Brown University
Department of Philosophy
PhD, 2003
Tucson, Arizona, United States of America
Areas of Specialization
Areas of Interest
  •  273
    Is Evidence of Evidence Evidence?
    with Eyal Tal
    Noûs 51 (1): 95-112. 2017.
    We examine whether the "evidence of evidence is evidence" principle is true. We distinguish several different versions of the principle and evaluate recent attacks on some of those versions. We argue that, whatever the merits of those attacks, they leave the more important rendition of the principle untouched. That version is, however, also subject to new kinds of counterexamples. We end by suggesting how to formulate a better version of the principle that takes into account those new counterexa…Read more
  • Security and Dreams in the Epistemology of Sosa
    Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 28 (1): 75-81. 2009.
  •  135
    Normative Requirements and Contrary-to-Duty Obligations
    Journal of Philosophy 112 (11): 600-626. 2015.
    I argue that normative requirements should be interpreted as the conditional obligations of dyadic deontic logic. Semantically, normative requirements are conditionals understood as restrictors, the prevailing view of conditionals in linguistics. This means that Modus Ponens is invalid, even when the premises are known
  •  134
    Easy Knowledge Makes No Difference: Reply to Wielenberg
    with Carolina Sartorio
    Logos and Episteme 6 (2). 2015.
    We have recently proposed a diagnosis of what goes wrong in cases of ‘easy-knowledge.’ Erik Wielenberg argues that there are cases of easy knowledge thatour proposal cannot handle. In this note we reply to Wielenberg, arguing that our proposal does indeed handle his cases.
  •  80
    Conciliation and Peer-Demotion in the Epistemology of Disagreement
    American Philosophical Quarterly 49 (3): 237-252. 2012.
    What should your reaction be when you find out that someone that you consider an "epistemic peer" disagrees with you? Two broad approaches to this question have gained support from different philosophers. Precise characterizations of these approaches will be given later, but consider for now the following approximations. First, there is the "conciliatory" approach, according to which the right reaction to a disagreement is to move one's opinion towards that of one's peer, in proportion to the de…Read more
  •  230
    Unsafe Knowledge
    Synthese 146 (3): 395-404. 2005.
    Ernest Sosa has argued that if someone knows that p, then his belief that p is “safe”. and Timothy Williamson has agreed. In this paper I argue that safety, as defined by Sosa, is not a necessary condition on knowledge – that we can have unsafe knowledge. I present Sosa’s definition of safety and a counterexample to it as a necessary condition on knowledge. I also argue that Sosa’s most recent refinements to the notion of safety don’t help him to avoid the counterexample. I consider three replie…Read more
  •  374
    Evidentialist Reliabilism
    Noûs 44 (4): 571-600. 2010.
    I argue for a theory that combines elements of reliabilism and evidentialism.
  •  63
    Falsehood and Entailment
    Philosophical Perspectives 29 (1): 82-94. 2015.
  •  160
    Can We Believe for Practical Reasons?
    Philosophical Issues 25 (1): 189-207. 2015.
  •  486
    Williamson on Gettier Cases and Epistemic Logic
    Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 56 (1): 15-29. 2013.
    Timothy Williamson has fruitfully exploited formal resources to shed considerable light on the nature of knowledge. In the paper under examination, Williamson turns his attention to Gettier cases, showing how they can be motivated formally. At the same time, he disparages the kind of justification he thinks gives rise to these cases. He favors instead his own notion of justification for which Gettier cases cannot arise. We take issue both with his disparagement of the kind of justification that …Read more
  •  90
    On a Puzzle About Withholding
    Philosophical Quarterly 63 (251): 374-376. 2013.
    I discuss Turri's puzzle about withholding. I argue that attention to the way in which evidence can justify withholding dissolves the puzzle
  •  196
    Evidence of evidence is evidence
    with Eyal Tal
    Analysis 75 (4): 557-559. 2015.
    Richard Feldman has proposed and defended different versions of a principle about evidence. In slogan form, the principle holds that ‘evidence of evidence is evidence’. Recently, Branden Fitelson has argued that Feldman’s preferred rendition of the principle falls pray to a counterexample related to the non-transitivity of the evidence-for relation. Feldman replies arguing that Fitelson’s case does not really represent a counterexample to the principle. In this note, we argue that Feldman’s prin…Read more
  •  24
    Comments on Carl Ginet’s “Self-Evidence”
    Veritas – Revista de Filosofia da Pucrs 54 (2): 41-47. 2009.