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144Being Rational and being RightOxford University Press. 2020.In Being Rational and Being Right, Juan Comesaña argues for a cluster of theses related to the rationality of action and belief. His starting point is that rational action requires rational belief but tolerates false belief. From there, Comesaña provides a novel account of empirical evidence according to which said evidence consists of the content of undefeated experiences. This view, which Comesaña calls "Experientialism," differs from the two main views of empirical evidence on offer nowada…Read more
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84Knowledge from BlindspotsIn Rodrigo Borges & Ian Schnee (eds.), Illuminating Errors: New Essays on Knowledge from Non-Knowledge, Routledge. pp. 76-91. 2023.No False Lemmas (NFL) says: necessarily, S’s belief that p is knowledge only if it is not inferred from any falsehood. Its proponents argue that alleged counterexamples to NFL are really cases of knowledge despite falsehood, wherein the false premise is inessential to the inference; perhaps some nearby truth does the justificatory heavy-lifting. We argue that there can be cases of inferential knowledge from a blindspot premise. Given that in such cases the relevant falsehood is essential to the …Read more
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81Conciliation and Peer-Demotion in the Epistemology of DisagreementAmerican Philosophical Quarterly 49 (3): 237-252. 2012.What should your reaction be when you find out that someone that you consider an "epistemic peer" disagrees with you? Two broad approaches to this question have gained support from different philosophers. Precise characterizations of these approaches will be given later, but consider for now the following approximations. First, there is the "conciliatory" approach, according to which the right reaction to a disagreement is to move one's opinion towards that of one's peer, in proportion to the de…Read more
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66Rigidity, symmetry and defeasibility: On Weisberg's puzzle for perceptual justificationPhilosophical Issues 30 (1): 54-70. 2020.Philosophical Issues, Volume 30, Issue 1, Page 54-70, October 2020.
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62Review of Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (ed.), Pyrrhonian Skepticism (review)Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2005 (6). 2005.
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33Comments on Carl Ginet’s “Self-Evidence”Veritas – Revista de Filosofia da Pucrs 54 (2): 41-47. 2009.---
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31Review of Stephen Hetherington (ed.), Aspects of Knowing: Epistemological Essays (review)Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2007 (5). 2007.
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27Justified vs. Warranted Perceptual Belief: Resisting DisjunctivismPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (2): 367-383. 2007.In this paper I argue that McDowell's brand of disjunctivism about perceptual knowledge is ill‐motivated. First, I present a reconstruction of one main motivation for disjunctivism, in the form of an argument that theories that posit a “highest common factor” between veridical and non‐veridical experiences must be wrong. Then I show that the argument owes its plausibility to a failure to distinguish between justification and warrant (where “warrant” is understood as whatever has to be added to t…Read more
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6Escepticismo semántico y teorías del significadoAnálisis Filosófico 18 (2): 143-149. 1998.In several works H. Putnam has developed an argument addressed against "realist" semantic theories (in particular, against causal theories of reference ). In this paper I argue that Putnam's argument is weaker than what is generally supposed, as Devitt has shown in Realism and Truth. I disagree, however, with Devitfs latest strategy against model-theoretic arguments as presented in an ''Afterword'' to that book.
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The Ways of ReasonDissertation, Brown University. 2003.This dissertation is about rationality, both practical rationality , and theoretical rationality . I argue that there are interesting similarities as well as interesting differences between practical and theoretical rationality. One of the similarities is that both of them are essentially related to the explanation of actions and beliefs, and one of the differences is that whereas theoretical rationality has the hyper-external aim of truth, practical rationality has the non-hyper-external aim of…Read more
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Seguridad y sueños en la epistemología de SosaTeorema: International Journal of Philosophy 28 (1). 2009.
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En defensa de un externalismo epistémicoRevista Latinoamericana de Filosofia 28 (2): 173-200. 2002.
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Security and Dreams in the Epistemology of SosaTeorema: International Journal of Philosophy 28 (1): 75-81. 2009.
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There is no immediate JustificationIn Matthias Steup & John Turri (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology, Blackwell. 2013.
New Brunswick, NJ, United States of America
Areas of Specialization
Epistemology |
Areas of Interest
Epistemology |
Metaphysics |