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211Jesse J. Prinz, Furnishing the Mind: Concepts and their Perceptual Basis. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2002 (review)Metascience 12 (3): 279-303. 2003.
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248Innateness as Closed Process InvariancePhilosophy of Science 73 (3): 323-344. 2006.Controversies over the innateness of cognitive processes, mechanisms, and structures play a persistent role in driving research in philosophy as well as the cognitive sciences, but the appropriate way to understand the category of the innate remains subject to dispute. One venerable approach in philosophy and cognitive science merely contrasts innate features with those that are learned. In fact, Jerry Fodor has recently suggested that this remains our best handle on innateness
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1576Experimental Philosophy, Noisy Intuitions, and Messy InferencesIn Jennifer Nado (ed.), Advances in Experimental Philosophy & Philosophical Methodology, Bloomsbury Academic. 2016.Much discussion about experimental philosophy and philosophical methodology has been framed in terms of the reliability of intuitions, and even when it has not been about reliability per se, it has been focused on whether intuitions meet whatever conditions they need to meet to be trustworthy as evidence. But really that question cannot be answered independently from the questions, evidence for what theories arrived at by what sorts of inferences? I will contend here that not just philosophy's…Read more
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101Naturalism and intuitions: Commentary on Steven Hales, relativism and the foundations of philosophyInternational Journal of Philosophical Studies 16 (2). 2008.This Article does not have an abstract
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3Configuring the Cognitive ImaginationIn Kathleen Stock & Katherine Thomson-Jones (eds.), New waves in aesthetics, Palgrave-macmillan. pp. 203-223. 2008.
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511Accentuate the NegativeReview of Philosophy and Psychology 1 (2): 297-314. 2010.Our interest in this paper is to drive a wedge of contention between two different programs that fall under the umbrella of “experimental philosophy”. In particular, we argue that experimental philosophy’s “negative program” presents almost as significant a challenge to its “positive program” as it does to more traditional analytic philosophy.
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116What is evaluative normativity, that we (maybe) should avoid it?Behavioral and Brain Sciences 34 (5): 274-275. 2011.Elqayam & Evans (E&E) argue that we should avoid evaluative normativity in our psychological theorizing. But there are two crucial issues lacking clarity in their presentation of evaluative normativity. One of them can be resolved through disambiguation, but the other points to a deeper problem: Evaluative normativity is too tightly-woven in our theorizing to be easily disentangled and discarded
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