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26Causal dispositions, aspectual shape and intentionalityBehavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1): 196-197. 1993.
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6A Consideration of Modifications to the Multiplying AccountPhilosophy Research Archives 11 141-154. 1985.A sequel to “A Problem of Motivation for Multipliers”, SJPhil 20, 209-24. It is argued that Goldman’s account of act and event individuation cannot be modified to escape criticisms previously raised. Augmentation generation and the counterfactual basis of the account are featured inthe discussion.
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42Chisholm on expressions for intentional relationsPhilosophical Studies 53 (1). 1988.THE PAPER IS A FOOTNOTE TO C B MARTIN AND KARL PFEIFER, "INTENTIONALITY AND THE NON-PSYCHOLOGICAL," "PHIL PHENOMENOL RES" 46 (1986) 531-554. A CHARACTERIZATION OF INTENTIONALITY NOT CONSIDERED THEREIN IS SHOWN, NONETHELESS, ALSO TO FAIL TO DISTINGUISH BETWEEN INTENTIONAL STATES AND MERELY PHYSICAL CAUSAL CAPACITIES.
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162A Short Vindication of Reichenbach's «Event-Splitting»Logique Et Analyse 31 (121-122): 143-152. 1988.In "The Logical Form of Action Sentences" Donald Davidson argues that Hans Reichenbach's analysis of action and event sentences is "radically defective." I show that Reichenbach can easily deflect Davidson's objections, thus leaving their respective accounts largely comparable.
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459Intentionality and the non-psychologicalPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 46 (4): 531-54. 1986.IT IS SHOWN IN DETAIL THAT RECENT ACCOUNTS FAIL TO DISTINGUISH BETWEEN INTENTIONALITY AND MERELY CAUSALLY DISPOSITIONAL STATES OF INORGANIC PHYSICAL OBJECTS—A QUICK ROAD TO PANPSYCHISM. THE CLEAR NEED TO MAKE SUCH A DISTINCTION GIVES DIRECTION FOR FUTURE WORK. A BEGINNING IS MADE TOWARD PROVIDING SUCH AN ACCOUNT.
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158Philosophy outside the academy: The role of philosophy in people-oriented professions and the prospects for philosophical counselingInquiry: Critical Thinking Across the Disciplines 14 (2): 58-69. 1994.I suggest that the current interest in philosophical counseling is comparable to the situation in the Sixties when many philosophy graduates entertained false hopes of nonacademic philosophical employment. I describe my own experience as a welfare worker, in the course of which my philosophical training proved useful in various ways; I maintain, though, that there was nothing especially philosophical in this. I then consider some ways in which philosophical counseling might be distinctively phil…Read more
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24A Note on the v-Elimination RuleCogito 4 (1): 69-70. 1990.The paper reports that the explanations of the v-elimination rule in three commonly used introductory logic textbooks are misleading to students and can result in invalid inferences.
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33Thomson on events and the causal criterionPhilosophical Studies 39 (3). 1981.JUDITH THOMSON, IN "ACTS AND OTHER EVENTS", PURPORTS TO PROVIDE A COUNTER-EXAMPLE TO DONALD DAVIDSON'S CAUSAL CRITERION OF EVENT IDENTITY. IT IS SHOWN THAT ONCE A CERTAIN ASSUMPTION MADE BY THOMSON IS REPLACED BY A MORE PLAUSIBLE VARIANT, HER EXAMPLE IS NO LONGER A COUNTER-EXAMPLE TO DAVIDSON'S CRITERION.
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33More on Morreall on LaughterDialogue 26 (1): 161-. 1987.ADDITIONAL ARGUMENTS ARE MUSTERED AGAINST MORREALL'S CONTENTION THAT BEING EFFECTED BY A PLEASANT PSYCHOLOGICAL "SHIFT" IS AN ESSENTIAL PROPERTY OF LAUGHTER.
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121DM Armstrong and Norman Malcolm, Consciousness and Causality Reviewed byPhilosophy in Review 5 (7): 279-281. 1985.
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Causal capacities and the inherently funnyConceptus: Zeitschrift Fur Philosophie 27 (70): 149-159. 1994.It is widely held that nothing is funny per se, but only funny relative to the subjective responses of some person or social group. However, I argue that this view does not square with our humor-appraisal discourse, whose intelligibility seems to require that funniness be an objective matter. I then sketch a "causal capacity" account of funniness which explains how such objectivity is possible. *** Nach einer weitverbreiteten Ansicht ist nichts witzig an sich, sondern nur witzig in bezug auf …Read more
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259Actions and Other Events: The Unifier-multiplier ControversyPeter Lang. 1989.This book is a general defence of Donald Davidson's and G.E.M. Anscombe's 'unifying' approach to the individuation of actions and other events against objections raised by Alvin I. Goldman and others. It is argued that, ironically, Goldman's rival 'multiplying' account is itself vulnerable to these objections, whereas Davidson's account survives them. Although claims that the unifier-multiplier dispute is not really substantive are shown to be unfounded, some room for limited agreement over the …Read more
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338Some by the Way Remarks on Wreen's 'By' WaysAnalysis 48 (2). 1988.WREEN'S PROPOSAL FOR AVOIDING CAUSAL LOOPS IN THE DESCRIPTION OF ACTION IS, I ARGUE, ITSELF LOOPY.
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48A problem of motivation for multipliersSouthern Journal of Philosophy 20 (2): 209-224. 1982.GOLDMAN HAS RAISED THREE MAIN OBJECTIONS AGAINST DAVIDSON'S UNIFYING APPROACH TO THE INDIVIDUATION OF ACTIONS AND EVENTS. THESE OBJECTIONS—A CAUSAL OBJECTION, A RELATIONAL OBJECTION, AND A TEMPORAL OBJECTION—ARE TAKEN AS MOTIVATION FOR HIS OWN MULTIPLYING ACCOUNT. IT IS DEMONSTRATED THAT GOLDMAN'S ACCOUNT IS ITSELF NOT ADEQUATE TO THESE OBJECTIONS.
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321Review – Correct English: Reality or Myth? (review)Metapsychology Online Reviews 21 (10). 2017.Geoffrey Marnell presents philosophical arguments favoring grammatical descriptivism over grammatical prescriptivism. I argue that his explanation and defence of descriptivism reveal that his descriptivism is itself prescriptivist.
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39"When" In DoubtCogito 5 (1): 46-49. 1991.Some problems are raised regarding the interpretation of the temporal sentence connective "when" in introductory logic courses.
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19On BullshitHarry G. Frankfurt Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005, 67 pp., $9.95 (review)Dialogue 45 (3): 617-620. 2006.
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166D.M. Armstrong And Norman Malcolm, Consciousness And Causality (review)Philosophy in Review 5 279-281. 1985.
Wantirna South, VIC, Australia
Areas of Specialization
Metaphysics |
Philosophy of Mind |
Aesthetics |
Areas of Interest
Aesthetics |
Logic and Philosophy of Logic |
20th Century Philosophy |