Megan Jane Laverty

The reconstruction of philosophy, of education, and of social ideals and methods thus go hand in hand.In society today, we are inundated with reports on climate change, nuclear accidents, sectarian violence, terrorism, school shootings, police brutality, shrill mainstream politics, dire poverty, civil wars, and migration crises. As we observe their proliferation and escalation, it can feel as if we lack not only solutions to these social ills, but, even more fundamentally, ways to communicate about and make sense of their conditions and consequences. Unfortunately, our failure to parse these events will not make them go away. To the contrary, their full impact will be endured for generations to come. As with other...

Contemporary educational theorists focus on the significance of Dewey’s conception of experience, learning-by-doing and collateral learning. In this essay, I reexamine the chapters of Dewey’s Democracy and Education, that pertain to thinking and highlight their relationship to Dewey’s How We Think: A Restatement of the Relation of Reflective Thinking in the Educative Process—another book written explicitly for teachers. In How We Think Dewey explains that nothing is more important in education than the formation of concepts. Concepts introduce permanency into an otherwise impermanent world. He defines concepts as established meanings, or intellectual deposits used to found a better understanding of new experiences; they are what makes any experience educationally worthwhile. Dewey accuses traditional and progressive education of failing to appropriately form concepts in students. His position is that concepts are formed and transformed by experience, reflection and activity. He argues that the individual makes a personalized use of concepts for which he or she requires: continuity of experience, exposure to new or surprising possibilities, and sustained communication with others—all of which are discussed at length in Democracy & Education. I conclude with the practical recommendation that K-12 schools introduce philosophy into the curriculum. Philosophy not only invites students to engage their concepts in a reflective manner, but it also provides a valuable resource for that engagement. Most if not all of philosophy’s canonical texts are dedicated to analyzing such concepts as beauty, friendship, love and justice. The introduction of philosophy in K-12 education would, I suggest, offer a correction to both traditional and progressive education.

Do the humanities have a future? In the face of an increased emphasis on the so-called practical applicability of education, some educators worry that the presence of humanistic study in schools and universities is gravely threatened. In the short-term, scholars have rallied to defend the humanities by demonstrating how they do, in fact, advance our practical interests. Martha Nussbaum, for example, argues that the humanities uniquely support democratic citizenship by cultivating critical thinking and narrative imagination — two skills needed for the development of sympathetic and autonomous judgment. Defending the humanities in this manner, however, puts practitioners of the humanities in an impossible position. In this essay, Megan Laverty explains that while arguments such as Nussbaum's, which defend the instrumental value of the humanities, are persuasive and strategic, their use is double-edged. They belie the fact that the humanities are valuable for their own sake. Such arguments imply that the humanities derive their value from their ability to provide extrinsic benefits such as critical thinking and narrative imagination. Moreover, they can prevent individuals from discovering that the value of the humanities is revealed over time and from the inside out. In fact, having to answer the question of why the humanities matter puts us in an impossible position precisely because humanistic study is what Laverty describes, drawing upon the work of Talbot Brewer and R. F. Holland, as a form of dialectical activity: one in which the activity's constitutive ideals and internal goods are progressively clarified by means of the individual's ongoing engagement in the activity itself. Having redescribed the humanities as intrinsically valuable, Laverty goes on to distinguish humanistic study from other forms of dialectical activity, arguing that the humanities call upon students to imagine alternative linguistic and conceptual possibilities — thereby connecting us with others. It is in the pursuit of this question about the nature of our humanity — not its answer, but the question itself — that the meaning of humanistic study continues, indefinitely, to unfold

The perceived importance of a global experience in higher education is hard to underestimate. University presidents are known to boast of their “percentage,” or the proportion of undergraduates who study abroad. At least part of the rationale is a cosmopolitan one: an essential part of being acknowledged as educated derives in part from an appreciation of different cultures and development of worldliness. The expectation is that a global experience will stand out as an enduring memorial of an encounter with others. These experiences are edified in resumes and narrated with veneration, further illuminating their cultural importance as coming-of-age rituals, particularly among a striding upper middle class...

