Axel Gosseries

This chapter explores the specificities, strengths, and weaknesses of the idea of reciprocity as a basis for intergenerational obligations. Three models are presented: descending, ascending, and double reciprocity. Each of these three models is tested against three objections. The first objection asks why having received something from someone would necessarily entail the obligation to give back. The second objection questions the ability of each model to justify the direction of reciprocation. A final objection looks at the extent to which reciprocity-based views adjust the content of our obligation to the fluctuations in population size.

Doit-on attendre des membres actuels d'une communauté qu'ils compensent les victimes des émissions de gaz à effet de serre causées par leurs ancêtres? Nous défendons l'idée que les générations précédentes de pollueurs peuvent très bien ne pas être mo-ralement responsables des dommages qu'elles ont causés. Et nous acceptons aussi la position selon laquelle les descendants d'une génération de pollueurs ne sauraient être tenus pour res-ponsables des dommages engendrés par leurs ancêtres. Il n'en subsiste pas moins que même si l'on effectue ces deux concessions, il reste possible de défendre l'idée d'obligation des des-cendants d'une génération de pollueurs à compenser les victimes actuelles des actions de leurs ancêtres, et ce sur base d'une notion morale de free-riding transgénérationnel. Une définition est proposée et des objections au recours à une telle notion sont rejetées. Suit une comparaison de deux logiques possibles sous-tendant l'utilisation d'un concept de free-riding dans le cadre d'une théorie de la justice, ainsi qu'un examen de leurs implications pratiques

Competition – more specifically economic competition – is relevant to ethical reflection in different ways. Some of its features exacerbate the intensity of moral problems we may otherwise come across in a context of scarcity. For instance, when competition is especially tough – think about winner-takes-all cases – one agent is likely to lose significantly if he or she acts ethically, to the benefit of others who act in ways that seem ethically questionable. Whenever ‘ethics does not pay’ and competition is intense, an economic actor can lose business as a result. Admittedly, business death does not necessarily amount to a person’s death, which makes it different from lifeboat cases. But running out of business is still a very serious problem. Consider also the issues that arise in the context of strong tax competition. Imposition of a fair corporate tax structure may simply chase the most mobile players to low-tax jurisdictions.Another fact about economic competition that renders ethical issues more vivid is company replaceability. Often, if a single agent renounces acting in a way considered morally problematic – e.g. investing in natural resource infrastructure and exploration in a country such as Burma – other players may step in to replace the single agent and immediately assume its morally problematic role. As a result, the people the single agent was concerned about – the citizens of Burma – may reap no positive consequences at all from what we consider the right act by the single agent.There is of course a connection between the first phenomenon – “competition may make it more costly for me to be moral” – and the second – “it makes no difference whether I act morally or not”. I lose in both cases, while no one other than a competitor who has no more moral status than I do wins. If I lose business because I aim at doing the right thing, and others immediately replace me, I will be the only loser. The only winner will be another company. And the very people I am most concerned about may gain nothing at all.It seems legitimate to expect moral theory to have at least something to tell us about what individual agents are supposed to do in such types of contexts. It is also moral theory’s task to consider under which conditions competition itself can be seen as a good thing, whether more competition is always better – as consumer protection too often assumes – and whether there is some connection between coming closer to perfect competition and getting closer to what could be called a fair price. The question is not only “how to be fair when there is competition”, it is also “can competition be fair?”These questions invite us to look more closely at markets. The marketplace allows for supply-demand coordination. It also allows consumers to compare products from different suppliers. We often operate under the assumption that the existence of competition helps to reduce the degree to which producers can exploit consumers. This assumption is, indeed, key to justifying policies that aim at fighting monopolies. But is this salutary effect enough to render even perfect competition fair? One might claim, for example, that while markets permit a reduction in producer exploitation of consumers, it may in fact exacerbate the reverse phenomenon, i.e. by allowing consumers to “exploit” workers and capitalists.Three papers offered in the present edition of Ethical Perspectives are the outcome of a workshop organized in October 2010 as part of a project entitled “Social Responsibility in Economic Life”. This workshop took place with the financial support of the Fondation Emile Bernheim at the Université catholique de Louvain. The first two papers – by Roberts and Dietsch – look at issues of fairness in competition, whereas the third – by Arnsperger – addresses the problem of fairness of competition.Competition is a location in which people continuously harm one another – e.g. my competitive practices can easily make you lose clients or your leadership position. Against this backdrop, the only important issue is often considered to be whether – and to what extent – such a harm should also be seen as a wrong.Roberts focuses on cases in which the very harm itself seems impossible to locate – a finding that would itself seem to moot the issue of wrongdoing from the start. Multiple-agent situations in particular challenge our ability to discern harm in any clear sense. Consider the case in which one agent’s acting in a questionable way seems to make no difference to the alleged victim, since had the one agent not acted in that way a second agent would have stepped in to replace the one agent and imposed at least the same degree of damage on that victim. In such an instance, how can the one agent’s acting in a questionable way be said to harm the victim, when the fact is that it makes no difference from the victim’s perspective whether the one agent acts in this way or not?Relying on an account of how individual agents can be said to participate in what is in effect a group harm, Roberts argues that that ‘no difference’ assessment is a mistake. She then demonstrates how the application of this concept of harm can translate into ethical constraints on specific agents.Dietsch focuses on regulatory competition and more specifically on the duties of one type of actor – the tax planning industry. He considers three definitions of corporate social responsibility before offering an even weaker definition. The latter consists in the following double obligation. According to Dietsch, corporations should ‘pay their taxes’ and ‘not undermine the respect of fiscal obligations by third parties’. He does not directly question the legitimacy of tax planning as a whole. He insists instead that self-regulation in this sector is utopian – more than in other sectors – even if one assigns to the actors in question a truly minimal social responsibility. In this connection, he identifies a twofold challenge that the ethical actor must, in Dietsch’s view, be prepared to meet.Finally, Arnsperger shows that the relationship between solidarity and competition can be understood in at least three ways. Competition can be seen as a source of solidarity. Solidarity can be seen as a counterweight to some effects of competition. And competition can be considered as a dynamic threat to genuine solidarity. He defends the third view as central, with clear implications for the claim according to which competition can be seen as fair

