Competition – more specifically economic competition – is relevant to ethical reflection in different ways. Some of its features exacerbate the intensity of moral problems we may otherwise come across in a context of scarcity. For instance, when competition is especially tough – think about winner-takes-all cases – one agent is likely to lose significantly if he or she acts ethically, to the benefit of others who act in ways that seem ethically questionable. Whenever ‘ethics does not pay’ and co…
Read moreCompetition – more specifically economic competition – is relevant to ethical reflection in different ways. Some of its features exacerbate the intensity of moral problems we may otherwise come across in a context of scarcity. For instance, when competition is especially tough – think about winner-takes-all cases – one agent is likely to lose significantly if he or she acts ethically, to the benefit of others who act in ways that seem ethically questionable. Whenever ‘ethics does not pay’ and competition is intense, an economic actor can lose business as a result. Admittedly, business death does not necessarily amount to a person’s death, which makes it different from lifeboat cases. But running out of business is still a very serious problem. Consider also the issues that arise in the context of strong tax competition. Imposition of a fair corporate tax structure may simply chase the most mobile players to low-tax jurisdictions.Another fact about economic competition that renders ethical issues more vivid is company replaceability. Often, if a single agent renounces acting in a way considered morally problematic – e.g. investing in natural resource infrastructure and exploration in a country such as Burma – other players may step in to replace the single agent and immediately assume its morally problematic role. As a result, the people the single agent was concerned about – the citizens of Burma – may reap no positive consequences at all from what we consider the right act by the single agent.There is of course a connection between the first phenomenon – “competition may make it more costly for me to be moral” – and the second – “it makes no difference whether I act morally or not”. I lose in both cases, while no one other than a competitor who has no more moral status than I do wins. If I lose business because I aim at doing the right thing, and others immediately replace me, I will be the only loser. The only winner will be another company. And the very people I am most concerned about may gain nothing at all.It seems legitimate to expect moral theory to have at least something to tell us about what individual agents are supposed to do in such types of contexts. It is also moral theory’s task to consider under which conditions competition itself can be seen as a good thing, whether more competition is always better – as consumer protection too often assumes – and whether there is some connection between coming closer to perfect competition and getting closer to what could be called a fair price. The question is not only “how to be fair when there is competition”, it is also “can competition be fair?”These questions invite us to look more closely at markets. The marketplace allows for supply-demand coordination. It also allows consumers to compare products from different suppliers. We often operate under the assumption that the existence of competition helps to reduce the degree to which producers can exploit consumers. This assumption is, indeed, key to justifying policies that aim at fighting monopolies. But is this salutary effect enough to render even perfect competition fair? One might claim, for example, that while markets permit a reduction in producer exploitation of consumers, it may in fact exacerbate the reverse phenomenon, i.e. by allowing consumers to “exploit” workers and capitalists.Three papers offered in the present edition of Ethical Perspectives are the outcome of a workshop organized in October 2010 as part of a project entitled “Social Responsibility in Economic Life”. This workshop took place with the financial support of the Fondation Emile Bernheim at the Université catholique de Louvain. The first two papers – by Roberts and Dietsch – look at issues of fairness in competition, whereas the third – by Arnsperger – addresses the problem of fairness of competition.Competition is a location in which people continuously harm one another – e.g. my competitive practices can easily make you lose clients or your leadership position. Against this backdrop, the only important issue is often considered to be whether – and to what extent – such a harm should also be seen as a wrong.Roberts focuses on cases in which the very harm itself seems impossible to locate – a finding that would itself seem to moot the issue of wrongdoing from the start. Multiple-agent situations in particular challenge our ability to discern harm in any clear sense. Consider the case in which one agent’s acting in a questionable way seems to make no difference to the alleged victim, since had the one agent not acted in that way a second agent would have stepped in to replace the one agent and imposed at least the same degree of damage on that victim. In such an instance, how can the one agent’s acting in a questionable way be said to harm the victim, when the fact is that it makes no difference from the victim’s perspective whether the one agent acts in this way or not?Relying on an account of how individual agents can be said to participate in what is in effect a group harm, Roberts argues that that ‘no difference’ assessment is a mistake. She then demonstrates how the application of this concept of harm can translate into ethical constraints on specific agents.Dietsch focuses on regulatory competition and more specifically on the duties of one type of actor – the tax planning industry. He considers three definitions of corporate social responsibility before offering an even weaker definition. The latter consists in the following double obligation. According to Dietsch, corporations should ‘pay their taxes’ and ‘not undermine the respect of fiscal obligations by third parties’. He does not directly question the legitimacy of tax planning as a whole. He insists instead that self-regulation in this sector is utopian – more than in other sectors – even if one assigns to the actors in question a truly minimal social responsibility. In this connection, he identifies a twofold challenge that the ethical actor must, in Dietsch’s view, be prepared to meet.Finally, Arnsperger shows that the relationship between solidarity and competition can be understood in at least three ways. Competition can be seen as a source of solidarity. Solidarity can be seen as a counterweight to some effects of competition. And competition can be considered as a dynamic threat to genuine solidarity. He defends the third view as central, with clear implications for the claim according to which competition can be seen as fair