Alasdair MacIntyre and Paul Ricoeur both argue for the narrative unity of human life and see this as a basis for ethical theory. Differences aside, they argue that to conceive of one's life as a whole is to tell a story about it, and that, as the good life is the best possible living out of this whole, telling a story about one's life, is a founding move in the good life. Alternatively, Raimond Gaita argues that meaning bestows upon human life a distinctive kind of unity, which he refers to as the narrative unity of a life for the reason that we uniquely disclose the meaning of a life in a story about that life. He argues that the narrative unity of a life is connected with an ethically conditioned consciousness because ethics deepens our sense of the meaning of life. Whilst I agree with Gaita as to both the distinctive unity that meaning confers upon a life, and the connection between the meaning of a life and an ethically conditioned consciousness, I argue that this unity is better characterized as an expressive unity which can be illustrated through the operation of metaphor . I develop my argument by firstly drawing on the resemblance between Gaita's moral philosophy and what Charles Taylor refers to as the expressivism' of Romanticism, and secondly reading E. Annie Proulx's prize winning novel, The Shipping News. What emerges from my reading of The Shipping News with respect to the meaning of a life is, that it is the transformation of the narrative unity of a life that is crucial, and that this transformation is connected with metaphor. The connections that emerge in the first part of the thesis between: narrative unity, metaphor and ethical consciousness open up possibilities for a fresh approach to the connections between aesthetic and ethical consciousness in some central themes in Immanuel Kant's Critique of Judgement. I offer a reading of these central themes in Kant's Critique of Judgement which highlights the connections between narrative unity, the structure of judgement and the unity of consciousness

In this essay, I demonstrate the value of the Bildungsroman for philosophy of education on the grounds that these narratives raise and explore educational questions. I focus on a short story in the Bildungsroman tradition, Thomas Hardy’s “A Mere Interlude”. This story describes the maturation of its heroine by narrating a series of events that transform her understanding of what it means to lead a human life. I connect her conceptual shift with two paradigms for leading a human life. One stresses the exercise of distinct human capacities like agency and autonomy, whereas the other stresses human vulnerability to fate or moral luck. I conclude by offering important reasons for educators to adopt the later paradigm over the former

Throughout history, philosophers have reflected on educational questions. Some of their ideas emerged in defense of, or opposition to, skepticism about the possibility of formal teaching and learning. These philosophers include Plato, Augustine, St Thomas Aquinas, Søren Kierkegaard, Martin Heidegger, and Ludwig Wittgenstein. Together, they comprise a tradition that establishes the impossibility of instruction and the imperative to undertake it. The value of this tradition for contemporary education is that it redirects attention away from performance assessments and learning outcomes to the ethical, aesthetic, and metaphysical dimensions of schooling. I argue that philosophers of education are uniquely responsible for teaching this tradition so that instruction might be undertaken in the right spirit. To this end, my essay is divided into three parts. In the first part, I explain why instructional skepticism has not been prominent in philosophy of education. I follow up, in the second part, by clarifying my choice of the term ‘instruction.’ In the third part, I sketch the instructional philosophies that ‘book-end’ this tradition: those of Plato and Wittgenstein.

In this essay Megan J. Laverty argues that Jean-Jacques Rousseau's conception of humane communication and his proposal for teaching it have implications for our understanding of the role of listening in education. She develops this argument through a close reading of Rousseau's most substantial work on education, Emile: Or, On Education. Laverty elucidates Rousseau's philosophy of communication, beginning with his taxonomy of the three voices—articulate, melodic, and accentuated—illustrating the ways in which they both enhance and obfuscate understanding. Next, Laverty provides an account of Rousseau's philosophical psychology, with specific reference to amour-propre and amour de soi. Listening plays a central role in Rousseau's philosophy of communication, Laverty maintains, because it is in the act of listening that humans fulfill, or fail to fulfill, the imperative that we seek to understand others

