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49Searle, strong AI, and two ways of sorting cucumbersJournal of Philosophical Research 17 347-50. 1992.This paper defends Searle against the misconstrual of a key claim of “Minds, Brains, and Programs” and goes on to explain why an attempt to turn the tables by using the Chinese Room to argue for intentionality in computers fails
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48A problem of motivation for multipliersSouthern Journal of Philosophy 20 (2): 209-224. 1982.GOLDMAN HAS RAISED THREE MAIN OBJECTIONS AGAINST DAVIDSON'S UNIFYING APPROACH TO THE INDIVIDUATION OF ACTIONS AND EVENTS. THESE OBJECTIONS—A CAUSAL OBJECTION, A RELATIONAL OBJECTION, AND A TEMPORAL OBJECTION—ARE TAKEN AS MOTIVATION FOR HIS OWN MULTIPLYING ACCOUNT. IT IS DEMONSTRATED THAT GOLDMAN'S ACCOUNT IS ITSELF NOT ADEQUATE TO THESE OBJECTIONS.
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42Chisholm on expressions for intentional relationsPhilosophical Studies 53 (1). 1988.THE PAPER IS A FOOTNOTE TO C B MARTIN AND KARL PFEIFER, "INTENTIONALITY AND THE NON-PSYCHOLOGICAL," "PHIL PHENOMENOL RES" 46 (1986) 531-554. A CHARACTERIZATION OF INTENTIONALITY NOT CONSIDERED THEREIN IS SHOWN, NONETHELESS, ALSO TO FAIL TO DISTINGUISH BETWEEN INTENTIONAL STATES AND MERELY PHYSICAL CAUSAL CAPACITIES.
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39"When" In DoubtCogito 5 (1): 46-49. 1991.Some problems are raised regarding the interpretation of the temporal sentence connective "when" in introductory logic courses.
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38Laughter, freshness, and titillationInquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 40 (3). 1997.Robert C. Roberts's suggestion that the conditions for laughter at humor (e.g. jokes) can best be captured with a notion of freshness, as opposed to surprise, is pursued. The relationship freshness has to setup and surprise is clarified, and the place of freshness within a larger system of structuring metaphors is alluded to. The question of whether freshness can also cover laughter at the nonhumorous (e.g. tickling) is then taken up, it being determined that such coverage is possible but uneven…Read more
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34Causal dispositions + sensory experience = intentionalityBehavioral and Brain Sciences 10 (4): 757. 1987.
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34Yu guang‐Yuan's two categories of matterJournal of Chinese Philosophy 12 (1): 57-62. 1985.IN "THE FUNCTION OF CONSCIOUSNESS ON MATTER", "CHINESE STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY" 12 (1981) PAGES 38-54, YU CLAIMS THAT IN ORDER TO UNDERSTAND HOW CONSCIOUSNESS CAN AFFECT THE PHYSICAL WORLD, TWO CATEGORIES OF MATTER MUST BE DISTINGUISHED. I ARGUE THAT YU'S DISTINCTION HAS NO EXPLANATORY FORCE AND, MOREOVER, IS AT ODDS WITH HIS MATERIALIST ASSUMPTIONS. I THEN SUGGEST OTHER STRATEGIES.
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33Searle, Strong AI, and Two Ways of Sorting CucumbersJournal of Philosophical Research 17 347-350. 1992.This paper defends Searle against the misconstrual of a key claim of “Minds, Brains, and Programs” and goes on to explain why an attempt to turn the tables by using the Chinese Room to argue for intentionality in computers fails.
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33Thomson on events and the causal criterionPhilosophical Studies 39 (3). 1981.JUDITH THOMSON, IN "ACTS AND OTHER EVENTS", PURPORTS TO PROVIDE A COUNTER-EXAMPLE TO DONALD DAVIDSON'S CAUSAL CRITERION OF EVENT IDENTITY. IT IS SHOWN THAT ONCE A CERTAIN ASSUMPTION MADE BY THOMSON IS REPLACED BY A MORE PLAUSIBLE VARIANT, HER EXAMPLE IS NO LONGER A COUNTER-EXAMPLE TO DAVIDSON'S CRITERION.
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33More on Morreall on LaughterDialogue 26 (1): 161-. 1987.ADDITIONAL ARGUMENTS ARE MUSTERED AGAINST MORREALL'S CONTENTION THAT BEING EFFECTED BY A PLEASANT PSYCHOLOGICAL "SHIFT" IS AN ESSENTIAL PROPERTY OF LAUGHTER.
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25Causal dispositions, aspectual shape and intentionalityBehavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1): 196-197. 1993.
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24A Note on the v-Elimination RuleCogito 4 (1): 69-70. 1990.The paper reports that the explanations of the v-elimination rule in three commonly used introductory logic textbooks are misleading to students and can result in invalid inferences.
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18On BullshitHarry G. Frankfurt Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005, 67 pp., $9.95 (review)Dialogue 45 (3): 617-620. 2006.
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17Events, individuation, and identityDissertation, University of Calgary. 1980.Bibliography: p. 199-206.
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17A Consideration of Modifications to the Multiplying AccountPhilosophy Research Archives 11 141-154. 1985.A sequel to “A Problem of Motivation for Multipliers”, SJPhil 20, 209-24. It is argued that Goldman’s account of act and event individuation cannot be modified to escape criticisms previously raised. Augmentation generation and the counterfactual basis of the account are featured inthe discussion.
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6A Consideration of Modifications to the Multiplying AccountPhilosophy Research Archives 11 141-154. 1985.A sequel to “A Problem of Motivation for Multipliers”, SJPhil 20, 209-24. It is argued that Goldman’s account of act and event individuation cannot be modified to escape criticisms previously raised. Augmentation generation and the counterfactual basis of the account are featured inthe discussion.
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2Laughter and pleasureHumor: International Journal of Humor Research 7 (2): 157-172. 1994.Karl Pfeifer counters the thesis that laughter and pleasure are intimately connected with one another, and addresses the thesis of John Morreall (1982) that a pleasant psyohological shift is a causally necessary condition for laughter. A variety of examples suggesting that laughter does not have to have pleasure as its causal antecedent are presented. Imitative, nervous, hysterical, physiogenic, and acerbic laughter suggest that it is neither incoherent nor implausible to consider laughter as be…Read more
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1Mothering wordsHumor: International Journal of Humor Research 6 (2): 223-225. 1993.This is a response to Mark Turner’s claim that Saddam Hussein’s use of the phrase “mother of all battles” provoked the widespread use of the “mother of” idiom as a metaphorical association of motherhood with efficiency and power. I suggest a cruder, less salutary, but more plausible interpretation of that use.
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Causal capacities and the inherently funnyConceptus: Zeitschrift Fur Philosophie 27 (70): 149-159. 1994.It is widely held that nothing is funny per se, but only funny relative to the subjective responses of some person or social group. However, I argue that this view does not square with our humor-appraisal discourse, whose intelligibility seems to require that funniness be an objective matter. I then sketch a "causal capacity" account of funniness which explains how such objectivity is possible. *** Nach einer weitverbreiteten Ansicht ist nichts witzig an sich, sondern nur witzig in bezug auf …Read more
Wantirna South, VIC, Australia
Areas of Specialization
Metaphysics |
Philosophy of Mind |
Aesthetics |
Areas of Interest
Aesthetics |
Logic and Philosophy of Logic |
20th Century Philosophy |