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42On Two Different Kinds of Computational IndeterminacyThe Monist 105 (2): 229-246. 2022.It is often indeterminate what function a given computational system computes. This phenomenon has been referred to as “computational indeterminacy” or “multiplicity of computations.” In this paper, we argue that what has typically been considered and referred to as the challenge of computational indeterminacy in fact subsumes two distinct phenomena, which are typically bundled together and should be teased apart. One kind of indeterminacy concerns a functional characterization of the system’s r…Read more
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32The role of the environment in computational explanationsEuropean Journal for Philosophy of Science 9 (3): 1-19. 2019.The mechanistic view of computation contends that computational explanations are mechanistic explanations. Mechanists, however, disagree about the precise role that the environment – or the so-called “contextual level” – plays for computational explanations. We advance here two claims: Contextual factors essentially determine the computational identity of a computing system ; this means that specifying the “intrinsic” mechanism is not sufficient to fix the computational identity of the system. I…Read more
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32Review of Goldman (1993): Readings in Philosophy and Cognitive Science (review)Pragmatics and Cognition 3 (2): 377-385. 1995.
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24What is Computer Science About?The Monist 82 (1): 131-149. 1999.What is computer-science about? CS is obviously the science of computers. But what exactly are computers? We know that there are physical computers, and, perhaps, also abstract computers. Let us limit the discussion here to physical entities and ask: What are physical computers? What does it mean for a physical entity to be a computer? The answer, it seems, is that physical computers are physical dynamical systems that implement formal entities such as Turing-machines. I do not think that this a…Read more
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20Anomalism and Supervenience: A Critical SurveyCanadian Journal of Philosophy 39 (2): 237-272. 2009.The thesis that mental properties are dependent, or supervenient, on physical properties, but this dependence is not lawlike, has been influential in contemporary philosophy of mind. It is put forward explicitly in Donald Davidson's seminal ‘Mental Events.’ On the one hand, Davidson claims that the mental is anomalous, that ‘there are no strict deterministic laws on the basis of which mental events can be predicted and explained’ (1970, 208), and, in particular, that there are no strict psychoph…Read more
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18The Nature of Physical ComputationOxford University Press. 2021.What does it mean to say that an object or system computes? What is it about laptops, smartphones, and nervous systems that they are considered to compute, and why does it seldom occur to us to describe stomachs, hurricanes, rocks, or chairs that way? Though computing systems are everywhere today, it is very difficult to answer these questions. The book aims to shed light on the subject by arguing for the semantic view of computation, which states that computingsystems are always accompanied by …Read more
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16The role of the environment in computational explanationsEuropean Journal for Philosophy of Science 9 (3): 1-19. 2019.The mechanistic view of computation contends that computational explanations are mechanistic explanations. Mechanists, however, disagree about the precise role that the environment – or the so-called “contextual level” – plays for computational explanations. We advance here two claims: Contextual factors essentially determine the computational identity of a computing system ; this means that specifying the “intrinsic” mechanism is not sufficient to fix the computational identity of the system. I…Read more
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16The role of the environment in computational explanationsEuropean Journal for Philosophy of Science 9 (3): 1-19. 2019.The mechanistic view of computation contends that computational explanations are mechanistic explanations. Mechanists, however, disagree about the precise role that the environment – or the so-called “contextual level” – plays for computational explanations. We advance here two claims: Contextual factors essentially determine the computational identity of a computing system ; this means that specifying the “intrinsic” mechanism is not sufficient to fix the computational identity of the system. I…Read more
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9Gödel on Turing on ComputabilityIn Adam Olszewski, Jan Wolenski & Robert Janusz (eds.), Church's Thesis After 70 Years, Ontos Verlag. pp. 393-419. 2006.
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Computation and its Relevance to Cognition: An Essay on the Foundations of Cognitive ScienceDissertation, University of California, San Diego. 1994.Is the mind/brain a kind of a computer? In cognitive science, it is widely believed that cognition is a form of computation--that some physical systems, such as minds/brains, compute appropriate functions, whereas other systems, such as video cameras, stomachs or the weather, do not compute. What makes a physical system a computing system? In my dissertation I first reject the orthodox, Turing-machine style answer to this question. I argue that the orthodox notion is rooted in a misunderstanding…Read more
Jerusalem, Jerusalem District, Israel
Areas of Specialization
Philosophy of Mind |
Philosophy of Cognitive Science |
Philosophy of Computing and Information |
Areas of Interest
Metaphysics |
Logic and Philosophy of Logic |
Science, Logic, and Mathematics |