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1137Williamson on Gettier Cases and Epistemic LogicInquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 56 (1): 15-29. 2013.Timothy Williamson has fruitfully exploited formal resources to shed considerable light on the nature of knowledge. In the paper under examination, Williamson turns his attention to Gettier cases, showing how they can be motivated formally. At the same time, he disparages the kind of justification he thinks gives rise to these cases. He favors instead his own notion of justification for which Gettier cases cannot arise. We take issue both with his disparagement of the kind of justification that …Read more
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321Safety and Epistemic Frankfurt CasesIn John Turri (ed.), Virtuous Thoughts: The Philosophy of Ernest Sosa, Springer. pp. 165--178. 2013.
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342On a Puzzle About WithholdingPhilosophical Quarterly 63 (251): 374-376. 2013.I discuss Turri's puzzle about withholding. I argue that attention to the way in which evidence can justify withholding dissolves the puzzle
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384Evidence of evidence is evidenceAnalysis 75 (4): 557-559. 2015.Richard Feldman has proposed and defended different versions of a principle about evidence. In slogan form, the principle holds that ‘evidence of evidence is evidence’. Recently, Branden Fitelson has argued that Feldman’s preferred rendition of the principle falls pray to a counterexample related to the non-transitivity of the evidence-for relation. Feldman replies arguing that Fitelson’s case does not really represent a counterexample to the principle. In this note, we argue that Feldman’s prin…Read more
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33Comments on Carl Ginet’s “Self-Evidence”Veritas – Revista de Filosofia da Pucrs 54 (2): 41-47. 2009.---
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31Review of Stephen Hetherington (ed.), Aspects of Knowing: Epistemological Essays (review)Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2007 (5). 2007.
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27Justified vs. Warranted Perceptual Belief: Resisting DisjunctivismPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (2): 367-383. 2007.In this paper I argue that McDowell's brand of disjunctivism about perceptual knowledge is ill‐motivated. First, I present a reconstruction of one main motivation for disjunctivism, in the form of an argument that theories that posit a “highest common factor” between veridical and non‐veridical experiences must be wrong. Then I show that the argument owes its plausibility to a failure to distinguish between justification and warrant (where “warrant” is understood as whatever has to be added to t…Read more
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464Williamson on Gettier Cases in Epistemic Logic and the Knowledge Norm for Rational Belief: A Reply to a Reply to a ReplyInquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 56 (4): 400-415. 2013.No abstract
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Seguridad y sueños en la epistemología de SosaTeorema: International Journal of Philosophy 28 (1). 2009.
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324On Sharon and Spectre’s argument against closurePhilosophical Studies 174 (4): 1039-1046. 2017.
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683Epistemic Pragmatism: An Argument Against ModerationRes Philosophica 90 (2): 237-260. 2013.By “epistemic pragmatism” in general I will understand the claim that whether propositions instantiate certain key epistemic properties (such as being known or being justifiably believed) depends not just on factors traditionally recognized as epistemic, but also on pragmatic factors, such as how costly it would be to the subject if the proposition were false. In what follows I consider two varieties of epistemic pragmatism. According to what I shall call moderate epistemic pragmatism, how much …Read more
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151What lottery problem for reliabilism?Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 90 (1): 1-20. 2009.It can often be heard in the hallways, and occasionally read in print, that reliabilism runs into special trouble regarding lottery cases. My main aim in this paper is to argue that this is not so. Nevertheless, lottery cases do force us to pay close attention to the relation between justification and probability.
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62Review of Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (ed.), Pyrrhonian Skepticism (review)Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2005 (6). 2005.
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185Knowledge and Subjunctive ConditionalsPhilosophy Compass 2 (6): 781-791. 2007.What relation must hold between a fact p and the corresponding belief that p for the belief to amount to knowledge? Many authors have recently proposed that the relation can be captured by subjunctive conditionals. In this paper I critically evaluate the main proposals along those lines
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En defensa de un externalismo epistémicoRevista Latinoamericana de Filosofia 28 (2): 173-200. 2002.
New Brunswick, NJ, United States of America
Areas of Specialization
Epistemology |
Areas of Interest
Epistemology |
Metaphysics |