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Causal capacities and the inherently funnyConceptus: Zeitschrift Fur Philosophie 27 (70): 149-159. 1994.It is widely held that nothing is funny per se, but only funny relative to the subjective responses of some person or social group. However, I argue that this view does not square with our humor-appraisal discourse, whose intelligibility seems to require that funniness be an objective matter. I then sketch a "causal capacity" account of funniness which explains how such objectivity is possible. *** Nach einer weitverbreiteten Ansicht ist nichts witzig an sich, sondern nur witzig in bezug auf …Read more
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283Actions and Other Events: The Unifier-multiplier ControversyPeter Lang. 1989.This book is a general defence of Donald Davidson's and G.E.M. Anscombe's 'unifying' approach to the individuation of actions and other events against objections raised by Alvin I. Goldman and others. It is argued that, ironically, Goldman's rival 'multiplying' account is itself vulnerable to these objections, whereas Davidson's account survives them. Although claims that the unifier-multiplier dispute is not really substantive are shown to be unfounded, some room for limited agreement over the …Read more
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369Some by the Way Remarks on Wreen's 'By' WaysAnalysis 48 (2). 1988.WREEN'S PROPOSAL FOR AVOIDING CAUSAL LOOPS IN THE DESCRIPTION OF ACTION IS, I ARGUE, ITSELF LOOPY.
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50A problem of motivation for multipliersSouthern Journal of Philosophy 20 (2): 209-224. 1982.GOLDMAN HAS RAISED THREE MAIN OBJECTIONS AGAINST DAVIDSON'S UNIFYING APPROACH TO THE INDIVIDUATION OF ACTIONS AND EVENTS. THESE OBJECTIONS—A CAUSAL OBJECTION, A RELATIONAL OBJECTION, AND A TEMPORAL OBJECTION—ARE TAKEN AS MOTIVATION FOR HIS OWN MULTIPLYING ACCOUNT. IT IS DEMONSTRATED THAT GOLDMAN'S ACCOUNT IS ITSELF NOT ADEQUATE TO THESE OBJECTIONS.
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40"When" In DoubtCogito 5 (1): 46-49. 1991.Some problems are raised regarding the interpretation of the temporal sentence connective "when" in introductory logic courses.
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315Review – Correct English: Reality or Myth? (review)Metapsychology Online Reviews 21 (10). 2017.Geoffrey Marnell presents philosophical arguments favoring grammatical descriptivism over grammatical prescriptivism. I argue that his explanation and defence of descriptivism reveal that his descriptivism is itself prescriptivist.
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21On BullshitHarry G. Frankfurt Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005, 67 pp., $9.95 (review)Dialogue 45 (3): 617-620. 2006.
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171D.M. Armstrong And Norman Malcolm, Consciousness And Causality (review)Philosophy in Review 5 279-281. 1985.
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35Causal dispositions + sensory experience = intentionalityBehavioral and Brain Sciences 10 (4): 757. 1987.
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18A Consideration of Modifications to the Multiplying AccountPhilosophy Research Archives 11 141-154. 1985.A sequel to “A Problem of Motivation for Multipliers”, SJPhil 20, 209-24. It is argued that Goldman’s account of act and event individuation cannot be modified to escape criticisms previously raised. Augmentation generation and the counterfactual basis of the account are featured inthe discussion.
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51Searle, strong AI, and two ways of sorting cucumbersJournal of Philosophical Research 17 347-50. 1992.This paper defends Searle against the misconstrual of a key claim of “Minds, Brains, and Programs” and goes on to explain why an attempt to turn the tables by using the Chinese Room to argue for intentionality in computers fails
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44Laughter, freshness, and titillationInquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 40 (3). 1997.Robert C. Roberts's suggestion that the conditions for laughter at humor (e.g. jokes) can best be captured with a notion of freshness, as opposed to surprise, is pursued. The relationship freshness has to setup and surprise is clarified, and the place of freshness within a larger system of structuring metaphors is alluded to. The question of whether freshness can also cover laughter at the nonhumorous (e.g. tickling) is then taken up, it being determined that such coverage is possible but uneven…Read more
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37Yu guang‐Yuan's two categories of matterJournal of Chinese Philosophy 12 (1): 57-62. 1985.IN "THE FUNCTION OF CONSCIOUSNESS ON MATTER", "CHINESE STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY" 12 (1981) PAGES 38-54, YU CLAIMS THAT IN ORDER TO UNDERSTAND HOW CONSCIOUSNESS CAN AFFECT THE PHYSICAL WORLD, TWO CATEGORIES OF MATTER MUST BE DISTINGUISHED. I ARGUE THAT YU'S DISTINCTION HAS NO EXPLANATORY FORCE AND, MOREOVER, IS AT ODDS WITH HIS MATERIALIST ASSUMPTIONS. I THEN SUGGEST OTHER STRATEGIES.
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3856On Bullshit Harry G. Frankfurt Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005, 67 pp., $9.95 (review)Dialogue 45 (3): 617-620. 2006.According to Frankfurt’s analysis, bullshitting and lying necessarily differ in intention. I argue contra Frankfurt that (i) bullshitting can be lying, and that (ii) bullshitting need involve neither misrepresentation nor intention to deceive. My discussion suggests that bullshit is not capturable by a simple formula and that, although illuminating, Frankfurt’s analysis is limited to one paradigm.
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27Causal dispositions, aspectual shape and intentionalityBehavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1): 196-197. 1993.
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6A Consideration of Modifications to the Multiplying AccountPhilosophy Research Archives 11 141-154. 1985.A sequel to “A Problem of Motivation for Multipliers”, SJPhil 20, 209-24. It is argued that Goldman’s account of act and event individuation cannot be modified to escape criticisms previously raised. Augmentation generation and the counterfactual basis of the account are featured inthe discussion.
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43Chisholm on expressions for intentional relationsPhilosophical Studies 53 (1). 1988.THE PAPER IS A FOOTNOTE TO C B MARTIN AND KARL PFEIFER, "INTENTIONALITY AND THE NON-PSYCHOLOGICAL," "PHIL PHENOMENOL RES" 46 (1986) 531-554. A CHARACTERIZATION OF INTENTIONALITY NOT CONSIDERED THEREIN IS SHOWN, NONETHELESS, ALSO TO FAIL TO DISTINGUISH BETWEEN INTENTIONAL STATES AND MERELY PHYSICAL CAUSAL CAPACITIES.
Wantirna South, VIC, Australia
Areas of Specialization
Metaphysics |
Philosophy of Mind |
Aesthetics |
Areas of Interest
Aesthetics |
Logic and Philosophy of Logic |
20th Century Philosophy |