Brown University
Department of Philosophy
PhD, 2003
Tucson, Arizona, United States of America
Areas of Specialization
Areas of Interest
  •  160
    Can We Believe for Practical Reasons?
    Philosophical Issues 25 (1): 189-207. 2015.
  •  486
    Williamson on Gettier Cases and Epistemic Logic
    Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 56 (1): 15-29. 2013.
    Timothy Williamson has fruitfully exploited formal resources to shed considerable light on the nature of knowledge. In the paper under examination, Williamson turns his attention to Gettier cases, showing how they can be motivated formally. At the same time, he disparages the kind of justification he thinks gives rise to these cases. He favors instead his own notion of justification for which Gettier cases cannot arise. We take issue both with his disparagement of the kind of justification that …Read more
  •  90
    On a Puzzle About Withholding
    Philosophical Quarterly 63 (251): 374-376. 2013.
    I discuss Turri's puzzle about withholding. I argue that attention to the way in which evidence can justify withholding dissolves the puzzle
  •  196
    Evidence of evidence is evidence
    with Eyal Tal
    Analysis 75 (4): 557-559. 2015.
    Richard Feldman has proposed and defended different versions of a principle about evidence. In slogan form, the principle holds that ‘evidence of evidence is evidence’. Recently, Branden Fitelson has argued that Feldman’s preferred rendition of the principle falls pray to a counterexample related to the non-transitivity of the evidence-for relation. Feldman replies arguing that Fitelson’s case does not really represent a counterexample to the principle. In this note, we argue that Feldman’s prin…Read more
  •  24
    Comments on Carl Ginet’s “Self-Evidence”
    Veritas – Revista de Filosofia da Pucrs 54 (2): 41-47. 2009.
  •  19
    Justified vs. Warranted Perceptual Belief: Resisting Disjunctivism
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (2): 367-383. 2005.
    In this paper I argue that McDowell’s brand of disjunctivism about perceptual knowledge is ill-motivated. First, I present a reconstruction of one main motivation for disjunctivism, in the form of an argument that theories that posit a “highest common factor” between veridical and non-veridical experiences must be wrong. Then I show that the argument owes its plausibility to a failure to distinguish between justification and warrant.
  •  156
    Difference‐Making in Epistemology
    with Carolina Sartorio
    Noûs 48 (2): 368-387. 2014.
  •  150
  • Seguridad y sueños en la epistemología de Sosa
    Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 28 (1). 2009.
  •  106
    On Sharon and Spectre’s argument against closure
    Philosophical Studies 174 (4): 1039-1046. 2017.
  •  173
    Epistemic Pragmatism
    Res Philosophica 90 (2): 237-260. 2013.
    By “epistemic pragmatism” in general I will understand the claim that whether propositions instantiate certain key epistemic properties (such as being known orbeing justifiably believed) depends not just on factors traditionally recognized as epistemic, but also on pragmatic factors, such as how costly it would be to the subject if the proposition were false. In what follows I consider two varieties of epistemic pragmatism. According to what I shall call moderate epistemic pragmatism, how much e…Read more