
  •  71
    Context as Assumptions
    In Franck Lihoreau & Manuel Rebuschi (eds.), Epistemology, Context, and Formalism, Springer Verlag. pp. 9-39. 2014.
    In this article some phenomena of linguistic context-dependence are investigated from the perspective of regarding context as being constituted by the assumptions of individual discourse participants.
    Context and Logical FormThe Nature of ContextThe Role of Language in ThoughtSemantics, MiscSemantics…Read more
    Context and Logical FormThe Nature of ContextThe Role of Language in ThoughtSemantics, MiscSemantics-Pragmatics Distinction
  •  34
    Reference and Indexicality
    Logos. 2007.
    Reference and indexicality are two central topics in the Philosophy of Language that are closely tied together. In the first part of this book, a description theory of reference is developed and contrasted with the prevailing direct reference view with the goal of laying out their advantages and disadvantages. The author defends his version of indirect reference against well-known objections raised by Kripke in Naming and Necessity and his successors, and also addresses linguistic aspects like c…Read more
    Reference and indexicality are two central topics in the Philosophy of Language that are closely tied together. In the first part of this book, a description theory of reference is developed and contrasted with the prevailing direct reference view with the goal of laying out their advantages and disadvantages. The author defends his version of indirect reference against well-known objections raised by Kripke in Naming and Necessity and his successors, and also addresses linguistic aspects like compositionality. In the second part, a detailed survey on indexical expressions is given based on a variety of typological data. Topics addressed are, among others: Kaplan's logic of demonstratives, conversational versus utterance context, context-shifting indexicals, the deictic center, token-reflexivity, vagueness of spatial and temporal indexicals, reference rules, and the epistemic and cognitive role of indexicals. From a descriptivist perspective on reference, various examples of simple and complex indexicals are analyzed in first-order predicate logic with reified contexts. A critical discussion of essential indexicality, de se readings of attitudes and accompanying puzzles rounds up the investigation.
    Character and ContentRussellian and Direct Reference Theories, MiscDescriptive Theories of ReferenceRead more
    Character and ContentRussellian and Direct Reference Theories, MiscDescriptive Theories of ReferenceFirst-Person Contents
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