In close collaboration with the late Matthew Lipman, Ann Margaret Sharp pioneered the theory and practice of ‘the community of philosophical inquiry’ (CPI) as a way of practicing ‘Philosophy for Children’ and prepared thousands of philosophers and teachers throughout the world in this practice. In Community of Inquiry with Ann Margaret Sharp represents a long-awaited and much-needed anthology of Sharp’s insightful and influential scholarship, bringing her enduring legacy to new generations of academics, postgraduate students and researchers in the fields of education, philosophy, philosophy of education, Philosophy for Children and philosophy of childhood.　 Sharp developed a unique perspective on the interdependence of education, philosophy, personhood and community that remains influential in many parts of the world. This perspective was shaped not only by Sharp’s work in philosophy and education, but also by her avid studies in literature, feminism, aesthetic theory and ecumenical spirituality. Containing valuable contributions from senior figures in the fields in which Sharp produced her most focused scholarship, the chapters in this book present a critical overview of how Sharp’s ideas relate to education, philosophy of education, and the Philosophy for Children movement as a whole. The historical and philosophical nature of this collection means that it will be a vital resource for philosophers and educators. It should also be of great interest to teacher educators and those involved in the study of pragmatism and feminism, as well as the history of education across the globe, particularly in the United States of America.

I argue that philosophy has a dual role in teacher education: first, it prompts teachers to take individual responsibility for and become more reflective about the values expressed by their teaching practices so as to enable them to teach with greater authenticity; second, it provides teachers with a disciplinary technique that is useful in the facilitation of student reflection and dialogue so as to enable students to think and live more authentically. In this paper, I focus on the former and suggest that because teaching practices are expressions of values, teachers need to become more aware of competing conception of the human good(s)—including their own—and how these inform their relationship to disciplinary expertise, educational institutions, and teaching. I argue that authentic teaching necessitates: a conviction that individuals are improved, as human beings, by what it is they study; a deepening engagement with what this conviction means; and a commitment to its truth by way of how one engages with one’s discipline and students. It is in this regard that I explore Plato’s dialogue Gorgias, in particular, the example of Socrates, his conversations with Callicles, as well as his distinction between sophistry/pandering and educating/healing. In the final part of the paper, I argue that, assuming I am correct about the necessity and value of teaching authentically, philosophy—conceived of as honest, rigorous, ongoing, open-ended and dialogical engagement with our convictions—should be an integral part of any good teacher education program.

Richard Stanley Peters appreciates the centrality of concepts for everyday life, however, he fails to recognize their pedagogical dimension. He distinguishes concepts employed at the first-order (our ordinary language-use) from second-order conceptual clarification (conducted exclusively by academically trained philosophers). This distinction serves to elevate the discipline of philosophy at the expense of our ordinary language-use. I revisit this distinction and argue that our first-order use of concepts encompasses second-order concern. Individuals learn and teach concepts as they use them. Conceptual understanding is an obligation that all individuals, and not just academically trained philosophers, must fulfil. I conclude that the role of philosophy in education is to provide a conversational context for the pedagogical dimension of concepts. I draw upon the philosophies of Cora Diamond, Stephen Mulhall, Iris Murdoch and Rush Rhees.

If philosophical dialogue is broadly defined by concepts that are central to our lives and essentially contested, then philosophical dialogue is ethically valuable because it engages participants in the kind of communal and reasonable deliberation necessary for ethical life. Discourse Ethics acknowledges the instrumental value of philosophical dialogue for the making of ethical judgments. I defend the intrinsically ethical value of philosophical dialogue on the grounds that it potentially orients us towards that which transcends human subjectivity in an effort to include it (which could also be called “otherness,” “alterity,” “Thou,” or “the unthinkable”). If respect is the modality of reason, then love is the modality of the transcendent, and, as with respect, love is recognizable by the virtues that express it. These include faith, grace, naivety, irony, and genius. My observation that these qualities are more readily found in children than adults suggests that children are particularly suited to philosophical dialogue because they can engage in it with an appreciation of its value and limits.