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30Review of Stephen Hetherington (ed.), Aspects of Knowing: Epistemological Essays (review)Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2007 (5). 2007.
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27Justified vs. Warranted Perceptual Belief: Resisting DisjunctivismPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (2): 367-383. 2007.In this paper I argue that McDowell's brand of disjunctivism about perceptual knowledge is ill‐motivated. First, I present a reconstruction of one main motivation for disjunctivism, in the form of an argument that theories that posit a “highest common factor” between veridical and non‐veridical experiences must be wrong. Then I show that the argument owes its plausibility to a failure to distinguish between justification and warrant (where “warrant” is understood as whatever has to be added to t…Read more
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455Williamson on Gettier Cases in Epistemic Logic and the Knowledge Norm for Rational Belief: A Reply to a Reply to a ReplyInquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 56 (4): 400-415. 2013.No abstract
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Seguridad y sueños en la epistemología de SosaTeorema: International Journal of Philosophy 28 (1). 2009.
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309On Sharon and Spectre’s argument against closurePhilosophical Studies 174 (4): 1039-1046. 2017.
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661Epistemic Pragmatism: An Argument Against ModerationRes Philosophica 90 (2): 237-260. 2013.By “epistemic pragmatism” in general I will understand the claim that whether propositions instantiate certain key epistemic properties (such as being known or being justifiably believed) depends not just on factors traditionally recognized as epistemic, but also on pragmatic factors, such as how costly it would be to the subject if the proposition were false. In what follows I consider two varieties of epistemic pragmatism. According to what I shall call moderate epistemic pragmatism, how much …Read more
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151What lottery problem for reliabilism?Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 90 (1): 1-20. 2009.It can often be heard in the hallways, and occasionally read in print, that reliabilism runs into special trouble regarding lottery cases. My main aim in this paper is to argue that this is not so. Nevertheless, lottery cases do force us to pay close attention to the relation between justification and probability.
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61Review of Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (ed.), Pyrrhonian Skepticism (review)Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2005 (6). 2005.
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185Knowledge and Subjunctive ConditionalsPhilosophy Compass 2 (6): 781-791. 2007.What relation must hold between a fact p and the corresponding belief that p for the belief to amount to knowledge? Many authors have recently proposed that the relation can be captured by subjunctive conditionals. In this paper I critically evaluate the main proposals along those lines
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En defensa de un externalismo epistémicoRevista Latinoamericana de Filosofia 28 (2): 173-200. 2002.
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228The diagonal and the demonPhilosophical Studies 110 (3). 2002.Reliabilism about epistemic justification - the thesis that what makes a belief epistemically justified is that it was produced by a reliable process of belief-formation - must face two problems. First, what has been called "the new evil demon problem", which arises from the idea that the beliefs of victims of an evil demon are as justified as our own beliefs, although they are not - the objector claims - reliably produced. And second, the problem of diagnosing why skepticism is so appealing des…Read more
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530Perceptual reasonsPhilosophical Studies 173 (4): 991-1006. 2016.The two main theories of perceptual reasons in contemporary epistemology can be called Phenomenalism and Factualism. According to Phenomenalism, perceptual reasons are facts about experiences conceived of as phenomenal states, i.e., states individuated by phenomenal character, by what it’s like to be in them. According to Factualism, perceptual reasons are instead facts about the external objects perceived. The main problem with Factualism is that it struggles with bad cases: cases where perceiv…Read more
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5Escepticismo semántico y teorías del significadoAnálisis Filosófico 18 (2): 143-149. 1998.In several works H. Putnam has developed an argument addressed against "realist" semantic theories (in particular, against causal theories of reference ). In this paper I argue that Putnam's argument is weaker than what is generally supposed, as Devitt has shown in Realism and Truth. I disagree, however, with Devitfs latest strategy against model-theoretic arguments as presented in an ''Afterword'' to that book.
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145Could there be exactly two things?Synthese 162 (1). 2008.Many philosophers think that, necessarily, any material objects have a fusion (let’s call that doctrine “Universalism”). In this paper I point out a couple of strange consequences of Universalism and related doctrines, and suggest that they are strange enough to constitute a powerful argument against those views
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731Is Evidence of Evidence Evidence?Noûs 51 (1): 95-112. 2017.We examine whether the "evidence of evidence is evidence" principle is true. We distinguish several different versions of the principle and evaluate recent attacks on some of those versions. We argue that, whatever the merits of those attacks, they leave the more important rendition of the principle untouched. That version is, however, also subject to new kinds of counterexamples. We end by suggesting how to formulate a better version of the principle that takes into account those new counterexa…Read more
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Security and Dreams in the Epistemology of SosaTeorema: International Journal of Philosophy 28 (1): 75-81. 2009.
New Brunswick, NJ, United States of America
Areas of Specialization
Epistemology |
Areas of Interest
Epistemology |
Metaphysics |