Evidence provided by the scientific community strongly suggests that limits should be placed on greenhouse gas emissions. This means that states, firms, and individuals will have to face potentially serious burdens if they are to implement these limits. Which principles of justice should guide a global regime aimed at reducing greenhouse gas emissions originating from human activities, and most notably from CO2emissions? This is both a crucial and difficult question. Admittedly, perhaps this question is too ambitious, given the uncertainties and complexities characterizing the issue of climate change. Yet, rather than listing them all at this stage, let us address the question in a straightforward manner, introducing some of these complexities as the need arises.

Should the foreign debt of the world’s poorest countries be cancelled? In this essay, I am concerned with whether a generational perspective makes a difference in answering this question. I will show that it does, and that alternative accounts of repayment obligations are possible. I argue that a distributive theory of justice is not only appropriate to address the challenges to justice raised by long-term sovereign indebtedness, but that it is also superior to the solution offered by the odious debt doctrine.Unlike the odious debt doctrine, a distributive view is capable of taking intoaccount the separateness of generations. More specifically, I also argue thatthe need to preserve creditors’ incentives to lend to the poor in order toensure that the latter keep having access to credit for important development purposes requires the adoption of a narrow, problem-specific view, which focuses on the distributive impact of the loan transaction, rather than a broad distributive view, which looks at the general distributive situation of the two descendent communities.

This Introduction tells the story of intergerational justice and how it has influenced philosophers and political thinkers throughout history. The Introduction goes on to discuss the aims of the book, which is to offer a sustained discussion of intergenerational justice as seen by practical philosophers. The first part of the book focuses on the way in which various schools of thought in moral and political philosophy approach the domain of intergenerational justice, while the second part focuses on more specific aspects, such as how these theories address the question of motivation, how they deal with demographic fluctuations, or how they can be applied to real-world issues such as climate change.

This paper provides a comparative analysis of the way in which, as well as the extent to which, two key variables potentially allow for the development of more left-wing versions of libertarianism and hobbesianism. It turns out that hobbesianism, while disposing of ways to extend the scope of what should be seen as the “cooperative surplus”, is in trouble when it comes to justifying “equal division” as a general rule to divide up such a surplus. In contrast, libertarianism can meaningfully rely on strategies extending the notion of external resources as well as on an equal division rule. We then explore what this entails with respect to the capacity of such theories to offer more redistributive versions than their standard forms. We also briefly look at how to map such left-wing versions, and especially left-libertarianism, once they are compared with other theories such as luck egalitarianism or sufficientarianism.

Is it fair to leave the next generation a public debt? Is it defensible to impose legal rules on them through constitutional constraints? From combating climate change to ensuring proper funding for future pensions, concerns about ethics between generations are everywhere. In this volume sixteen philosophers explore intergenerational justice. Part One examines the ways in which various theories of justice look at the matter. These include libertarian, Rawlsian, sufficientarian, contractarian, communitarian, Marxian and reciprocity-based approaches. In Part Two, the authors look more specifically at issues relevant to each of these theories, such as motivation to act fairly towards future generations, the population dimension, the formation of preferences through education and how they impact on our intergenerational obligations, and whether it is fair to rely on constitutional devices.

The A. discusses conditions for the idea of obligations towards the dead, while simultaneously holding the view that dead people have ceased to exist in a morally relevant sense. He examines and rejects three «lateral» strategies (Callahan, Wellman, Partridge) that rest on a notion of obligations concerning, rather than towards the dead. He then goes on to scrutinize Feinberg's «frontal» strategy, that consists in defending the possibility of (pre)posthumous harms, and, as a result, of obligations towards the dead. The A. rejects this standpoint also, especially because of the deterministic view on which it rests, and because of the coexistence it implies between post-mortem properties and ante-mortem harm. Both lateral and frontal strategies thus fail to justify obligations towards the dead. The A. then suggests that if we wish to stick to the latter, we might have to endorse the metaphysical claim that seems to be implied in it (i.e. that dead people do exist in some morally relevant sense), unless we are ready to abandon the idea that a moral obligation towards a person only makes sense if this person is in a position to be harmed.

In this paper, the author offers a synoptic view of different theories of intergenerational justice, along two dimensions (savings/dissavings) and three modalities (prohibition, authorisation, obligation). After presenting successively the indirect reciprocity, the mutual advantage, the utilitarian and the Lockean approaches, special attention is given to the egalitarian theory of intergenerational justice. Two key differences between the egalitarian view on intergenerational justice and the sufficientarian interpretation of sustainability are highlighted

Axel Gosseries1 | : À la suggestion de Jefferson,3 nous nous proposons de prendre au sérieux la comparaison entre nations et générations dans le cadre d’une théorie philosophique de la justice et de la démocratie préoccupée par nos devoirs envers les membres d’autres générations. Nous nous concentrons ici sur trois des caractéristiques propres aux relations intergénérationnelles, à travers une comparaison avec des situations internationales spécifiques. La première a trait à l’immobilité temporelle des personnes au delà de la période s’étendant de leur naissance à leur mort. Cette immobilité rend certaines ressources qui sont spécifiques à des périodes données, inaccessibles aux générations des autres périodes, ce qui peut importer pour certaines théories de la justice. Nous nous intéressons ensuite au caractère enclavé de chaque génération. La transmission intergénérationnelle des biens dépend alors de la collaboration tant passive qu’active des générations de transit. Nous montrons en quoi cela importe pour la définition de nos obligations de justice intergénérationnelle. Enfin, nous insistons sur le caractère unidirectionnel de l’écoulement du temps — cette fois à travers l’analogie avec les nations riveraines d’un fleuve — et son effet sur la distribution temporelle des coûts et bénéfices, et des vulnérabilités. Nous en examinons les implications normatives possibles pour la définition de la juste distribution du pouvoir entre générations. À travers ces trois illustrations, nous espérons montrer la pertinence de cette approche anatomico-analogique pour la compréhension de ce que nous devons aux autres générations, et en particulier aux générations futures. | : Following Jefferson’s suggestion, I take seriously the promises of a comparison between nations and generations, as part of a philosophical theory of justice and of democracy concerned with our obligations towards members of other generations. I focus here on three of the features that are specific to intergenerational relations, through a comparison with corresponding international situations. The first feature has to do with people’s temporal immobility beyond the lapse of time that extends from their birth to their death. Such immobility renders some period-specific resources inaccessible to generations from other periods, which may have implications for some theories of justice. The second feature that I look into is the period-locked nature of the members each generation. The intergenerational transfer of goods to future generations then depends on the passive as well as active collaboration of transit generations. I show why and to what extent this matters to the definition of our intergenerational obligations. Finally, I insist on the one-directional feature of time’s passage — through an analogy with the situation of riparian nations along a river — and on its effect on the temporal distribution of costs and benefits, as well as of vulnerabilities. I explore the potential normative implications of such one-directionality for the definition of a fair distribution of power between generations. Through looking at these three features and closely examining their implications, I also hope to stress the relevance of an anatomico-analogical method for the understanding of what we owe other generations, and especially future ones

La cobertura universal de salud está en el centro de la acción actual para fortalecer los sistemas de salud y mejorar el nivel y la distribución de la salud y los servicios de salud. Este documento es el informe fi nal del Grupo Consultivo de la OMS sobre la Equidad y Cobertura Universal de Salud. Aquí se abordan los temas clave de la justicia (fairness) y la equidad que surgen en el camino hacia la cobertura universal de salud. Por lo tanto, el informe es pertinente para cada agente que infl uye en ese camino y en particular para los gobiernos, ya que se encargan de supervisar y guiar el progreso hacia la cobertura universal de salud.

In this article, we explore the implications of a Rawlsian theory for intergenerational issues. First, we confront Rawls's way of locating his `just savings' principle in his Theory of Justice with an alternative way of doing so. We argue that both sides of his intergenerational principle, as they apply to the accumulation phase and the steady-state stage, can be dealt with on the bases, respectively, of the principle of equal liberty and of the difference principle. We then proceed by focusing on the implications of applying maximin to his steady-state stage. One central claim is that, in principle, Rawlsians should consider not only generational dissavings, but also generational savings, as unfair. This principle suffers a series of exceptions on which we focus in the fourth section of the article. In some cases, growth can be maximin compatible.

In this volume, fourteen philosophers, economists and legal scholars and one computer scientist address various facets of the same question: under which conditions (if any) can intellectual property rights be fair? This general question unfolds in a variety of others: What are the parallels and differences between intellectual and real property? Are libertarian theories especially sympathetic to IP rights? Should Rawlsian support copyright? How can a concern for incentives be taken into account by each of the main theories of justice? What's exactly wrong with free-riding, when dealing with non-rival goods? This requires a close examination of a variety of specific issues such as peer-to-peer file sharing, access to vital medicines, the interaction between copyright and freedom of expression, patents on genes, etc. It also involves bringing together state-of-the-art knowledge on legal, economic and technical issues with the most advanced state of our normative theories.